Ludwig Wittgenstein: Towards a Meaningful Talk About Religion (original) (raw)

Worlds or words apart? Wittgenstein on understanding religious language

Ratio, 2007

In this paper I develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. I show that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible -either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a 'doctrineless' form of life. I offer a defence of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the 'content' from religious belief and renders the religious form of life 'incommensurable' with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.

Wittgenstein on the Grammar of Religious Beliefs

Ludwig Wittgenstein's renewed approach to language and religious belief has significantly influenced the traditional Judeo-Christian approach to religious belief that is highly metaphysical with its doctrinal and dogmatic character. Penetrated into the depth grammar, Wittgenstein claimed that religious language does not give an explanation of supernatural entities as does natural science, which explains natural entities and facts. The meaning of religious language is divorced from its doctrinal footings and finds its meaning in ordinary life situations. This paper is an attempt to expose Wittgenstein's non-metaphysical approach to religious discourses, emphasizing the priority of practice over doctrine by delving into the depth grammar of religious beliefs to find a space for meaningful talk about religion and religious beliefs in the form of life where they are used in religious celebrations and ritual practices. Wittgenstein has made an attempt to bring religious beliefs and discourse to their original home, centered on the life of the community of believers.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Religion

How do images, idols and pictorial representations of the supernatural define our ability to decipher God? How does language communicate what is seen into what is audible or written? This is a humble attempt to look at religion from a different perspective, this piece was inspired by reading the first work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Religion as A Form of Life: Some Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Concept of “Religion”

2019

Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion and religious language has some bearings on the current discussions on place of the religion in the secular societies. Early Wittgenstein represents a restrictive concept of religion as the religious language remains beyond the limits of ordinary experience and senses. In the Investigations religious life regarded as one form of life among other life experiences and hence the religious expression may as well constitutes a particular language game in itself. Wittgenstenians are divided on implications of this new conception of religion later works of Wittgenstein indicates.In this article I will analyze the implications of Wittgenstein’s concept of religion and religious language in the context of his later works. The question about the religion as a form of life needs to be answered as follows: Is religious language, according to Wittgenstein, a closed discourse that only within particular religious language game becomes meaningful? Or does Wittgen...

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Language-Game and Religious Belief

Interference: Journal of Language, Literature, and Linguistics, 2020

Wittgenstein's new understanding of meaning as use has far reaching implications in religion and religious belief. The meaningfulness of language does not depend on the referent but on the actual use of it in the human context. The variety of language uses makes religious language legitimate, and the social character of language makes clear the role of training in religious belief. The characteristic features of religious belief can be summarized as follows: It is an unshakable commitment devoid of evidences and arguments, and it is reasonable only within its framework and grounded on the religious form of life. The rituals that are part of religious beliefs are symbolic and expressive. The existential concerns of human beings reveal a common spiritual nature enabling us to understand other religions and cultures as mirrored in our own humanity.

The Significance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Religious Belief

Philosophia, 2021

This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one's own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.

Not Beyond Language: Wittgenstein and Lindbeck on the Problem of Speaking about God

2021

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Religion as a Wittgensteinian Language Game

Is religion discourse a language game? Or maybe an axiomatic system? How can we combine Wittgenstein's idea of a language game and studies on religion made by polish logician, Josef Bochenski? And what it means for the contemporary philosophy of religion? I present my dissertation written in Jesuit University in Krakow, under the supervision of Piotr Sikora PhD.