The Russian Dilemma: Oligarchs, Economic Reform, and the Possible Paths of Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soviet Russia (original) (raw)

The Atlas That has Not Shrugged: Why Russia's Oligarchs are an Unlikely Force for Change

Daedalus, 2017

There is demand among Russia's oligarchs for systemic change, but not for the rule of law proper. Instead, it is the de facto accountability of political elites and improved relations with the West that the Russian oligarchs want from the Kremlin. However, the oligarchs currently lack the capacity to effect change. Their insufficient leverage vis-à-vis Putin is rooted in their competition for rents, which prevents them from confronting the Kremlin as a united force. In addition to analyzing the lack of systemic pressure for change from the oligarchs, this essay considers the prospects of individual oligarchs who have nevertheless pushed openly for liberalization or tried to effect incremental change. It also draws on comparisons with other countries to chart the political behavior of Russia's business elites in the future.

The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005

Using a unique dataset, we describe the degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian ‘oligarchs’ do control a substantial part of the economy. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. The oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other Russian owners controlling for industry, region and size.

Local elites and transition in Russia: adaptation or competition?

2001

Abstract Has regime transition in Russia generated a major cleavage in its elite structure and, if so, what is its nature? The concern of political scientists and reformers is that the presence of communist era elites in the post-Soviet regime, which have retained their core values and recirculated into positions of power, may be a significant obstacle to the consolidation of democracy and a market economy.

Privatization to putinization: The genesis of Russia's hobbled oligarchy

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2017

This article examines how Russian privatization helped create the Putin political system. During the ‘who lost Russia’ debate in the 1990s, American economic advisors were rebuked for allowing a ‘capture of the state’ by the oligarchs. A larger time frame reveals that the consequences of Russian privatization were quite different from the forecasted ones. Because the new class of owners were regarded as illegitimate, lacked clear property rights, and ran conglomerates immersed in a command economy these owners, that is, oligarchs, were easily subdued by the state. As a consequence, there is little chance for a coalition of elites to mobilize against Putin.

Authoritarian modernization in post-Soviet Russia

Russian Modernization in Post-Soviet Russia. Structures, Agencies, and Choices, 2021

Russia’s is an electoral political system biased towards authoritarianism. This chapter analyses the structural conditions of the political system and the major choices made by Russia’s political and economic elites over the last two decades. The Russian elite sees modernization narrowly as only improvement in economic and technological competitiveness. However, they avoid long-term commitment to modernization programmes because a concrete failure could lead to a crisis in the legitimacy. In this way, the elite is both a promoter of, and an obstacle to narrow modernization. Our analysis shows that Russian system combines the risks of both democratic institutional forms and those of authoritarianism. The most important constraints of Russian modernization stem from a combination of authoritarianism and informal administrative practices.

Democratization, the Bourgeoisie and Russia

Government and opposition, 1998

THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA REMAIN ONE OF THE MOST compelling questions both for scholarly analysis and in inter-national politics. But in attempting to survey the prospects for a democratic future in post-communist Russia, all too often we are ...

Transition to Market Economy in Eastern Europe: Interest Groups and Political Institutions in Russia

Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 2002

The article analyzes the causes of the incoherent reformprogram in Russia in the last decade. It argues that the slow and partial policies can be attributed to a viscous combination of lobbyism and constitutional design. Because the post-communist transitions after 1989 were non violent “velvet revolutions,” the old state monopolies were not removed. State monopolies have small-group advantages in contrast to the large group of private firms, which are numerous and not yet organized. It leads to an asymmetrical pattern of lobbyism in favor of non-transition, which can only be mitigated by establishing dispersed political institutions, that can raise the price on rent-seeking. In Russia the centralized political institutions of the past were not replaced. Hence, Russia inherited both interest groups and political institutions of the late communist era – an unfortunate starting point for carrying out comprehensive economic reforms. Free trade with the West and potential competition ma...