Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia : Options and Scenarios (original) (raw)
Related papers
Land Reform in Ethiopia: Recommendations for Reform
2011
The challenges of land tenure in Ethiopia are part of a complex policy problem that stem from failed attempts at agricultural modernization and the consolidation of state power. Several significant problems have brought Ethiopia's land tenure laws to the attention of international observers. Food Insecurity. Food insecurity has made Ethiopia a center of development efforts in Africa. It is estimated that 44 percent of Ethiopians are chronically or acutely undernourished. 1 Undernourishment has largely been attributed to Ethiopia's susceptibility to famine, the most recent of which was the root cause of the food crisis of 2002-2003. 2 Rural Poverty. Agriculture makes up 50.7 percent of Ethiopia's GDP, 3 meaning that food insecurity has a disproportionate impact on Ethiopia's total economy. Malnourishment decreases productivity, which then increases poverty as part of a downward cycle of food insecurity and poverty, 4 Landlessness and Land Poverty. High rates of rural landlessness and land poverty exacerbate food insecurity and poverty. Forty-three percent of rural Ethiopians have no access to land and fully 60 percent lack sufficient land to grow enough food for a family of five. 5 Land Expropriations for Foreign Investment. Recent years have seen an increase in land contracts between Ethiopia's government and foreign agriculture investors for "unused" land. This land is typically arid or semi-arid pastoral grazing land in lowland areas of Oromia, Afar, Gambella, Southern Nations, Nationalities, Republics and Peoples (SNNPR), and Benishangul Gumuz regions held under unregistered customary tenure arrangements. Large farming operations displace pastoralists, monopolize resources, and degrade the land, causing increasingly bloody conflicts among pastoral clans over resources. Drought is not solely responsible for these problems. The roots of Ethiopia's food security, poverty, landlessness, and expropriation problems lie in deficiencies in education, infrastructure, business environment, and land tenure policies. This policy proposal will focus on the role of land tenure policy in creating and mitigating these problems. We will show that food insecurity, poverty, landlessness, and expropriations are the result of land tenure policies and governance that undermine tenure security, contribute to weak land administration institutions, and limit market efficiency. i This document is a condensed form of "Land Reform in Ethiopia: Recommendations for Reform" produced by these same authors. Please contact SMNE to review the long-form version of this document. who are, in turn, granted usufruct rights by the community. By legitimizing traditional tenure arrangements, this model is designed to utilize the legitimacy of customary practices and institutions as a path to good governance while maintaining land tenure security for individuals. Case Studies from sub-Saharan Africa Recent land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa have focused on formalizing customary land tenure to improve land tenure security. They have largely taken two forms: conversion to individual or associative freehold title (Kenya, Uganda, Ghana), or certification of individual or associative usufruct rights on state-owned land (Mozambique). Each of these case studies resulted in partial (Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique) or complete (Uganda) failure. In each instance, low percentages of total plots were registered, with a high of 60 percent in Ghana (the African average is 80 percent). 6 In Uganda, complete failure led to a wholesale return to customary tenure practices. In Kenya, Mozambique, and Ghana, partial failure led to the development of parallel formal and informal tenure systems under which wealthy and wellconnected individuals exploited to take land from unregistered landholders. For these reasons, quantitative studies have shown little impact on land tenure security, investment, or productivity and large increases in inequality as a result of these land policy reforms. There are three main reasons for these failures: Cost. Precise measurement for cadastral maps pushed total nominal costs for plot surveys above 200 USD in Uganda. 7 Corruption added to nominal costs, and long, complicated registration processes increased transaction and opportunity costs. Poor farmers who could not afford to register their land instead chose to remain in traditional tenure arrangements, while the wealthy took advantage of reforms to register land and thereby legally 'claim' it. This formation of parallel formal and informal tenure systems allowed the wealthy to dispossess traditional landholders, causing landlessness, exploitation and conflict. Institutional Capacity. In each example of reform, administrative institutions lacked capacity to inform the public about land reforms and process land registrations. None of the case studies featured widespread knowledge of reform among rural landholders. Adjudication and registration was complicated and time intensive. As a result, the educated and politically well connected were able to leverage information asymmetries to grab land from traditional landholders. Governance. Corruption and politicization in reform implementation processes were found to be a substantial problem in all case studies. Examples of abuse included: allocation of land to political favorites, the double-registry of land, and the widespread use of bribery to settle resulting land disputes. In Kenya, for example, democracy deficiencies undermined associative ownership structures as community elders abused their authority, allocating land to family members and selling land as if it were their own. Thus, corrupt, politicized governance structures contributed to land tenure insecurity. The main lesson to be drawn from the case studies examined here is that the form of land tenure system is secondary to issues of cost, institutional capacity, and governance in determining success. region contains many different systems of land management, largely based on tribal arrangements. Pastoral groups in Ethiopia's lowlands operate under community-based tenure arrangements. Local Experience of the State. The Ethiopian state administers policy through a hierarchical system of ethnic federalism with power ostensibly concentrated in regional bureaucracies, from the regional level down through the local woreda (district) and kebele (neighborhood) governments. Woreda and kebele officials are typically loyal to the EPRDF/TPLF ruling party, and decentralization (or more correctly de-concentration) has granted them significant power over daily life. These officials are the main administrators of federal and regional laws and gatekeepers of budgetary aid flows. Local officials are viewed as inconsistent and corrupt, and therefore lack legitimacy and accountability to the people they supposedly serve. Broadly speaking, peasant-tostate relations are characterized by vertical power structures that peasants allow to generally go unquestioned. Peasants are typically unaware of their legal rights and therefore are unable to defend themselves against abuse. Even when they are aware of such rights most choose to defer to authority out of fear of reprisal or punishment. These roles and relationships are particularly salient in the case of land administration. The Political System. In Ethiopia, EPRDF functionaries dominate all levels of government, effectively blurring the lines between government and the ruling party. In short, all federal policies, including land policies, are drawn up and implemented largely to reflect the position of the party. This fact complicates reform in that any proposal for change must criticize current policy, and in doing so, criticizes the policy position of the EPRDF. This relationship makes land tenure reform an extremely sensitive political issue in Ethiopia. Recent Land Reform in Ethiopia Recent land tenure reforms in Ethiopia can be characterized by the success of regional certification programs in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and the SNNPR. However this success is tempered by failure of administrative institutions to create an environment conducive to development and effective governance and the specter of redistribution and dispossession enshrined in land laws. Land Law Ethiopia's land tenure laws are largely the combination of the Federal Land Proclamation of 2005 and the regional proclamations. The 2005 Proclamation was rushed to passage after the contested 2005 elections and had the effect of increasing federal control over land tenure. Land tenure reforms since 1997 have largely preserved the Derg system of expropriation and redistribution as a means to deal with rural development issues. The focus of the system is to A) encourage equity in land distribution and prevent the emergence of exploitative land relationships and B) promote rural development through limited market reforms and providing land to the landless. Ownership. Ethiopia's land laws view land as the "common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia" 8 with the right to ownership "exclusively vested in the state and in the
Institutional Arrangements Help to Get Farmland: A Case of Amigna District, Arsi Zone, Ethiopia
Land is an asset of enormous importance for billions of rural dwellers in the developing world. Increased land access for the poor can also bring direct benefits of poverty alleviation, not least by contributing directly to increased household food security. In countries where agriculture is a main economic activity (e.g. Ethiopia), access to land is a fundamental means whereby the poor can ensure household food supplies and generate income. Therefore, this study aimed to sketch-out institutional arrangements help to get access to farmland in Amigna district. The result revealed that land rental markets appeared to be the dominant institutional arrangement to get access to farmland next to Peasant Association allocated arrangement. This created breathing space for short-term land acquisition for landless and/or nearly landless farm households. Moreover, the dominant transactions took place among a neighbor followed by transfers between friends in the same peasant association, and a relatives in the same peasant association. Therefore, policy and development interventions should give emphasis to improvement of such institutional arrangements that create venue for land access and strengthening enforcing rules of formal land rental markets allowed in the proclamation so as to enhance well functioning dynamic land transaction in the district.
Access to Rural Land Rights in the Post-1991 Ethiopia: Unconstitutional Policy Shift
Journal of land and rural studies, 2019
In an agrarian society, like Ethiopia, where lion share of the population relies on land rights for livelihoods and welfare, access to land is fundamental to be capable of existence as a free and dignified human being. Otherwise, it can also be used a political asset for political control and to impoverish the societal well-being. With the opinion of historical pitfalls and injustices and the tremendous holistic contribution of access to rural land rights in Ethiopia, the constitutional makers of the post-1991 Ethiopia have incorporated the egalitarian concept of 'free access to land for all needy nationals'. However, the content analysis of the legislation framed aftermath of the 1995 FDRE Constitution reveals the introduction of a policy shift towards land regionalism and market-based land access, because, it has attached regional residency requirement, prioritised to investors and model peasants and introduced land use payment in contradiction to the constitutional rule. Hence, this author argues for the restoration of the Constitutional principle of access to land rights.
Land Resource, Uses, and Ownership in Ethiopia: Past, Present and Future
– Land had been controlled by the elite (kings and their trusted group) in Ethiopia. Private ownership of land had never been known except for some historical incidents. The Ethiopian people had been struggling for centuries with the inequitable land holdings of the country and effectively removed the feudal system in 1975. The following regime (Derg) that came to power in 1975 under the slogan " Land to The Tiller " paradoxically dissatisfied the slogan and ended up in owning the land itself (state ownership?) rather than giving it to the people. The existing government, which controlled power in 1991, was expected to cure the age old land rights ills, among others by giving land to the people in tenure. Rather, it maintained the Derg's state ownership of land and controls all urban and rural land as well as natural resources. Even though it is the state which controls land ownership, rural peasants and pastoralists are guaranteed with lifetime " holding " right that gives all rights except sale and mortgage. Although it is not mentioned in the constitution, urban residents are also provided with the right to get land for residence on a 99 years lease based agreement. The state ownership of land in contemporary Ethiopia is far from ideal since it restricts the different land rights of use, rent, lease, endowment, and inheritance for different reasons. Since redistribution of land is highly restricted, access to rural land is also almost nonexistent. The constitution is commended for its protection of land holdings against arbitrary state eviction by inserting a provision that gives " commensurate " amount of compensation during expropriation. However, successive implementing proclamations have violated this protection by denying market value (fair compensation) for loss of property. In short, the amount of compensation in the event of expropriation is insufficient. By creating more access to rural land, liberating the land holding rights, and by compensating fairly the loss of properties during expropriation, the current government could give more secure land rights compared to its predecessors.
In late 1960s and early 1970s, progressive Ethiopians and international agencies urged Haile-Selassie's Imperial government to introduced land reform and rural change and in 1974 the emperor was deposed and the Derg took power. Soon, the new régime, the Derg, promulgated a revolutionary land reform program. The land reform proclamation abolished all private ownership making all land common property of the Ethiopian people. Despite the wide spread of the resistance, the law was implemented in most part of the province. In 1980's the Derg regime introduced villagisation and collectivization program in most parts of the country and that were unpopular and hence contributed for the fall of the regime. In 1996 to 1997, the second land reform in the province was made under the current government. Like the Derg, land property rights have remained vested in the state. In November 1996, the Regional Council of the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) issued a proclamation of new land reform programme that has been hotly debated. However, despite the politico-economic and symbolic significance of arable land in the area under study, we have no scholarly work in the agrarian reform of Gojjam. The intriguing question arises as to why land right in Gojjam, despite its importance in the political economy of the region and the country, remained an infertile area for historical investigation. The available sources lack structural analysis and focus. It is only through a thorough and independent research that we can have detail and genuine knowledge on the topic under investigation. The aim of this discussion is to analyze the contexts and dynamics of land rights in Ethiopia in general and Gojjam in particular. The study, based on oral testimonies, published and unpublished sources, is intended to provide readers with objective issues on land politics and history. An attempt has made to collect both oral information and archival materials from local offices. In addition, I have consulted different archives of the Governorate General so as to compare and contrast the tenure reforms of the Derg and the EPRDF with the imperial period. The study will hopefully make a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the features and natures of Ethiopian agrarian reform and tenure system. Students of policy development will also find this work quite useful.
The role of land registration in reducing rural poverty has been debated for several decades. This article analyses the impacts of land registration on land rentals, security of land tenure, disputes over land, use of credit facilities from formal financial institutions and gender access and control over land. Our findings are based on data collected between April and December 2011 in irrigation systems in three regional states of Ethiopia using in-depth interviews and field surveys. Land registration has a positive influence on land rentals by reducing the fear of landholders in losing land to renters. Important benefits of land registration also include enhancing tenure security through ensuring usufruct rights over land and addressing the conflicts that arise from the competition to access irrigable land. Joint land titling secures women’s access to land and encourages women’s decision-making on land rentals, input use, cropping patterns and the marketing of harvest from irrigable plots. While land registration allows for improved tenure security, gender equity and reduced disputes over land, it does little to facilitate access to credit or increase the use of farm inputs. The findings suggest that more work needs to be carried out to translate the benefits of land registration into improved livelihoods by increasing investment in farm inputs, production of high value, off-season crops and increase market participation.
2011
Land Expropriations for Foreign Investment. Recent years have seen an increase in land contracts between Ethiopia’s government and foreign agriculture investors for “unused” land. This land is typically arid or semi-arid pastoral grazing land in lowland areas of Oromia, Afar, Gambella, Southern Nations, Nationalities, Republics and Peoples (SNNPR), and Benishangul Gumuz regions held under unregistered customary tenure arrangements. Large farming operations displace pastoralists, monopolize resources, and degrade the land, causing increasingly bloody conflicts among pastoral clans over resources.