Thoughts on a Critique of Modernity (original) (raw)

European Journal of Political Theory, 2009

Freedom occupies centre stage among the fields that went through various realignments due to 'the critique of the subject' and the keener perception of contingency in 20 th century thought. In this refiguring of freedom, attention has tended so far to focus on the work of individual thinkers such as the later Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty. But there is little awareness that a whole new scheme of thought has taken shape over time, cohering around a shared nexus of premises and responses to particular stakes.

Freedom and the Social and Human Condition: A Reflective Essay

ABSTRACT In this reflective essay, the author makes an urgent appeal to humanity in favor of the adoption of a concept of freedom that recognizes that it, freedom, can only be realized when assumed with a sense of moral, axiological, and ethical responsibility, as well as a sense of obligation and respect towards the “Other” and all beings who find themselves in situations of vulnerability. The author’s line of argumentation is grounded on the great philosophical, axiological, and social European thought traditions, and it is accompanied by a critique of some post-modernist currents of thought as well as the primacy given to the logic of capital accumulation in contemporary societies. The latter have brought us to a social state characterized by debauchery, selfishness (me first), arrogance, in sum, an “anything goes” way of life. This societal state, in turn, and in another extreme, has resulted in the emergence of orthodoxies, demagoguery, bigotry, and various forms of oppression. It has also led to the devaluation and trivialization of the arts and the humanities, precisely because they cannot be easily subjugated to the logic of accumulation of savage capitalism. KEY WORDS: freedom, sense, western philosophy, modernity, post-modernism, human condition, dialectical polarities

Towards a redefinition of freedom and subjectivity in contemporary society

1995

This work consists of a study of the historical, philosophical and political elements determining the essence of freedom and subjectivity in contemporary society. It identifies the origin of subjectivity in Renaissance Humanism, and demonstrates that Humanism's definition of individual freedom and subjectivity became a base upon which the Anglo-Germanic Romantics grounded their intellectual and political framework. The philosophical parallel between Humanism and Romanticism, the projects of which express subjectivity and freedom in terms of 'creation' and 'individualism', establishes a basis from which a study of postmodernism (French post-structuralism) shows that postmodernists, in spite of their critique of modernity, continue to define freedom and subjectivity along the same lines. It contends that the postmodernist critique of society espouses a severely limited notion of subjectivity, i.e. one which is basically negative and antisocial , and whose effect on the way individuals view themselves as socio-political agents is detrimental. This study is not one which aims to discount the importance of the postmodernist critique altogether. Rather, it shows that there are many elements which enter into the definition of freedom and subjectivity as a 'lived' experience in the world, such as those present in Hegelian philosophy, which are often concealed, or negated by postmodernism's rejection of dialectics in history. The study takes as central the Hegelian definition of the elements constituting the process of actualisation of subjectivity and freedom in society, and argues that all three identified intellectual movements, Humanism, Romanticism and Postmodernism, fail to recognise that the other, the means, is not a thingness, a whatness, nor is it other individuals, but is itself an activity the base of which is social, and whose telos is present in the objective order. The work argues that although postmodernism defends individual rights against a visibly declining social, political and ethical order, it does not present individuals with alternatives that are feasible and desirable in today's social and political context. Preface The primary objective of the present work is to demonstrate that contemporary social and political thought bases its definition of freedom and subjectivity on Humanist conceptions, themselves the product of Medieval Christian thought. At first glance, such a contention may appear implausible due to the stark contrast which exists between the power structures of these societies. According to the Medieval tradition, God is all powerful, and the Church is God's instrument, the only institution capable of assuring individuals of the possibility of reaching heaven, i.e. freedom, in the hereafter. All individuals, including Kings, were at the mercy of the Church. By contrast, contemporary society has long separated the realm of political power from religious power, to the extent that the latter was made to stand outside the power structure altogether. However, this superficial distinction fails to recognise that the very separation between Church and state allowed the presence of Medieval Christian concepts of freedom and subjectivity to go unchecked. Given the analysis that will be provided of the nature of the Humanist project for liberty, one may conclude that in contrast to the classical Greek notion of 'reason', the type of reason which developed during the Renaissance was not teleological. Reason was used to obtain knowledge of the end, but did not constitute the end as such. In this respect, Renaissance reason, and indeed Enlightenment reason, whilst able to transcend 'religious' control of reality in what was immediate and palpable, were unable to do so in terms of finality. It is difficult to state whether it was the nature of reason itself, or one acquired through practice, that was responsible for the failure of the philosophers of the past to break away from the dependency of reason on divinity. Nevertheless, the application of reason in the modern age, once the state became separate from the Church and value from morality, appeared purposeless, leaving many philosophers in this century to condemn it as the very instrument of oppression and self-delusion.1 This study makes clear that reason as such is not a concept that can be taken in isolation from the social, political and ideological aspects which combine to define its nature and purpose. Hegel demonstrates this fact clearly in his definition of a type of liberty that he believed was both possible and desirable. Hegel's definition of freedom as action which begins, in the first instance, in thought does not differ entirely from the postmodernist definition of freedom, but nevertheless goes beyond it in its adherence to the idea that only in action is freedom to be actualised. For Hegel, the idea of v freedom was necessarily one which combined the attributes of the past with the means of the present. Hegel sought to impart to us the benefit of knowledge of the past with a heightened understanding of the present, and of the self in the present. For Hegel, individuals, once aware of their dissociation from the earlier tyranny of the Church (which he took to be exemplified in the French Revolution's success in separating Church from State), will abandon the belief in freedom as realisable only and conditionally in the hereafter, and will seek their freedom in the here-and-now. Hegel believed in the idea that freedom is a product of this lifetime and can be enjoyed by the individual who is able to recognise that freedom is not necessarily 'absence of restraint', but in fact a product of 'necessary' choice and hence self-limitation. Thomas Mann defines freedom in a manner that is reminiscent of Hegel: "freedom always inclines to dialectical reversals. She realises herself very soon in constraint, fulfils herself in the subordination to law, rule, coercion, systembut to fulfil herself therein does not mean she therefore ceases to be freedom."2 Of course, it is in and through dialectics that Hegel is able to conceive of the possibility of making of freedom an experience to be enjoyed in the present. As is noted in chapter I of Part III, Hegel acquired his understanding of dialectics from earlier philosophical teachings, most of which were pagan.3 By identifying each attribute with its negation, Hegel was able to introduce a theory of liberty that endowed its definition with the need for both absence of restraint, and restraint. However, unlike the earlier Humanists, freedom as absence from restraint constitutes for Hegel the freedom of thought and that of the will, and freedom as restraint is necessary in terms of the social and political system which establishes the laws of the state. Hegel maintains that freedom as self-determination depends on both elements for its actualisation. Free thought conceives of, and indeed empowers, the will, but only restrictions, i.e. choice, make self-determination possible. This conception is also not peculiarly Hegelian. Machiavelli in the Discourses made clear that the ordini, the laws and ordinances, were the necessary tools for the securing of liberty; individuals need to be coerced in order to act virtuosi, according to virtue, and hence maintain their liberty, which they would have abandoned without such constraint.4 Machiavelli did not believe in the natural inclination of individuals to virtue, and therefore maintained that freedom for self-determination would only be available at a cost, that of coercion of the law without which individuals would always find a way to act in a cowardly way, and hence give up their liberty. However, unlike Machiavelli, Hegel did not believe in the power offortuna, but rather in the power of reason and self-knowledge which he deemed capable of guiding individuals toward vi Cf. Q. Skinner, "Two Views on the Maintenance of Liberty," Contemporary Political Theorv, Philip Pettit (ed.), (New York: Macmillan Pub., 1991), p. 36. 3Cf. Julia Kristeva, L'Etranger en nous, (Paris: Gallimard, 1988); in this book FCristeva argues that the 'other1, the stranger, signifies in fact the negative' side of the self, and that all xenophobic behaviour, ostracism and rejection is itself an act of fear of the 'unknown' that we conceal within us. IX 'Examples of this can be found in A. Maclntyrc's After Virtue (Duckworth. 1985), also in main stream postmodernist literature, el. Part III of this dissertation.-Here I have in mind the work of phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger, but equally the work of members of the Frankfurt School, that of Existentialists, and at least some postmodernists among others in the fields of sociology, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Christopher Laseh, The Culture of Narcissism, (London: ABACUS. 1980), pp. xv-xvi. "'.lean Baudrillard. lj> Transparence tin mat, essai stir les phenomenes extremes, (Paris: Galilee. 1990), p. 65. It is not the author's intention to portray the authors mentioned in this exposition of the 'state in contemporary society', i.e. Lasch, Bauman and Baudriilard. as representatives of the postmodern tradition. Rather, their work is taken here as a criLique of contemporary society. Postmodernism, as a tradition, is dealt with in the discussion on Foueault, Lyotard and Dcrnda. in Part III, Chapter II of this work. Moreover, it is necessary to point out that Bauman and Baudnllard, although quite opposed to being qualified as a postmodernists, are often referred io as such. However, what is certainly clear, is that they are both critical of modernism and postmodernism, and hence can readily be cited as critics in reference to both traditions. Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, "The Sweet Scent of Decomposition," Former Baudrillard. Chris Rojck & Bryan S. Turner (cds.), (London: Routledgc, 1993), pp. 22-46. 6Ibid" pp. 38-39. 7Ibid.. p. 43. Ibid.. pp. 43-44. 9Ibid. p. 43. '°Ibid., p. 32. ' 'Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic...

Freedom and the Imaginary Dimension of Society

the Iranian Yearbook of Phenomenology

The notion of 'freedom' has gained an emblematic character in contemporary political discourse. It is, commonly, viewed as the central value and political goal of modern societies. Similarly, human rights documents conceive of freedom as their founding principle with universal validity. In contradistinction to this prevalent approach to freedom, this paper aims to demonstrate that freedom is, primarily, a political signifier with social-historical variability. One cannot, therefore, simply and uncritically assume that freedom has (or should have) universal validity or transhistorical significance. In the first section of this paper, the structure of the contemporary liberal discourse on freedom is discussed and called into question. In light of Arendt's interpretation of freedom and through her analysis of the public domain, I reflect on the social-historical variability of the meaning of freedom and its inextricable nexus with a particular form of society. In the second section and drawing on Castoriadis, the notion of 'freedom' is approached in view of human signifying practices and imaginary dimension of society. This examination reveals in what way freedom––in the sense of a central social imaginary signification––contributes to the institution of an autonomous mode of society and determines the affective disposition and intentional vector of its inhabitants.

The Abyss of Human Freedom

This chapter attempts to examine Heidegger’s dealing with the question of freedom in his lecture course on The Essence of Human Freedom. Taking Heidegger’s destructive reading of Kant as point of departure, the chapter in a Heideggerian manner attempts to think freedom in a more originary manner: not as man’s property, but the unconditional opening, or possibility of existence itself as such. In this sense freedom is the event of the possibility of existence itself which breaks through in man who is essentially finite and mortal. Man grounded in this manner in freedom is open to the ground of his own existence in so far as he is the ‘most finite of all being’. Finitude is not an impossibility of freedom but the possibility of existence itself. Freedom is no longer thought here as man’s will to determine itself on its own ground, but freedom as the groundless site of history’s inauguration and is irreducible to any causality, whether transcendental causality or practical causality of Kantian type. As the groundless condition of the mortal’s event of existence, freedom is not one question of amongst others but the question of finitude itself out of which existence erupts. This event of freedom, understood, is the event of leap from the grounding principle of reason, even if it is practical reason and the principle of causality to the un-groundable event of inauguration of finite history itself.

"Freedom is not a Thing: Toward a Theory of Liberation for the 21st Century"

Radical Philosophy Review, 2016

Beginning from a critique of neoliberalism, and in particular of its concept of freedom, I lay the foundations for developing a critical theory of neoliberal globalization. But, in order to escape the current hegemony of neoliberal ideology, I argue that we must reconnect with the radical traditions of the 19th and 20th centuries. By excavating the debate Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse had about the nature of freedom in the pages of Dissent in the mid-1950s, I try to escape the neoliberal conception of freedom as individual autonomy, and to reconstruct a social theory of freedom as love. Because Fromm and Marcuse were intellectuals of their times, I argue that while their debate gives us some clues about how to reconstruct a radical theory of freedom, it is vital to articulate our conception on a new basis that relies neither on the presuppositions of classical psychoanalytic metapsychology nor on a Marxist sociology of alienation. Instead I develop a kind of naturalist phenomenology of the ego as radically open to the world and as fundamentally vulnerable on the basis of recent research in the human and life sciences. And it is precisely this openness/vulnerability that forms the basis of the human capacity to associate with others in a relationship of forming/being formed, or what I call ‘connective expression.’ And it is precisely this uniquely human capacity for a deep sociability that is being corrupted by the ever-intensifying market relations over which neoliberalism presides.