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The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy Extract
With fifty-four chapters charting the development of moral philosophy in the Western world, this volume examines the key thinkers and texts and their influence on the history of moral thought from the pre-Socratics to the present day. Topics including Epicureanism, humanism, Jewish and Arabic thought, perfectionism, pragmatism, idealism and intuitionism are all explored, as are figures including Aristotle, Boethius, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Mill, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Rawls, as well as numerous key ideas and schools of thought. Chapters are written by leading experts in the field, drawing on the latest research to offer rigorous analysis of the canonical figures and movements of this branch of philosophy. The volume provides a comprehensive yet philosophically advanced resource for students and teachers alike as they approach, and refine their understanding of, the central issues in moral thought. Read more at http://www.cambridge.org/it/academic/subjects/philosophy/history-philosophy/cambridge-history-moral-philosophy#SKuHy5AdTDKYDw3K.99
A Moral Reconciliation With Aristotle\u27s Intellectualism
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Aristotle’s complete picture of human flourishing departs problematically from our commonplace conceptions of personal moral goodness when he draws rapid conclusions in Book X concerning the eudaimonic supremacy of theoria; a static comprehension of the timeless order of nature exemplified by the academic philosopher. I develop a sympathetic account of this anxiety as a philosophically legitimate ground of resistance to Aristotle, but go on to make a further case drawing on resources from Aristotle, particularly the relationship between phronesis and theoria and the role of friendship, which I believe can bring about significant if not total allayment of the worry and reconcile us to an Aristotelian approach for the justification of the ethical life
Historical Narrative as a Moral Guide and the Present as History as an Ethical Project
The aim of this paper is to explain why the many turns that historiography has undergone from the middle of the twentieth century to the present are related to the " living experiences " that have occurred outside of academia. Trying to grasp the concept of " practical past " from Oakeshott and White, it will be argued that the disciplinary transformations such as " gender history " or the " historiography of decolonization " that accompany " living experiences " outside of academia are the result of the " practical attitude " that accompanies historical narratives and function as a moral guide to the present. Finally, it will be discussed that if historians assume a critical attitude toward the " living experiences " and regard the " present as history, " then the different transformations of the discipline can be explained by a critical attitude and go together with an ethical project.
Moral Judgment and Historical Understanding
2011
Philosophers, historians, and social scientists often suppose that our moral judgments are insulated from our historical understanding, and vice versa. That is, they generally assume that while our moral judgments appraise social and historical facts, they do not constrain our predictions and explanations of those facts; conversely, our historical accounts describe and explain social phenomena, including ethical phenomena, but they are separate from our evaluations of those phenomena. I challenge both of these assumptions, in arguing that our historical understanding is wrapped up in certain inextricable ways with our moral outlook. More specifically, I contend that some of our moral judgments presuppose assumptions about history and the social world; and also that our social and historical accounts can be informed by our views about morality. In short, our moral and historical views are interdependent. 9 See Samuel Scheffler's Equality and Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 10. Scheffler's definition of tradition is intended to apply to traditions of many different kinds, including religious traditions, literary or artistic traditions, and the traditions associated with particular institutions, organizations, communities, and professions. 10 David Wiggins, Ethics (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 236. 11 A form of ethical life includes what Bernard Williams calls-ideas of responsible action, justice, and the motivations that lead people to do things that are admired and respected‖ in Shame and Necessity, p. 4. 12 Similar arguments to the one I shall present could also in principle be formulated to address others and non-liberal forms of ethical life to which others attach great value.