Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science (original) (raw)
Misunderstanding Science?
This chapter takes as its focus one very specific example of public interaction with sci ence-the case of the hill sheep-farmers of the Lake District of northern England. They experienced radioactive fallout from the 1986 Chernobyl accident which contaminated their sheep flocks and upland pastures. In an area dominated by a traditional and demanding hill-farming economy, they were restricted from selling their sheep freely (almost 100 farms are still under restriction). They also received intensive expert advice about the environmental hazards from the radiocaesium deposits, and the relationship of these to other such deposits from the nearby Windscale-Sellafield nuclear facilities and 1950s weapons testing fallout. Fieldvvork comprising mainly in-depth interviews with affected farmers and others provided data for analysis of the factors influencing the reception of scientific expertise by this sub-population. In analysing the farmers' understanding of the science, it was immediately apparent that it would have been meaningless and utterly misleading to treat their response to its cognitive content-for example, the claim that radiocaesium from Chernobyl was clearly distinguishable from Sellafield emissions of the same radio-isotopes-as if separ ate from its social and institutional form. Examining how the scientific institutions framed the issue and the knowledge they articulated as science, identified certain com mitments which were institutionalised and taken for granted, thus not deliberately introduced. They constituted the very culture of science as institutionalised and prac tised as public knowledge. These assumptions shaped the scientific knowledge, they were not extra to it; and they were built in as social prescriptions in the way the science was institutionalised and deployed. These were elements of cultural prescription posing, albeit innocently, as objective knowledge. They included the assumptions: • that the natural (and achievable) purpose of knowledge was control and prediction; • that standardisation of environmental measurements and concepts over given areas and social units was natural even though it imposed standardisation on the social units too;
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Misunderstood misunderstanding: social identities and public uptake of science
Public Understanding of Science, 1992
This paper draws general insights into the public reception of scientific knowledge from a case study of Cumbrian sheep farmers' responses to scientific advice about the restrictions introduced after the Chernobyl radioactive fallout. The analysis identifies several substantive factors which influence the credibility of scientific communication. Starting from the now-accepted point that public uptake of science depends primarily upon the trust and credibility public groups are prepared to invest in scientific institutions and representatives, the paper observes that these are contingent upon the social relationships and identities which people feel to be affected by scientific knowledge, which never comes free of social interests or implications. The case study shows laypeople capable of extensive informal reflection upon their social relationships towards scientific experts, and on the epistemological status of their own `local' knowledge in relation to `outside' knowle...
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