What do aggregation results really reveal about group agency? (original) (raw)

2017, Philosophical Studies

Discoveries about attitude aggregation have prompted the re-emergence of non-reductionism, the theory that group agency is irreducible to individual agency. This paper rejects the revival of non-reductionism and, in so doing, challenges the preference for a unified account, according to which, agency, in all its manifestations, is rational. First, I offer a clarifying reconstruction of the new argument against reductionism (due to Christian List and Philip Pettit). Second, I show that a hitherto silent premise, namely, that an identified group intention need not be determined by member attitudes according to a rule, e.g., majority, is false. Third, I show that, on rejecting this premise, the aggregation results lead instead to the conclusion that, in contrast to individual agency, group agency is non-rational. Keywords Group agency Á Collective intentionality Á Judgement aggregation Á Social ontology Á Reductionism Á Discursive dilemma There are many scenarios in which a set of individual acts appears to constitute a group act rather than merely a sum of individual acts. Accounting for this appearance, theorists posit that a group itself may act. Some scenarios feature member-wide consensus on the act's performance, e.g., a sports team executing a pass play (Searle 1990), a team of volunteers painting a house (Bratman 1992), a couple walking on a beach (Gilbert 1990). Accordingly, theorists agree that a group may act if, '[e]ach participant… wills [the shared activity]' (Roth 2010). But whilst sufficient for group action, member unanimity is not necessary. Scenarios that