Group-sharing, not Groupthink: Understanding Foreign Policy Decision-Making through a Social Sharedness Approach (original) (raw)
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives crossed into Israel and attacked a military patrol, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two more. In retaliation to this incident Israel launched a military operation that resulted in 34 days of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. The Israeli retaliation has been deemed to be severe and surprising. Furthermore, a public investigation commission established by the Israeli government implicated key decision-makers, and especially Prime Minister Olmert, as guilty of hasty and irresponsible decision-making. This article views this case through the lens of prospect theory, showing how the decision was made at the framing stage, and suggesting that this decision was not hasty but, rather, was consistent with the logic of loss-aversion. On the morning of 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives cut the fence and crossed the border from Lebanon into Israel, where they ambushed a military patrol. In the violent incident that developed two patrol vehicles were attacked, three Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers were killed, three injured, and two were kidnapped into Lebanon. The Israeli reaction and retaliation was severe and sparked a war that lasted for 34 days and resulted in many casualties on both sides and widespread infrastructure and property damage. Combat fighting between IDF and Hezbollah forces took place in Lebanon; the Lebanese Army avoided direct involvement. Civilian life on both sides of the Lebanese–Israeli border was heavily interrupted because Israel often bombed Hezbollah targets located near civilians, and Hezbollah aimed a rocket campaign at military and civilian targets deep within northern Israel. The war ended with a UN guaranteed ceasefire and peacekeeping operation which came into power on 14 August 2006 (UNSC Resolution 1701). 1