Sport as Mirror on Modernity (original) (raw)

Abstract

Sport is a form of game. In games we waste time, energy, and ingenuity on pointless and childish tasks. Even the most performance-oriented game remains unproductive. It is all show, a display of excellence for the sake of excellence in activities that are completely irrelevant to life. That which is not, or is no longer, important for "real" life is precisely that which is boisterously celebrated: physical power, skill. Some suspect that there is something wrong with people who are fascinated with this sort of thing. Perhaps it is a form of psychological immaturity, obsessive behavior, or an infantile compulsion for order? Alternatively, is it a form of mass hysteria urged upon us and manipulated by entertainment giants? However, none of these reductionist explanations makes the extraordinary attraction of sports in modernity understandable. This attraction points rather to elements that aptly appeal to modern persons, not in their aberrations, regressions, and infantilisms, but to the very basis of their scale of values and to the heart of their culture. However, how can we be appealed to by that which seems irrelevant to life and apparently is without any meaningful purpose? Precisely because the game is outside of life, and is eminently not real, it can be a symbol. Because it is nothing, it can mean everything. The way that modern Western persons experience relationships to themselves, to their fellow persons, to nature, and to society is pregnantly staged in their games. We catch the modern person in an unguarded moment, a moment of spontaneous fervor, when engaged in activities that are not in service of urgently vital interests. Sports could be compared to that other unguarded moment when the censor and the demands of reality are weakened: the dream. The game is a lived phantasm. 1 Moreover, there is a second reason why sports can so accurately stage modernity. Being separate from life, the game is not affected by life's ambiguities either. In daily life every meaning is ambiguous, every value stained, every task a risk, every victory an injustice, every law an oppression. Not so in a game. The rules of the game separate it from this dark everyday ambiguity. Amidst the confusion of life, it offers what Huizinga calls a 'limited perfection'. 2 All ambiguity is cleared away. The game is ruled by the clarity and univocality of a closed formalism. The rules are logically exhaustive. Every case is solvable. One could object that real games are never completely separated from life. Actors are real human beings with their own idiosyncrasies, their own

Key takeaways

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  1. Sports symbolize modernity, reflecting societal values rather than merely serving as childlike entertainment.
  2. The rules of sports create a closed universe, contrasting with the ambiguity of moral life.
  3. Modern sports exemplify the paradox of equality and difference, emphasizing competition while masking discrimination.
  4. Chance elements in sports amplify the perception of skill and mastery, reinforcing the value of performance.
  5. Sports critique the productivist mentality by showcasing the absurdity of seeking meaning in performance for its own sake.

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References (14)

  1. P. Parlebas, "Jeu sportif, rêve et fantaisie," Esprit 43 (1975), 784-803.
  2. J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 29. This idea, introduced by Huizinga in 1938, has become very popular in modern philosophy of play. It plays a fundamental role in the two most influential European books on the problem, by German phenomenologist Eugen Fink (Oase des Glücks: Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des Spiels, Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1960) and French sociologist Roger Caillois (Les jeux et les hommes, Paris: Gallimard, 1958).
  3. I have elaborated the difference between moral rules and rules of the game in F. De Wachter, "Spielregeln und ethische Problematik," in H. Lenk (ed.), Aktuelle Probleme der Sportphilosophie (Schorndorf, Germany: Hofmann, 1983), pp. 278-294. My text was used by Karl-Otto Apel to articulate his ethical system of transcendental pragmatism in Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Ubergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), p. 234.
  4. M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1-22.
  5. A. Brundage, Speech by the President of the International Olympic Committee, in Bulletin du comité international Olympique (1964), 63-65.
  6. P. de Coubertin, L'idée Olympique: Discours et essais (Schorndorf, Germany: Hofmann, 1967), p. 38.
  7. C. Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), pp. 30-33.
  8. Caillois, Les jeux et les hommes, pp. 193-249;
  9. P. Weiss, Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry (Car- bondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. 186-191.
  10. 9 For a more systematic classification of the elements of chance I refer the reader to A. J. Ayer, "Chance," in J. Dowie and P. Lefrère (eds.), Risk and Chance (Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1980), pp. 33-51. For a classification of all the differ- ent elements of chance in sports, see F. De Wachter, "In Praise of Chance: A Philo- sophical Analysis of the Element of Chance in Sports," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 12 (1985), 52-61.
  11. Cf. C. I. Bailey, "Sport and the Element of Chance," Journal of Sport Behaviour 3 (1980), 69-75.
  12. P. Weiss, Sport, p. 191.
  13. For an overview see E. Langer, "The Psychology of Chance," in Dowie and Lefrère, Risk and Chance, pp. 87-120.
  14. 13 This issue is discussed in detail in a classic text of B. Williams in Moral Luck (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20-39.