Time Is On Ukraine’s Side, Not Russia's (original) (raw)
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RUSSIA'S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE: SECURITY DILEMMA OR WHAT
Eurasian World, 2022
In the spring of 2021, particularly in March and April, international news agencies began reporting Russian military build-up along Ukraine's borders and in the Crimean Peninsula, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. Although the war rhetoric in news agencies relatively softened over the summer, it has begun to escalate once again starting in October 2021 which led to Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. This article seeks to answer the following questions: Why did Russia decide to invade Ukraine despite its upper hand in the peace negotiations with Kyiv? What is Russia’s endgame in Ukraine? Should we focus on relations between Russia and the United States, bypassing Ukraine, to find out a plausible explanation for the war? To what extent do Putin’s personal desires play a role in escalating tensions?
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2015: RUSSIA'S LONG WAR ON UKRAINE, 2015-16 PAPER SERIES NO. 1, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC
The clear de-escalation in the Russian- Ukrainian war observable since late summer 2015 suggests that Russia may have decided, at least for the time being, to turn from mostly military to mostly economic and political instruments. However, there is no indication that its strategic offensive goals toward Ukraine have changed. Moscow still seems to want, in the long term, to put Ukraine under its political control. To that end Russia, has promoted the “federalization” (or “decentralization”) of Ukraine: dividing it into large regions with strong powers, possibly including veto power over key decisions of the federal government in Kyiv — a scenario that seems hardly possible under the current political circumstances. Despite the increased political dialogue between Moscow and individual Western capitals, the crisis seems to be far from over, and a full return to “business as usual” between Russia and the West seems highly unlikely. Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began in February 2014 and included the occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea and the support of separatist militias in eastern Ukraine, has led to the biggest crisis in relations between the West and Russia since the Cold War. The gravity of what has occurred and the continued presence of major risks for regional stability posed by the conflict between Russia and the West create incentives for closer analyses of the crisis. This sort of close look reveals that the Kremlin’s moves have not been knee-jerk, but rather well-plotted and consistent with a long history of wanting to draw Ukraine closer to Russia. Several questions are critical. What were the major reasons for the crisis? What are the consequences of the crisis (especially for Ukraine), what is current state of play, and where we are heading? And finally, how should Europe and the United States react?
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The Russo-Ukrainian War: What Does It Mean For Russia Ukraine and The West
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare, 2023
Ibrahim Muradov presented The Russo-Ukrainian War: What Does it Mean for Russia, Ukraine, and the West? at this year's West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question-andanswer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed were that Ukrainian society's push for a pro-Western policy has shaped its foreign relations, despite international reluctance to integrate Ukraine into Western structures; Ukraine's strong protest culture, especially in Western regions, has significantly influenced its political direction and resistance to Russian dominance; and Ukraine developed a long-term strategy for economic, military and identity strengthening and this long-term strategy precipitated the full-scale invasion and forced the Kremlin to act before the strategy was complete. NATURE OF DISCUSSION Since Ukraine's independence, its civil society has increasingly been driving the Ukrainian government to democratize the country, which has resulted in a generally pro-Western foreign policy. Following the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Donbas, Ukraine has adopted a long-term strategy to bolster its economy, armed forces, and national identity. The full-scale invasion was a result of this strategy, which would have strengthened the country and its relationships with allies beyond a surmountable challenge for Russia.
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A Quest for hegemony or glory: Ukraine as a battle ground between U.S.A and Russia
RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary, 2022
The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is one of the major events of contemporary international politics. It is going to create global tension, increase arms race, pose security threats in different parts of the world and may even end up in a nuclear conflict. Economically, it will be a disaster not only for warring nations but also for entire world. It is resulting in supply shortage of oil, natural gas, food grains, motels and other commodities all over the world as Russia and Ukraine are major exporters of all these items. Rising inflation may result in slow economic growth, increasing poverty and growing hunger in different parts of the world. In a nut shell, the war may change the world order to a great extent. Ukraine has virtually become a battle ground where major powers of the world are show casing their military and technological strength. Generally speaking, the war is being fought on the question of Ukrainian sovereignty to join or not to join NATO. But, a deeper ana...
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Geopolitics of the War in Ukraine, 2022
In this 25,000-word monograph we present an analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as part of Russian revisionism and its implications for regional and global international order. We examine Russian interests and strategic objectives; the geopolitical impact of the invasion and we analyze in detail the military and strategic lessons of the war in Ukraine. Finally, we provide three possible military scenarios about the continuation of the war addressing also the issue of the possible use of nuclear weapons and conclude with some policy recommendations.
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UKRAINE: RUSSIA'S NEW ART OF WAR
The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a proliferation of hybrid wars, fought between flexible and sophisticated adversaries engaged in asymmetric conflicts using various forms of warfare according to the purpose and timing. The emergence of this kind of war specifically for the new globalized economy, increasingly integrated and polarized, has questioned traditional and conventional military thinking, generated a debate on the definition of the new concept of hybrid war and appropriate measures to take, in order to adapt to the new reality imposed by it. The violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine that broke out in 2014 has become a case study for hybrid conflict thru which Russia revealed only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to reinforce its imperialistic view on foreign policy. Russia will continue to wage a massive propaganda and information warfare campaign with the ultimate goal of undermining NATO and the EU by creating a pro-Russian narrative and even political change. This part of hybrid warfare will not easily disappear: it has been part of Russian thinking for over half of a century. This article focuses on the Russian strategy of indirect warfare during the Ukrainian crisis, providing also an analytical overview of the political developments of relations between Russia and the EU following the 2014 events in Ukraine.
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Stefan Hansen | Olha Husieva | Kira Frankenthal (Eds.)Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine “Zeitenwende” for German Security Policy, 2023
Russia’s Ukraine strategy is intimately linked to its quest to retain power nationally and internationally. From the perspective of Russian rulers, Ukraine must be deprived of its statehood and cultural identity to secure Russia’s great power status. For this purpose, Russia has mainly used an indirect strategy in which military power, including nuclear weapons, plays a central role. Having failed to topple the government in Kyiv in February 2022, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine bears features of a genocidal war of extermination. In the face of Russian military failures, Russia relies on its nuclear threat potential and indirect leverage to achieve its war aims.
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The Dangers of an Undefeated Russia
Strategic Panorama
This article highlights the importance of accuracy in understanding the expectations, judgments and apprehensions of all parties involved in an armed conflict. The author reviews misconceptions that Russia, Ukraine and the West had about each other prior to 24 February and singles out three axioms that arguably need to be kept in the foreground while analyzing the stakes and perils of this war. Five arguments, ranging from issues of geopolitics to matters of economy and security, are then put forward to prove why a failure to defeat Russia will cost Ukraine and the West more than the West’s determination to do what is necessary to enable Ukraine to prevail. The author concludes that if the West’s hesitancy is not replaced by a sense of urgency, the United States and its European allies will face a choice of a different nature: direct intervention with Russia or the loss of Ukraine.
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