Carthaginian Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, Allied Conscripts, and Multi-Ethnic Armies in Antiquity (original) (raw)
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In antiquity, the lines between soldier, bandit and mercenary were blurred. Soldiers could become foreign mercenaries; mercenaries could turn bandit; bandit groups could be hired as auxiliaries. But in many cases, the term which our aristocratic historians chose to use was politically motivated. What were the concerns that these historians sought to explain with this terminology? In some cases, they were ethnic—a desire to promote the discipline of civilized Greeks and Romans over the cheating ambuscades of German and Illyrian barbarians. In other cases, they were intended to change the stature of the enemy—greater skill would be needed to fight an army of soldiers than a gang of bandits (even if they were the same people). In still others, we see evidence of class conflicts—the poor, needing to be paid to provide service in wartime, were seen as less loyal to their country than those who had estates to support them. This presentation will outline several examples of how the ancient historians ‘spun’ events through nomenclature to ensure history told the correct ‘truth’.
The Laws of Yesterday's Wars 2, 2022
From the mid-sixth century BC until the end of the Second Punic War in 201 BC the city-state of Carthage was one of the great powers of the Mediterranean basin. In the multipolar, violent anarchy that was the international environment of the period, Carthage built a hegemony that spanned North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia and southern Hispania. An intensifying export trade in commodities stimulated an agricultural expansion throughout the Punic world. This commerce generated enormous wealth for the Carthaginian state and its political elite, encouraging territorial expansion in Sardinia and Tunisia. In undertaking the defence of its extended sphere of interest, particularly in Sicily against Greek Syracuse, Carthage was obliged to field armies. This chapter examines all aspects of Carthaginian warcraft, finding that it was typical for its times; unsurprising given Carthage was a trading city integrated into wider Mediterranean cultural and economic currents. The paper examines Carthaginian recruitment of citizens, subject levies, mercenaries, and allied auxiliaries during the period c. 550-201 BC.
Down Upon the Fold: Mercenaries in the Twelfth Century
Despite the trend in recent medieval historiography which has accepted the presence of paid warriors as no longer an aberration, the role o f the mercenary within and outside twelfth-century society has still escaped in-depth analysis. Such an approach, however, has the dual merit o f building an understanding of the mercenary phenomenon itself and of highlighting the often overlooked social and cultural relations, structures, and breakdowns that produce men willing to fight for profit. The period 1187-1218 provides one o f the earliest, richest backgrounds against which to examine the mercenary. The accelerating return o f a money economy, hardening of feudal structures, developing of a chivalric ethos, and opening (and closing) vistas of urban life all played a role in who constituted a mercenary or who fought in an acceptable manner for pay. Moreover, conditions at the start and finish of this long twelfth century had changed dramatically, creating markedly different groups of marginalized combatants. After a narrative of the century's paid military activity, the analysis examines the conditions that dictated whether a salaried warrior somehow qualified to contemporaries as contemptible. A survey o f the Latin vocabulary shows not only a wide variety of combatants, but also a lack o f consistent disparagement in the terms themselves (save for routiers and Braban^ons). A look at the business side o f warfare further reveals an array of men engaged in profitable violence: from magnates seeking viii permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. new realms to low-born infantrymen earning the wages of skilled laborers. With money so prevalent in military affairs, the real question o f mercenary status lies in the nature o f an individual's identification with a group. In the 1100s such identification could prove simultaneously regional, familial, national, and religious. The real crime of many low born mercenaries was in shedding these associations. In the end, this outsider status was confirmed in contemporary eyes by the many hired soldiers kept by the Cathar heretics o f the early 1200s. The condemnation o f paid warriors derived ultimately from their position as intruders and not solely from a rejection o f profit-making within wartime. IX Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. * Again, see Andreski in conjunction with Gelven, p. 13: "No culture is possible without normative codes, and these cannot be upheld unless deviations from them are condemned." 3 permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they made possible his plans to go beyond the scope of the crusade. Eventually, many o f these in the south would be demobilized after 1229, but Geraud concluded with a caution that this was not the end o f the routiers. already these adventurers had transformed into soldiers (with all that word's connotations of discipline and regular practice, as opposed to warriors, for instance). Their value and effectiveness would play, even centuries later, into Charles VII's creation of a permanent army.27 Geraud's two articles left few stones unturned in the field o f Plantagenet/ Capetian struggles, with the exception of the early English Exchequer records, the Pipe Rolls. He also passed over, except in brief asides, the use of mercenaries, especially Brabanpons, by Frederick Barbarossa in Italy. A century passed before Jacques Boussard and Herbert Grundmann filled these lacunae. Grundmann's contribution still provides the basic road map through the primary sources for all continental appearances of mercenaries, including finally the use o f such troops by Barbarossa and those o f his magnates who went to Italy with him. He has been faulted by some for not including mercenary activity in England (either in Stephen's or John's reigns), but this is hardly a just criticism since he clearly was limiting himself to occurrences o f routiers and 27H. Geraud, "Les Routiers au Douzieme Siecle," in Bihliotheque de t'E co le des Charles 3 (1841-2): 125-147; and "Mercadier.Les Routiers au Treizieme Siecle" in Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des C harles 3 (1841-2): 417-443. M.P. Henrard, "Les Mercenaires dits Brabansons, au Moyen Age," in Annales de I'A cadem ie d A rch eo lo g ie de B elgique XXII, 2nd series (1866): 416-35, followed up on some o f Geraud's tentative conclusions, but unfortunately weakened his credibility by the absence o f some critical information. The most glaring omission was the death of Mercadier, already covered in Geraud's articles, but of whom Henrard could only note a disappearance after Richard the Lionheart's death. Nor did it help to end on a note o f nationalist pride: "Vaillance inutile, mais qui prouvait qu'apres douze siecles le courage des Beiges, exaltes par Cesar, n'avait pas degenere."
The traditional Iberian panoply developed during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, superbly adapted to the local circumstances of warfare in the Iberian Peninsula, underwent major modifications and adaptations in the late 3rd century BC. After their defeat in the First Punic War, the Carthaginians, and in particular the Barcid faction, used the Southern and Eastern parts of the Iberian Peninsula, already subject to much Semitic influence since the ninth century BC, to rebuild some sort of territorial and economic ‘empire’. A big part of Spain became a logistical and military base, thousands of mercenaries were hired and local subjects and allies recruited, and by the time Hannibal marched on Italy, a sizeable part of his army was built around a hard core of African and Iberian or Celtiberian contingents. These troops (already partly familiar with foreign warfare through their previous employment as xenoi in Sicily and Greece), now increasingly employed new types of weapon, such as the oval thureos, the cut-and-thrust straight sword, and bronze Montefortino type helmets. These were used in a more sophisticated tactical framework of traditional, fourth-century vintage tactics (already based in a type of dualpurpose ‘line’ infantry with light infantry capabilities) but within the structure of a Hellenistic-type army in which those thureophoroi could be most useful in combination with other troop types. Although Hannibal’s army was not strictly a Hellenistic one, we will show that the implication of Iberia, velis nolis, in the ‘World Wars’ of the late 3rd century BC and later in the Roman Civil Wars, introduced military developments of ultimately Hellenistic origin. However, these oval shields, bronze Montefortino helmets, and straight swords never completely displaced the traditional weaponry based on the round shield, leather helmet and curved falcata, except probably in those units serving under Carthaginian standards on a more or less permanent basis. During this period Iberians were increasingly being used (as allies, subjects or mercenaries) by the Carthaginians and later by the Romans as either line (dual-purpose) or light infantry, and as cavalry, but also fought each other, or on their own against both Carthaginians and Romans.
Marius’ Military Reforms and the War Against Jugurtha
2009
is responsible for developing the Roman Legion into what it is known for today. Not only did his reforms but also his conduct & tactics as a commander paved the way to victory over Jugurtha and future foes. By considering the claims of rival commanders during the war, Q. Caecilius Metellus (ca 160 BC-91 BC) and L. Cornelius Sulla (c. 138 BC-78 BC), it can be determined whether or not Marius truly deserved credit for the victory because each one of them played key roles in Jugurtha's defeat. Marius' reforms, while they significantly improved the Roman military, they would also cause dissent within the Roman nobility and eventually bring an end to the Republic. I Centuries earlier when Rome was as just a village on the bank of the Tiber River, its army consisted of the king, his body guards and retainers, as well as members of the clan-groups living within the city. Rome fought with the Fidenae, and Veii, whose army differed very little from the armies of all the small towns scattered across Latium, the flat land south of the Tiber river mouth. The neighbors to the North, the Etruscans, introduced military tactics and equipment to the cities of Latium. It is believed that the first military structure was based on the three 'tribes' of the regal period, the era of Romulus and the early kings of Rome (735-509 BC), the Ramnes, the Tities and the Luceres-all Etruscan names and so a product of the period of strong Etruscan influence. 1 Each of these tribes provided 1,000 men to serve in the army, under the command of the tribunus, or a tribal officer. A total of 3,000 men were formed, known as the legio or levy. Of the earliest wars of the Republic, fought mainly side by side with Rome's Latin kinsmen, little can be said. It may fairly be assumed that the Roman foot