Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity (original) (raw)

Creation, Theodicy, and the Problem of Evil

This essay sets forth the claim that the absolute freedom of God's act of creation informs the nature and meaning of evil. Because God created the universe without prior constraint or necessity, His moral nature and the destiny of creation are inextricably related – creation will be completed in the eschaton, free from the grip of corruption at the last. The absolute freedom of divine creation denotes that evil is -and the completion of creation will reveal- without justification.

God and fruitless evil: A holistic response to the problem of evil

2015

The contemporary debate originates with the publishing of J. L. Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence." 2 In this article, Mackie articulates the standard version of the logical argument from evil by claiming that the three core tenants of theism ("God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists") are logically inconsistent. 3 H. J. McCloskey follows Mackie by taking a more general approach to the problem and examining a wider range of potential solutions. 4 The logical argument's momentum comes to a screeching halt with the publication of Alvin Plantiga's landmark work, The Nature of Necessity. 5 In this work Plantinga employs modal logic and possible world semantics to demonstrate "that it is possible that God could not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil." 6 By demonstrating this possibility, Plantinga shows that there is no necessary logical inconsistency between the existence of God and evil. Using this demonstration, he accomplishes a rare feat in the contemporary philosophical landscape: near universal agreement. Robert Adams states, "It is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem." 7 William Alston agrees: "It is now acknowledged on (almost) 2

The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil

Faith and Philosophy, 1992

It is widely accepted that a morally perfect God would prevent all "gratuitous evil,~ evil which is not necessary for some greater good. I argue that this requirement is unsound-that "if God necessarily prevents gratuitous evil, morality is undermined. ~ Objections by William Rowe complicate the discussion of this claim but do not refute it. In conclusion, a parallel argument concerning natural evil is presented.

God and Gratuitous Evil (Part II)

Philosophy Compass, 2016

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response – one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. In the prequel to this paper, I surveyed the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. Here, I survey the attempts due to William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively.

God and Gratuitous Evil (Part I)

Philosophy Compass, 2016

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response – one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. After introducing some key terms, I survey the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. In a follow-up paper, I discuss the attempts of William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively.

The Problem of Evil and the Probity of Theodicy from William Rowe's Evidential Evidential of Evil

2016

In this research, we discussed the types of evil: moral and natural, which are cited by atheistic philosophers as evidence against the existence of God. The so-called evidence from evil has been used by the atheistic and other non-theistic scholars to raise hypothesis on evaluating the possibility or likelihood that an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God exists in a world that is littered with evil. Moral evil is evil that arise from the misuse of free will by moral agents, while natural evils are natural disasters such as: earthquakes, famine, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes etc. We discussed moral evil and Plantinga's free will defense. We also discussed the natural evil and how it poses threat to theism. The logical and the evidential arguments from evil are the forms of arguments developed from moral and natural evils. While many scholars have agreed that Plantinga's free will defense adequately responds to the problem of logical evil, the same