The class basis of the cleavage between the New Left and the radical right (original) (raw)
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In a growing number of countries, the two dominant political poles of the 20th century, the parties of the Left and the Centre-Right, are challenged by a third pole made up by the Radical Right. Between 2000 and 2015, the Radical Right has obtained more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western European countries and in over twenty national elections. We argue that the three poles compete with each other for the allegiance of different social classes. Our analysis shows the micro-foundations of class voting in nine West European countries where the political space was tripolar for part – or all – of the period between 2000 and 2015. Based on the European Social Survey 2002-2014, we find that socio-cultural professionals still form the party preserve of the Left, and large employers and managers constitute the party preserve of the Centre-Right. However, the Radical Right competes with the Centre-Right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the Left over its traditional working-class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the coexistence of old and new patterns of class voting. The analysis of voters’ attitudes shows that old patterns are structured by the economic axis of conflict: production workers’ support for the Left and small business owners’ endorsement of the Centre-Right. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the Radical Right and structured by the cultural axis of conflict: the support for the Radical Right by production workers and small business owners.
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2019
Part of the literature identifies the core constituency of radical right parties (RRPs) in the so-called "modernization losers". But while analysing the social bloc supporting RRPs, the literature often treats the matter as a monolithic bloc rather than focusing on the different expectations of such a heterogeneous electorate. Our findings indicate that political attitudes and other social characteristics influence the voting behaviour in different ways depending on the voter's social backgrounds. Our study indicates that while cultural nativism is a common trait of the RR electorate, economic nativism is a significant predictor only for small-business owners and production workers. Our results also indicate also that the significance of Euroscepticism and political distrust as predictors of a RR vote varies across social backgrounds. We conclude by highlighting the need for further research to differentiate within the RR electorate.
Still blurry? Economic salience, position and voting for radical right parties in Western Europe
European Journal of Political Research, 2019
Do radical right parties present blurry economic stances, or have they clarified their positions while moving towards the economic left? This article questions the strategic behaviour of radical right parties in Western Europe. It shows that although radical right parties have increased their discussion of economic issues, and expert placements of this party family on the economic dimension have become more centrist over time, the uncertainty surrounding these placements continues to be higher for the radical right than any other party family in Europe. The article then moves on to examine to what extent voter‐party congruence on redistribution, immigration and other issues of social lifestyle predict an individual's propensity to vote for the radical right compared to other parties. Although redistribution is the component of economic policy where the radical right seems to be centrist, the findings indicate that it remains party‐voter congruence on immigration that drives supp...
Lost in Translation? Class Cleavage Roots and Left Electoral Mobilization in Western Europe
Perspectives on Politics, 2021
I investigate whether the strength of the class cleavage in Western Europe still "translates" into the electoral mobilization of the left. This research question is addressed through comparative longitudinal analysis in nineteen Western European countries after World War II. In particular, the impact of class cleavage is investigated by disentangling its socio-structural (working-class features) and organizational (corporate and partisan) components, thus accounting for its multidimensional nature. Data show that both components have a significant impact in Western Europe after 1945. However, while the socio-structural element is still nowadays a substantial predictor of left electoral mobilization, the impact of the organizational element has decreased over time and has become irrelevant in the last twenty-five years. Therefore, the class cleavage is not entirely lost in translation, but left electoral mobilization is no longer dependent upon the organizational features of trade unions and political parties that originally emerged to represent working-class interests.
The paper is intended to serve five purposes. First, a discussion of the literature will provide an overview of the literature on class and class voting. Second, the paper will discuss and bring together the Marxist and Weberian political theory traditions on how to define and operationalize class. Third, it will deliver accurate statistics on the class composition of the electorate of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe based on current data. Fourth, it will provide evidence on whether certain classes are particularly vulnerable to right-wing populism. Fifth, it will offer numbers of the relative share of individuals of different classes who vote for the populist right.
2023
This chapter analyzes the class base of support for left-wing parties in Western Europe, in light of early political socialization and patterns of intergenerational social mobility. We ask to what extent contemporary left-wing party support is a legacy of political socialization in the traditional social democratic constituency class of industrial workers-and if this is a sustainable model for future social democratic support considering post-industrial occupational transformation and upgrading. By investigating support for the Social Democrats (SD) in contrast to green and left-libertarian, radical left, moderate and radical right parties, we identify the main competitors of the Social Democrats among classes traditionally associated with social democratic support. Analyses using the European Social Survey (2002-2010) indicate three main findings. First, the composition of the electorates indicates that Social Democrats rely more than other parties on support from individuals socialized in the industrial working class, while contemporary patterns show that one-third of the social democratic electorate now stems from the middle class and workers make up the largest part of the radical right electorate. Second, as expected, contemporary middle-class social democratic support is largely a legacy from socialization in the working class, especially among older generations in Northwestern Europe. Third, new legacies are being built along post-industrially realigned patterns, as offspring of socio-cultural professionals is relatively more likely to vote for the Left, but for the Green Left or Radical Left instead of the Social Democrats. However, the impact of socialization among younger generations appears to be weaker than the one identified for working-class origins in older generations. These results imply that relying on middle-class support alone is not a viable long-term strategy for the Social Democrats, given the seemingly unique impact of past industrial alignments that is unparalleled by other class-party linkages among younger generations.
European Societies, 2008
In the 1990s, sociologists engaged in a heated controversy about class voting. Although empirical evidence accumulated, positions remained surprisingly divided. This paper argues that this disagreement is due to two factors. Firstly, it reflects diverging understandings as to the concept of class voting. Secondly, it is explained by the use of class models that do not satisfactorily represent today’s social stratification in Western Europe. In consequence, this paper uses a detailed multi-class schema and examines two cleavages running through the social structure: (i) the economic divide separating holders of organizational power from the workingclass, (ii) the cultural divide opposing high-skilled classes engaged in interpersonal work settings (who hold a liberation view of community) from low-skilled classes occupied in object-related tasks (who hold an authoritarian view of community). Based on individual level data, our analyses show that classes continue to systematically differ in their party support. There is strong electoral evidence for the traditional economic cleavage in Britain’s and Germany’s class structure, while in Switzerland the cultural cleavage seems more salient. Hence, class voting continues but appears to involve more (and different) class-party alliances than just leftvoting by the woking class. Among others, we find salaried professionals in the social and cultural services to rally the libertarian left, while managers support parties on the right. Moreover, where a right-wing populist party alternative exists, it attracts disproportionate support from production workers and small business owners.
Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe
European Union Politics
Support for radical parties on both the left and right is on the rise, fueling intuition that both radicalisms have similar underpinnings. Indeed, existing studies show that radical left and right voters have overlapping positions and preferences. In this article, however, we focus on the differences in the voting bases of such parties. We show that radical left and right voters have sharply diverging ideological profiles. When it comes to the historical traditions of the 'left' and 'right', these voters differ radically from each other. Both groups express the traditions associated with their mainstream counterparts-particularly with respect to (non-)egalitarian, (non-)altruistic, and (anti-) cosmopolitan values. Such differences also explain why radical left voters tend to be more, not less, educated than mainstream or radical right voters.
European Political Science Review, 2017
So far little has been done to explore similarities and differences between radical left parties and other traditionally perceived party families of the left at the societal level. A noticeable gap thus remains in the study of the European radical left: whether and in what ways social divides form the basis of radical left party support. Using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008), for five West European countries, we investigate radical left party supporters’ socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics, juxtaposing them with those of social democratic party supporters and green party supporters. Our approach departs from related studies by distinguishing three cognitional operations within the economic left-right axis, that are based on the distinction between ideals and their effects on reality; and by testing for intra-left divides revolving around trust. Based on insights from cleavage research, we devise a number of hypotheses, most of which test positively. Our findings suggest left party families across Western Europe do reflect certain lines of division in society, albeit with qualifications. While structural divides are not found to be significant, there appears to be correspondence between political and attitudinal divides on a three-dimensional space. These concern the cognitive divisions within the economic left-right axis, issues of political trust and attitudes towards the environment. Our findings have conceptual and empirical implications both for the left and for investigations into cleavage politics.