Empirical Adequacy and Scientific Discovery (original) (raw)
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The nature of scientific theory
CURRENT SCIENCE, 2012
This article explores Einstein’s views on the nature of scientific theory, and is directed towards students and researchers in the physical sciences and engineering. A majority of scientific theories belong to the constructive type whose axiomatic foundation consists of empirically observed principles and imaginary or speculative hypotheses. On this base is erected a logical superstructure (e.g. calculus) whose object is to make concrete predictions which can be tested against experiential data. A favourable comparison will point to validity of the hypotheses while an unfavourable one will require their revision. A constructive theory holds temporarily and will eventually be replaced with a more comprehensive approach. In contrast, in a theory of principle, the axiomatic foundation consists solely of principles of nature that are derived from human experience. Unless these principles are found to be false in the future, the security of such a theory is guaranteed. An example of a constructive theory is the kinetic theory of gases while classical thermodynamics and the theory of relativity belong to the class of principle theories.
On the relation between the normative and the empirical in the philosophy of science
1996
The relation between the normative and the empirical in the philosophy of science is examined by investigating apriori and aposteriori approaches to methodology. The apriori is usually equated with the prescriptive, and the aposteriori with the descriptive. It is argued that this equation is mistaken, and that neither a purely apriori nor a purely aposteriori approach to methodology can succeed. Methodologies based on probability are used as illustrations. Purely apriori and purely aposteriori approaches are examined in Parts I and II respectively. The former are investigated through the intuitionism of J.M. Keynes and the analytic method of Carnap. Dutch Book arguments are also considered as apriori arguments. I conclude that an apriori approach is irredeemably flawed, in that it can never meet the goal it sets for itself of producing a self-evidently justified set of rules for science. Purely aposteriori approaches are investigated in the second Part by focussing on R. Giere's...
PHILOSOPHY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE PLUS 2 PAPERS ON SCIENTIFIC REALISM FOR BALANCE
THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 2008
A WORTHWHILE REVIEW 648 PAGES TO BE ENJOYED ON A QUIET NIGHT OR TWO The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an outstanding guide to the major themes, movements, debates and topics in philosophy of science. Fifty-five entries by a team of renowned international contributors are organized into four parts: • Historical and Philosophical Context • Debates • Concepts • Individual Sciences The Companion begins with a critical examination of how philosophy of science has been involved in a mutually fruitful interaction with philosophical theories in areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, and reassesses the major schools of philosophy of science in the twentieth century. The second part explores the development of current debates among philosophers and scientists on issues such as confirmation, explanation, realism, scientific method, and the ethics of science. Part three discusses controversial concepts such as causation, prediction, unification, observation, and probability that lie at the heart of many disputes about science and scientific theories. The final part addresses some of the main philosophical problems that arise within eight branches of science: biology, chemistry, cognitive science, economics, mathematics, physics, psychology, and the social sciences. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is essential reading for anyone interested in philosophy of science and the connections between philosophy and the natural and social sciences. Stathis Psillos is an Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Athens, Greece. He is the author of Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (Routledge), Causation and Explanation and Philosophy of Science A–Z. Martin Curd is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA. He is co-editor (with Jan Cover) of Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. PART I Historical and philosophical context 1 1 The epistemology of science after Quine 3 PAUL A. ROTH 2 The history of philosophy and the philosophy of science 15 JOANNE WAUGH AND ROGER ARIEW 3 Metaphysics 26 Stephen Mumford 4 Philosophy of language 36 Rod Bertolet 5 The role of logic in philosophy of science 47 Diderik Batens 6 Critical rationalism 58 Gürol Irzik 7 The historical turn in the philosophy of science 67 ALEXANDER BIRD 8 Logical empiricism 78 Thomas Uebel 9 Pragmatism and science 91 Robert Almeder Part II Debates 101 10 Bayesianism 103 Colin Howson 11 Confirmation 115 ALAN HÁJEK AND JAMES M. JOYCE 12 Empiricism 129 Elliott Sober vi 13 Essentialism and natural kinds 139 BRIAN ELLIS 14 Ethics of science 149 David B. Resnik 15 Experiment 159 Theodore Arabatzis 16 Explanation 171 JAMES Woodward 17 The feminist approach to the philosophy of science 182 CASSANDRA L. PINNICK 18 Inference to the best explanation 193 Peter Lipton 19 Laws of nature 203 Marc Lange 20 Naturalism 213 RONALD N. GIERE 21 Realism/anti-realism 224 Michael Devitt 22 Relativism about science 236 Maria Baghramian 23 Scientific method 248 Howard Sankey 24 Social studies of science 259 ROBERT NOLA 25 The structure of theories 269 Steven French 26 Theory-change in science 281 John Worrall 27 Underdetermination 292 Igor Douven 28 Values in science 302 GERALD DOPPELT vii Part III Concepts 315 29 Causation 317 Christopher Hitchcock 30 Determinism 327 Barry Loewer 31 Evidence 337 Peter Achinstein 32 Function 349 D. M. WALSH 33 Idealization 358 James Ladyman 34 Measurement 367 HASOK CHANG AND NANCY CARTWRIGHT 35 Mechanisms 376 Stuart Glennan 36 Models 385 DEMETRIS PORTIDES 37 Observation 396 ANDRé KUKLA 38 Prediction 405 MALCOLM FORSTER 39 Probability 414 Maria Carla Galavotti 40 Reduction 425 Sahotra Sarkar 41 Representation in science 435 PAUL TELLER 42 Scientific discovery 442 Thomas Nickles 43 Space and time 452 OLIVER POOLEY 44 Symmetry 468 Margaret Morrison viii 45 Truthlikeness 478 Graham Oddie 46 Unification 489 TODD JONES 47 The virtues of a good theory 498 Ernan McMullin Part IV Individual sciences 509 48 Biology 511 Alexander Rosenberg 49 Chemistry 520 Robin FINDLAY Hendry 50 Cognitive science 531 Paul Thagard 51 Economics 543 USKALI MÄKI 52 Mathematics 555 PETER CLARK 53 Physics 567 SIMON SAUNDERS 54 Psychology 581 RICHARD SAMUELS 55 Social sciences 594 HAROLD KINCAID Index 605 THEN AS A COMPLEMENTARY READING https://www.academia.edu/2807083/In\_defence\_of\_scientism
2012
The present essay examines the relationship between ordinary empirical judgments and our scientific worldviews. It is concerned with how ordinary judgments (and the primitive frameworks in which they are formulated) might be usefully integrated into an account of epistemological progress, both of our personal views and scientific theories, so that the sciences (especially modern theories of space and time) can reasonably be thought as being informed by, and evolving out of, at least some of the various pre-scientific views they have replaced. We examine our normal perceptual judgments of magnitude, position, orientation, and displacement in the hope of uncovering the logical, conceptual, and empirical relations that exist between such judgments (as well as the views of the world they presuppose) and our sophisticated understandings of space, time, and motion in physical theory. This research contends that experience and a rich type of conceptual analysis-one that examines the presuppositions that make possible the application of concepts in empirical contexts-together provide the framework within which a rational account of such relations can be proposed. The project thus defends a form of empiricism, but one distinct from classical forms (be they British empiricism, Russellian empiricism, or logical empiricism)-rather a slightly modified version of Anil Gupta's "Reformed Empiricism". This empiricism is capable of avoiding the logical excesses and errors of earlier forms, whilst providing an account of how a set of basic empiricist principles might be extended from their context in general epistemology to recalcitrant problems in the philosophy of science, such as the problem of our formal knowledge, the problem of the communicability of observation, and the rationality of theoretical progress. Such an extension offers a comprehensive account both of our ordinary and scientific knowledge.
On the basis of an analysis of everyday experience and practice, criteria of legitimate assertions of existence and truth are offered. A specific object, like a newspaper, can be asserted to exist if it has some invariant characteristics and is present in actual perception. A statement, like «This newspaper is black and white», can be accepted as true if it is wellestablished in some empirical domain. Each of these criteria provides a sufficient condition for acceptance of existence and truth, respectively, at the empirical level. Following Herman Weyl, it is argued that these criteria can be extended to the scientific theoretical level to support a selective and moderate version of scientific realism according to which entities like the electromagnetic and gravitational fields, but not crystalline spheres or some topological manifolds, can legitimately be asserted to exist.