Euromaidan and the Role of Protest in Democracy (original) (raw)
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Impact of Repression on Mobilization: The Case of the Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine
Social Justice Journal, 2020
Although scholars of contentious politics generally acknowledge the importance of repression in conditioning the development of social movements, up to the present date there has been little consensus regarding its precise impact. In this article, I analyze the impact of repression of the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine on protesters’ mobilization in the oblasts (regions). Being driven and conditioned by police violence, the Euromaidan campaign lends itself as a suitable case for analysis. In different regions and at various stages of the protest, repression caused both backfire and deterrence. To unpack the effect of repression, I rely on regionally disaggregated daily protest event data from the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Dataset (UPCD). As my analysis shows, repression had an inverse U-shaped impact: low levels of repression fostered mobilization, whereas high levels of repression suppressed it. I also show the regional variation in responses to repression, which was concentrated in the capital. Where the Euromaidan protests had broader support, the protesters were more likely to respond to repression in the capital with more protests. Conversely, in regions where the campaign was unpopular, repression in the capital had a chilling effect and resulted in deterrence.
Protest, 2021
This paper compares the mass protests in Ukraine (the Euromaidan of 2013–14) and Belarus–2020 in the recent decade. The author tests the hypothesis that social movements successfully challenge the ruling groups if protests are sufficiently supported by Western governments, if autocratic regimes are not strong and consolidated, and if the regional tendencies are supportive of the protesters’ cause. Based on the comparative analysis of the two cases, the author concludes that the hypothesis is in general correct for Eastern Europe, but should be more nuanced: it should pay attention to the external influences of both Western states and Russia; it should note that the strength of an autocracy may create new opportunities for the challengers; and that it should take into account the changing nature of regional tendencies, which can be of democratization, autocratization, or some mixture.
The "Euromaidan," Democracy, and Political Values in Ukraine
This paper examines the political system, attitudes towards democracy, and their determinants in Ukraine before, during and after the “Euromaidan.” The research question is as follows: What type of political system has emerged in Ukraine since the “Euromaidan?” The related research question is to what extent political values in Ukraine are supportive of democracy. This study is based on theories of democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian political systems, democratization, and political culture. A number of major survey-based academic studies, conducted primarily before the “Orange Revolution,” concluded that mass political values in Ukraine were generally supportive of democracy, and that they did not preclude emergence of a consolidated democracy. Many previous studies presented the “Orange Revolution” as a democratic revolution that transformed Ukraine from semi-democracy or competitive authoritarianism to democracy. Democracy was often regarded as the most likely future path of political development of this post-Soviet state. The Western and Ukrainian media, the Western governments, and the Maidan government in Ukraine also generally presented the “Euromaidan” as a democratic revolution that overthrew the authoritarian government as a result of mass peaceful protests. However, there is lack of academic studies of the political system and democratic values in Ukraine since the “Euromaidan.” This paper compares political systems in Ukraine before, during and after the “Euromaidan.” It uses data from different waves of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems surveys, the Pew Global Attitudes surveys, and the World Values Surveys to examine public attitudes towards democracy in Ukraine before and after the “Euromaidan.” It also compares democratic and authoritarian preferences in Ukraine with those in Poland and Russia, two similar post-communist countries with differing political cultures and divergent trajectories of democratization. Finally, this study implements multiple regression analysis of the determinants of attitudes towards democracy. It analyzes effects of political party preferences, regional historical legacies, religion, ethnicity, and other factors on pro-democracy views. The study also discusses implications of its findings for the prospects for liberal democracy in Ukraine and for the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.
Maidan Past and Present (comparing the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2013/14 EuroMaidan in Ukraine)
2015
At first the EuroMaidan, seemed like something we have seen before: the ‘Orange Revolution’. We were brought back to 23 November 2004, when observers of Ukrainian politics were shocked when they witnessed a sea of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, joined activists and opposition party members in a moment of mass mobilization. While Ukraine had previously experienced several smaller protest events, such as the 1986 Chornobyl disaster protests, the 1991 Revolution on the Granite, and the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests, the sheer size of the 2004 protests and the fact that participation quickly shifted to a majority made of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians was unprecedented (Onuch 2014a). First heralded as a democratic awakening and the first step to Europeanization, but after the election of Viktor Yanukovych (the villain of the ‘Orange Revolution’) as president in 2010, academics agreed that for a variety of reasons, including protest fatigue, Ukraine would not see another mass-‐‑mobilization any time soon (Meirowitz and Tucker 2013). Thus, when the November 2013 protests grew to 800,000, political scientists had to go back to the drawing board. It was happening again, and again they did not see it coming. While it seemed like déjà vu, it was very different and not least because it was happening with the events of 2004 as the precedent. This chapter’s aim is to analyse and contextualizes the EuroMaidan as a critical case of mass protest, by placing it in comparative reference to the ‘Orange Revolution’. First, the chapter will briefly outline the data used. Second, the chapter will highlight some key writing on mobilization and activism in Ukraine and identify potential contributions of this analysis to the literature. The majority of the text will assess the EuroMaidan mobilization. Employing interview and focus groups data collected by the author, we will be able to contrast and compare the parameters and trajectories of two protest waves (duration, location, and geographical diffusion); the central actors involved in the mobilization process and their main claims. At each step highlighting the convergence and divergence between the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations. Finally, once the main boundaries of the mobilization have been mapped out, the chapter will address the recent focus among the media and social scientists alike on: the rise of the right, the rise of violence, and the ‘new’ role of social media in the EuroMaidan mobilizations. This initial analysis seeks to provide a blue print for larger studies of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and in the conclusion will highlight key hypotheses for future testing.
Using the political process model of social movements (Tilly, Tarrow, McAdam), paper analyzes the origins, dynamics and outcome of the protest movement in Ukraine (December, 2000 – March, 2001). Among structural preconditions of the protest, the paper points to increasingly authoritarian nature of Ukraine’s political system and the absence of an organized democratic opposition to the regime. Transitory opportunities for popular mobilization included division within Ukraine’s ruling elite and the emergence of an influential political actor allied with protesters. Finally, the murder of an independent journalist and public release of evidence implicating top Ukrainian officials in this crime provided emotional impetus for the nationwide protest. Development of the protest movement is viewed as a function of the tactical interaction between protesters, authorities and other political and social actors. Thus, authors differentiate between three stages of the protest cycle in Ukraine. In the incipient stage (1) all the main political actors experienced uncertainty regarding their interests and strategies, which provided protesters with considerable power leverage. During the reactive stage (2), protest diffused to the regions, the authorities tried various techniques to neutralize the protesters, while other political actors looked for ways to use the protest action to advance their interests. The escalation stage (3) of the protest was marked by high public mobilization, effective counters on the part of the authorities, and co-optation of the protest movement by emerging political opposition. Demobilization of Ukraine’s protest movement came as a result of a combination of internal and external factors, including lack of new protest forms, use of violence by protesters, renewed unity within the ruling elite and altered political context of insurgency. Paper traces the movement’s impact by focusing on changed societal attitudes, elite opinion and patterns of the political process in Ukraine in the aftermath of protest actions.
Civic Awakening: The impact of Euromaidan on Ukraine's Politics and Society
FRIDE Working Paper, 2014
The MH17 air-crash disaster of July 17 is likely to have a severe impact on the development of the Donbas conflict in Ukraine as well as on EU-Russia relations. Written before the tragedy, this FRIDE working paper argues that the ‘Euromaidan’ protests, that occurred between December 2013 and February 2014, have provoked two fundamental changes that give grounds for cautious optimism about Ukraine’s incipient transition to democracy. First, after more than two decades of civic apathy and low impact, Ukrainian civil society seems to be on the rise. Second, state-society relations are being reconfigured, with citizens demanding greater oversight of and accountability from state institutions, and civic activists pushing for a greater role in policy-making. These new societal and political trends should be further supported by the European Union.
Post-Soviet Affairs
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Democracy in Ukraine and its Current Struggles
This chapter analyses the issue of democracy in Ukraine and major factors which determine the prospects for democracy in the one of the largest European countries. The research question is as to how Ukraine fares in terms of common democracy criteria. The related question is as to which factors or obstacles affect democracy in Ukraine, specifically after the “Euromaidan.” The major measures of democracy, such as the Polity and Freedom House indexes, show that Ukraine did not turn into a democracy as a result of the “Euromaidan.” The Polity index and various evidence, specifically concerning the violent political transition during the “Euromaidan,” suggest a relative movement towards greater authoritarianism. Such development contrasts with relative democratization of Ukraine after it gained independence following a collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and after peaceful mass protests and an additional round elections during the “Orange Revolution” prevented an attempt to seize power with help of falsification of election results. However, the changes in the state of democracy in independent Ukraine and the application to Ukraine of various factors, which previous studies identified as promoting or hindering democracy, indicate that consolidated liberal democracy or consolidated autocracy are unlikely to take root in Ukraine. Such factors include the economic development level, semi-democratic political values, historical legacies, political institutions, political leadership, civil society, and European Union integration. The effect of Ukrainian diaspora on democracy in Ukraine is a factor that requires further research.