Review of Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization by William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna B. Puglisi (original) (raw)

Opportunity Seldom Knocks Twice: Influencing China’s Trajectory via Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement in Cyberspace

Asia Policy, 2020

This article challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the strategic motivation and significance of China's cyber-enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) and suggests that the U.S. has a unique opportunity via its cyber strategy to influence the trajectory of China's rise. main argument Common refrains regarding the strategic significance of China's theft of U.S. IP include concerns of immediate economic losses, with estimates ranging from 250billionto250 billion to 250billionto600 billion annually, and the potential longer-term threat of disincentivizing innovation investments. But a focus on these consequences obscures the true strategic intent of China's cyber-enabled IP-theft campaign. Around 2010, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership perceived that China was approaching a history-informed time limit to transition from a middle-to high-income economy, and that slowing growth or economic stagnation and sociopolitical upheaval could put at risk both the CCP's legitimacy and China's great-power status. In response, the CCP adopted a multifaceted technology transfer policy to counter the expected slowing growth by stimulating indigenous innovation. Only one facet of that policy-a centrally directed, significant cyber-enabled campaign of IP theft-was able to produce results in time, with certainty, and at a scale necessary to ensure China avoided economic stagnation. In 2018 the CCP again ramped up cyber-enabled IP theft to help mitigate pressure by jump-starting additional innovation-based growth. U.S. Cyber Command is a mature combatant command, and the U.S. Department of Defense is implementing a cyber strategy of "defend forward" and "persistent engagement" that intends to inhibit such illicit, cyber-enabled strategic gains by adversaries. policy implications • The U.S. has a second opportunity to use cyber strategy to shape China's rise while the Chinese economy is vulnerable. U.S. Cyber Command is now better aligned to the challenge of countering Chinese IP theft and has an improved capability to execute U.S. strategy. [ 67 ] fischerkeller • influencing china ' s trajectory in cyberspace C ommon refrains regarding the strategic significance of China's theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) include concerns of immediate economic losses-with estimates ranging from 250billionto250 billion to 250billionto600 billion annually-and a potential longer-term threat of disincentivizing innovation investments. However, a focus on these consequences obscures the true strategic intent of China's cyber-enabled IP-theft campaign. During its long march to a "moderately prosperous society" and global technological supremacy, China has encountered significant hurdles. 1 In 2010, for example, after years of significant economic growth, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership publicly expressed concerns about a slowing economy and social unrest-conditions Chinese leaders associated with the middle-income trap. 2 The historical consequences of failing to address these areas could put at risk both the CCP's' legitimacy and China's great-power status. As part of a multifaceted strategy to mitigate the middle-income trap and stave off impending calamity, China launched a campaign of cyber-enabled theft of U.S. IP. Evidence of successfully re-innovating illicitly acquired IP was arguably behind President Xi Jinping's confident exclamation in 2015 that growth would average 6.5% from 2015 to 2020, a target necessary for keeping the middle-income trap at bay. 3 Although the United States attempted to abate cyber-enabled IP theft through diplomacy, statecraft failed, resulting in a lost opportunity to shape the rise of China when its economy was in a vulnerable state. 4 Opportunity is knocking again. Current U.S. tariff policy began placing downward pressure on China's economy in 2018 that was not anticipated when President Xi made his 2015 proclamation. The Covid-19 pandemic has

THE IMPACT OF CHINA'S CYBERPOWER DEVELOPMENT ON THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Chinese aggressiveness in the virtual world for the last 10 years is not an instantly made plan. The desire to modernize the military has been seen since 3 decades ago. Since 2006 China has released "The State Information Development Strategy" which contains the purpose of building the information of China until the year 2020 in the future. President Xi Jinping explicitly said that China should be a cyber-power country. The development of Chinese cyberpower led to the outrage of the United States following a number of Chinese behaviors in cyberspace that harmed the interests of the United States. This study aims to understand the purpose of China's cyberpower development and how it falls on the interests of the United States.

China's Efforts in Civil-Military Integration, Its Impact on the Development of China's Acquisition System, and Implications for the United States

2019

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is significantly stepping up its efforts to pursue military-civil fusion (MCF) as an integral component of its whole of nation development strategy to build a technologically advanced and militarily powerful state within the next one to two decades. This paper examines the making, nature and implementation of Xi's grand MCF undertaking. This paper offers an analytical framework that seeks to provide a coherent and holistic view of the many moving parts and disparate elements of MCF through an innovation systems perspective. This framework identifies seven categories of factors that are important in shaping the structure and process of the MCF system: catalytic, input, institutional, organizational, networks, contextual, and output factors. Key dynamics that are examined in detail in the paper include high-level leadership engagement, the influence of external threats and technology environments, application of new financial mechanisms such as hybrid state-private sector investment funds, the role of key state and military agencies, and the evolution of the Chinese defense acquisition system to embrace MCF. This analytical perspective also helps highlight the barriers to implementing the MCF project, particularly as it moves beyond central level planning to execution within a complex subnational political economy. The paper concludes with analysis of how the MCF grand strategy is impacting China's own military modernization efforts and what the implications are for the United States and its defense acquisition base.

Review of 3 articles on China and the World, in special issue of International Security 42:4 (Spring 2018), 85-204. H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, Article Review 104 (October 12, 2018), 1-7.

Review of 3 articles in International Security 40:2 (Spring 2018): 85-204 David Shambaugh. “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence.” International Security 42:4 (Spring 2018): 85-127. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels. “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military Challenge.” International Security 42:4 (Spring 2018): 128-169. Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press. “Markets or Mercantilism? How China Secures Its Energy Supplies.” International Security 42:4 (Spring 2018): 170-204. Each of these three articles views China’s rapid growth in both economic and military power through a somewhat different lens. In all, though, the competition for power and influence between China and the United States, whether in Southeast Asia or Japan, over access to scarce energy supplies, or more broadly in Asia and beyond, is a palpable presence, its implications framing, underlying, and driving the entire essays. It seem that in the global context it is impossible to discuss China without also bringing in the United States. The relationship is fundamentally asymmetric, since the reverse is not true of the United States. For China, the constant near inescapable imperative to measure itself against the United States represents something of an existential dilemma. Should Chinese leaders set their country the competitive goal of performing better than the United States in areas where it currently excels, or should they rather change the arena and opt for a different and purportedly better playing field? Equally frustrating is China’s inability to operate internationally, most particularly in its own backyard, without in some manner falling under the shadow of the United States. Yet, however infuriating China’s leaders may find the constant references back to their sporadic model and great rival, at least for the indefinite future, they will almost certainly have to live with them. As these articles demonstrate, when considering China in any international setting, the United States is an inevitable part of the equation. http://tiny.cc/ISSF-AR104 https://issforum.org/articlereviews/104-china https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR104.pdf