Animal communication in linguistic & cognitive perspective (original) (raw)
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Linguists interested in language evolution tend to focus on combinatorial features and rightly point out the lack of comparable evidence in animal communication. However, human language is based on various unique capacities, such as a motor capacity of sophisticated vocal control and a cognitive capacity of acting on others' psychological states. These features are only present in very rudimentary forms in non-human primates, suggesting they have evolved more recently in the human lineage. Here, the evidence from recent fieldwork for precursors of these abilities is reviewed, notably sequence-based semantic communication, vocal tract control, and audience awareness. Overall, there is evidence for both continuity and discontinuity when comparing modern primate and human communication, suggesting that the origin of language is the result of multiple gradual transitions from earlier forms of primate-like communication and social cognition, rather than a sudden and fundamental redesign in ancestral human communication and cognition.
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The field of language evolution has recently made Gricean pragmatics central to its task, particularly within comparative studies between human and non-human primate communication. The standard model of Gricean communication requires a set of complex cognitive abilities, such as belief attribution and understanding nested higher-order mental states. On this model, non-human primate communication is then of a radically different kind to ours. Moreover, the cognitive demands in the standard view are also too high for human infants, who nevertheless do engage in communication. In this paper I critically assess the standard view and contrast it with an alternative, minimal model of Gricean communication recently advanced by Richard Moore. I then raise two objections to the minimal model. The upshot is that this model is conceptually unstable and fails to constitute a suitable alternative as a middle ground between full-fledged human communication and simpler forms of non-human animal communication.
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Comparative perspectives on primate and human communication have been marked by two equally untenable extremes: either language is special, without significant evolutionary precedent, or it is not: it is continuous in most aspects with animal communication systems. In this article we outline fertile common ground and point towards synthetic approaches that can unify the study of human and animal communication. First, we suggest that humans have a large suite of perceptual biases that introduce a pressure for languages to be 'functionally deployable'. We suggest that human languages are shaped by this pressure, along with previously established pressures to be both learnable and compressible, and domain-general constraints like memory. Collectively, we suggest that non-arbitrary structure-function relationships are crucial for the deployment of language and communication systems more generally.
'Pragmatics First': Animal Communication and the Evolution of Language
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2024
Research on the evolution of language is often framed in terms of sharp discontinuities in syntax and semantics between animal communication systems and human language as we know them. According to the so-called "pragmatics-first" approach to the evolution of language, when trying to understand the origins of human language in animal communication, we should be focusing on potential pragmatic continuities. However, some proponents of this approach (e.g. Seyfarth & Cheney 2017) find important pragmatic continuities, whereas others (e.g. Origgi & Sperber 2000) find sharp discontinuities. I begin (in Section 1) by arguing that this divergence is due to the fact that the proponents implicitly rely, respectively, on two different views of pragmatics, corresponding to different conceptions of what is involved in context-dependence-one "Carnapian", the other "Gricean". I argue that neither conception is fit to serve the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the evolution of language. In Section 2, I examine a recent formal "semantic-pragmatic" analysis of monkey calls, due to Philippe Schlenker et al. (in, e.g., 2014, 2016 a, b, 2017), which appears to improve on the Carnapian and Gricean conceptions. However, I argue that the appearances are misleading and that the S-P analysis is no better suited than Carnapian analyses for the purposes of those seeking to establish human-nonhuman pragmatic continuities. Understanding why this is so will point the way toward my preferred, genuinely intermediate conception of pragmatics (as defended in OMITTED), which-I argue in Section 3-is better fit for these purposes. Drawing on recent discussions of chimpanzee communication, I briefly indicate which aspects of extant primate call communication-both gestural and vocal-could potentially count as pragmatic according to this conception.