Shaping Indo-Pacific Strategy: The Quad and India-Japan Relations (original) (raw)
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Japan’s Approach towards Quadrilateral Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region
Russian Japanology Review
The article highlights the peculiarities of Japan's approach to the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue, the Quad, in the Indo-Pacific region. Tokyo initiated this framework in 2007, when Abe Shinzō proposed establishing permanent cooperation between Japan, the USA, Australia, and India. For several reasons, including the resignation of Abe Shinzō from the post of Prime Minister, the Quad ceased to exist. In 2017, Tokyo returned to the idea of reviving the quadrilateral dialogue, seeing this as one of the ways to keep the US focused on the region and balance China's influence. The resumption of quadrilateral cooperation in 2017, in the face of more pronounced contradictions between the members of the Quad and China, marked new priorities for Tokyo's regional agenda. Interest in quadrilateral cooperation is closely related to the strategy of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, put forward by Abe Shinzō in 2016, which provides for close political interaction with key players in the region and active infrastructure construction. Government of Suga Yoshihide continued the foreign policy course proclaimed by Abe, and the attention of the Biden administration to the Quad gives reason to believe that this area will become a key one in Japan-US cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Participation in the Quad is a logical continuation of Japan's close bilateral and trilateral dialogue with the United States, as well as with India and Australia, relations with which are reaching a level that can be characterized as quasi-alliances. At the same time, Japan is interested in the Quad not being perceived as an exclusive format that reduces the establishment of the rules of conduct in the region to the will of the 6
Carta Internacional, 2020
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, abbreviated to Quad, comprises Australia, the United States, Japan, and India. Although many think tanks and media outlets have written about recommendations to further this initiative, this essay believes the Quad is only evidence of a rising patchwork of small strategical dialogues within the Indo-Pacific region. The aims here are twofold: (a) to demonstrate the definitions and relevance of the Quad amid the soaring rivalry in the Indo-Pacific; and (b) to grasp this initiative as a "minilateral" grouping, which is settled in a more informal structure than multilateral institutions. In assessing these hypotheses, this research employs a qualitative content analysis of official statements and documents about the Quad meeting and national policies toward the Indo-Pacific. A systematic bibliographical review was applied to refine theoretical frameworks and to triangulate sources. In conclusion, this paper infers the Quad is not as ambitious and strong as previous literature claimed. These four members developed divergent interests in the Indo-Pacific; thereby, an alliance against China seems unlikely.
India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Indian Foreign Affairs Journal , 2018
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.
Securing the India-Japan Security Partnership: Lock, Stock, and Barrel
Security cooperation has become the hallmark of the bilateral relationship between India and Japan in the last decade. Security cooperation was slow to attain momentum, and it was the least prioritised component of the bilateral relationship until recently. However, once security cooperation gained momentum, this bilateral relationship strengthened for both India and Japan. In its current form, the relationship has established mechanisms at almost all levels including the Annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue, Defence Policy Dialogues, National Security Advisors' Dialogue, and staff-level dialogues between all three services and among the Coast Guards, exercises between the three-armed services, between the Coast Guards and Passage Exercises. Security cooperation between the two nations also exists through various trilateral, multilateral, and plurilateral avenues. This chapter will begin with the evolution and analysis of the India-Japan security cooperation and its current status. This section will analyse and describe all the important milestones in the journey of these two countries becoming close defence partners and also examine some of the challenges that continue to remain. The second part of the chapter will analyse two important components of the India-Japan security cooperation separately. The first component is the defence trade and technology transfer. This has been chosen for analysis because it has emerged as the most crucial component of the security cooperation, especially since 2014 when Japan removed the restriction on its weapons export policy. It is also important in the context of Japan's capability to develop advanced weapons technology and the fact that India is the second-largest importer of weapons in the world. This makes them the perfect partners. The second component is the Joint Combat Training and Exercises. This has been chosen because India and Japan have increased the interaction between their armed forces greatly in the last two decades, making Japan one of the most important defence partners of India. Their joint interactions and training also send a strong message in the context of the narrative of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad partnership. The question of the increasing interoperability has also been analysed closely as it of often cited as the most important goal of the joint training and exercises. The challenges that limit these two components of the India-Japan security cooperation have also been examined simultaneously. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the findings of the chapter and prescribe a way forward for the two countries. i Japan joined the US-led sanctions regime against India for its nuclear test in 1998. Japan also suspended Official Development Assistance(ODA) to India, which was the core element of the partnership.
The United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan
ISAS Insights, 2018
Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.
Japan–India Relations Beyond Coping with China in the Indo-Pacific Region
The journal of Indian and Asian studies, 2021
The Indo-Pacific region is said to be the center of the 21st century, unlike the Asia-Pacific in the 20th century. In the region, China is emerging rapidly in terms of economic strength, defense capability, and international presence. The US and other concerned countries are striving to cope with the new development. It looks that the US manages to somehow retain its Pax Americana as in the latter half of the last century. China which dreams to head for Pax Sinica has been implementing various measures including removing unfavorable circumstances to promote its dream. At the moment, it is hard to make prompt predictions on how these two Pax would be going. The key question would be ways to deal with China. Typical policies now under implementation are engaging policy represented by the RCEP and balancing policy by the Quad. These two policies have a timeline of short-term policy and middle-term policy. Perhaps, contents of the policies would be finalized depending upon China's economic development as one of the major factors. To bring about peace and stability of the region, in tandem with them, it might be necessary to bring about a regional order of the Indo-Pacific where it has been lacking. The close relations of Japan and India could be utilized for such a purpose also. Although COVID-19 is afflicting the whole region, it is hoped that the pandemic could be overcome by vaccines and other measures in the near future. It is the right time now to ponder over the future direction of the Indo-Pacific region before it is too late.
Master's Thesis, 2020
holds a geo-strategically important position in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Indo-Pacific region, making it a key partner to various democracies across the world for security as well as geo-economic partnerships in the region. Under the present Modi administration, India’s relations with Japan got a major spotlight under India’s Act East Policy (AEP) as well as India’s engagement in the US and Japan-led Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), leading to India joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). In the backdrop of growing Indian prominence and proactiveness in Asia and beyond, the thesis raises the research questions: How has India’s foreign policy towards Japan as well as Quad and FOIP changed under the Modi administration (2014-2019)? What factors have influenced India’s foreign policy towards Japan as well as Quad and Indo-Pacific? The thesis focuses on India's policy towards its bilateral relationship with Japan as well as a multilateral approach towards FOIP. Using the case study method for empirical analysis, it analyzes India’s Japan as well as the Quad and Indo-Pacific policy through the lens of IR theories- Realism and Constructivism. The thesis argues that the rise of Chinese influence in and around the Indian Ocean has impacted India’s foreign policy towards Japan to a certain extent, while greatly affecting India’s Indo-Pacific policy. The thesis also argues that India's guiding foreign policy ideal of non-alignment has made India's policy towards Japan and FOIP symbolically non-aligned, wherein India has exercised varying degrees of caution in partnering with other countries to preserve its strategic autonomy by engaging in strategic issue-based engagements with nations without allying with any.
Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century
2016
The growing strategic partnership between India and Japan is one of the most important geopolitical developments of the twenty-first century. This volume brings together a cross-generational group of scholars and analysts from both countries to study four key areas of bilateral cooperation: economics, energy and climate change, security, and global governance. The specific issues covered in the book include: trade, investment, energy security, renewable energy, maritime security, peacekeeping, multilateral institutional reform, nuclear non-proliferation, and the rise of China. The contributors to the volume discuss their respective countries’ interests, how successful their country has been in achieving them, the obstacles to deeper bilateral cooperation, and concrete policies that both sides can undertake to impart vitality and longevity to their partnership. At present, there is a dearth of policy-relevant scholarly literature on India–Japan relations. This volume comprehensively fills this niche at a particularly opportune moment, when New Delhi and Tokyo have signalled their intention to significantly increase bilateral cooperation.
Japan's strategic outreach to India and the prospects of a Japan–India alliance
International Affairs, 2018
Largely driven by Japan's strategic outreach to India, Tokyo and Delhi have rapidly improved relations and enhanced their strategic cooperation since the turn of the century. Today, developments in bilateral relations are moving faster than journalists and analysts can track, leading many observers to posit the emergence of Japan–India alliance. This article analyses the reasons behind Japan's strategic outreach to India and explores the conditions under which an alliance—understood as a formal association of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force in specific circumstances against a third party—might emerge between the two countries. It draws on existing scholarship on interstate alliances to examine the possible objectives, contours, operation and impact of such an alliance. It concludes that there are major obstacles in the way of an alliance forming and operating successfully. These include India's commitment to strategic autonomy; the incentives for limiting commitments and ‘buck-passing’ within a putative alliance; Chinese opposition and Beijing's ability to economically punish both parties; and differing views on US hegemony, world order and future Great Power status. Ultimately, Japan and India are better off being aligned—as they currently are—and not allied.