Neutrality (original) (raw)
Related papers
2003
The purpose of this paper is to show that procedural semantics should be thought of as independent from representational semantics. According to the standard representational view, semantics is expected to account for the relations that hold between language and reality. This conception, grounded in the universalistic tradition, is directly challenged by the dynamic turn that focuses on procedural semantics, i.e. on the way one understands the meaning of a discourse. The paper will concentrate on the special case of Hintikka's Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS) and its enlightenment of several dynamic phenomena of natural language. It will be claimed that GTS should be reinterpreted as a procedural and non-committing, i.e. ontologically neutral semantics.
'Neutralism within the semantic tradition', published in Thought
Thought, 2012
A neutralist framework is an account of the second-order quantifiers which does not by itself tell us what the ontological commitments of second-order quantification are, but which does tell us that those commitments cannot exceed those of predication. Recently, Wright has suggested that an inferentialist account of the second-order quantifiers is an adequate neutralist framework. I show that we do not have to become inferentialists in the pursuit of a neutralist framework: such a framework can be established within the semantic tradition.
Attitudes, Deontics and Semantic Neutrality
It has been recently suggested that a semantic theory for deontic modals should be neutral between a very large range of normative and evaluative theories. This paper aims to get clear about this talk of neutrality, in particular about its scope and motivation. My thesis is that neutrality is best understood as an empirical thesis about a fragment of natural language that includes deontic modals—not as a new, sui generis methodological constraint on natural language semantics.
New Ideas in Psychology, 2015
When people talk about “common ground”, they invoke shared experiences, convictions, and emotions. In the language sciences, however, ‘common ground’ also has a technical sense. Many taking a representational view of language and cognition seek to explain that everyday feeling in terms of how isolated individuals “use” language to communicate. Autonomous cognitive agents are said to use words to communicate inner thoughts and experiences; in such a framework, ‘common ground’ describes a body of information that people allegedly share, hold common, and use to reason about how intentions have been made manifest. We object to this view, above all, because it leaves out mechanisms that demonstrably enable people to manage joint activities by doing things together. We present an alternative view of linguistic understanding on which appeal to inner representations is replaced by tracing language to synergetic coordination between biological agents who draw on wordings to act within cultural ecosystems. Crucially, human coordination depends on, not just bodies, but also salient patterns of articulatory movement (‘wordings’). These rich patterns function as non-local resources that, together with concerted bodily (and vocal) activity, serve to organize, regulate and coordinate both attention and the verbal and non-verbal activity that it gives rise to. Since wordings are normative, they can be used to develop skills for making cultural sense of environments and other peoples’ doings. On our view, the technical notion of common ground is an illusion, because appeal to representations blinds theorists to bodily activity and the role of experience. Turning away from how wordings influence the circumstances, skills, and bodily coordination on which interpersonal understanding depends, it makes premature appeal to reasoning and internally represented knowledge. We conclude that outside its vague everyday sense, the concept of common ground is a notion that the language sciences would be well advised to abandon.
2010. Negation and Polarity: an introduction. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 28: 771-786.
Introduction of 'Negation and Polarity', Special Issue of Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 28:4. This introduction addresses some key issues and questions in the study of negation and polarity. Focussing on negative polarity and negative indefinites, it summarizes research trends and results. Special attention is paid to the issues of synchronic variation and diachronic change in the realm of negative polarity items, which figure prominently in the articles and commentaries contained in this special issue.
Introduction to the Philosophy of Language Winter 2004 Erich Rast
2005
Alice presupposes that Bob knows that in the given situation there is some coffee she’s refering to. (Presumably, she holds a cup of brown liquid in her hand and refers to the content of the cup.) Alice herself, if she’s not trying to deceive Bob, must believe as well that there’s coffee in the cup, and she believes that the coffee is good. !Literature !A Dialog !Common Ground !Update ! Illustration !Problems !Mad Scientist !Belief Sets !Expansion !Formal Update ! Informativity !Other Dialogs !Pragmatic Presupposition !Notes on Belief Revision !Problems !Compositional Projection