Internalism About Reasons for Action (original) (raw)
1993, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
In order to behave rationally, in one important sense of 'rationally', we must act for reasons; and we must not act in one way when there is a preponderance of reasons to act otherwise. Hence, the philosopher of action who is concerned with rational or intelligent action is interested in what general features a consideration must have in order to qualify as a reason. This also matters for important issues in ethics, including the question of what sorts of reasons there are, if any, for people to conform to morality. My topic is intemalism about reasons for action, currently a widely accepted view-perhaps an orthodoxy-about the nature of practical reasons. Internalists state it variously (and nonequivalently, as I shall show). Loosely, it is the view that all reasons for action have their basis in psychological features of the agent that do or can motivate her to do what the reason is a reason for doing. Externalists simply reject this general requirement that all reasons be based on such psychological features. Internalism is attractive because if it is true, then there is a necessary connection between reasons and motivation. Some internalists argue that externalism has a fatal weakness: it leaves room for reasons for action that cannot rationally motivate the person whose reasons they are. Since in order for anything to be a reason to act, it must be possible for someone actually to act for that reason on some occasion, it would seem that considerations that lack the power rationally to motivate the person whose reasons they allegedly are could not be reasons after all. Arguments in support of internalism about reasons for action have mainly taken the form of criticisms of extemalism which point out this supposed weakness. I shall analyze exactly what weakness internalists could plausibly
Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.