Implicit emotional biases in decision making: The case of the Iowa Gambling Task (original) (raw)
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Emotion-based learning: Insights from the Iowa Gambling Task
Interest in the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making, and the related phenomenon of emotion-based learning, has been heavily influenced by the Iowa Gambling Task. A number of psychological variables have been investigated as potentially important in understanding emotion-based learning. This paper reviews the extent to which humans are explicitly aware of how we make such decisions; the biasing influence of pre-existing emotional labels; and the extent to which emotion-based systems are anatomically and functionally independent of episodic memory. Review of literature suggests that (i) an aspect of conscious awareness does appear to be readily achieved during the IGT, but as a relatively unfocused emotion-based “gut-feeling,” akin to intuition; (ii) Several studies have manipulated the affective pre-loading of IGT tasks, and make it clear that such labeling has a substantial influence on performance, an experimental manipulation similar to the phenomenon of prejudice. (iii) Finally, it appears that complex emotion-based learning can remain intact despite profound amnesia, at least in some neurological patients, a finding with a range of potentially important clinical implications: in the management of dementia; in explaining infantile amnesia; and in understanding of the possible mechanisms of psychotherapy.
Affective biasing of choices in gambling task decision making
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2006
The proponents of the somatic marker hypothesis presume that rational decision making is guided by emotional reactions that are developed from prior experience. Supporting evidence for the hypothesis comes almost exclusively from the short-term affective reactions that are learned during the course of a hypothetical decision-making task-the gambling task (GT). We examined GT performance and affective reactions to choices when those choices were biased by words that had preexisting affective value. In one experiment, affectively valued words directly signaled good and bad choices. A congruent relation between affective value of word and choice outcome improved GT performance, whereas an incongruent relation greatly interfered with performance. In another experiment, affectively valued words were maintained as a working memory (WM) load between GT choices. A WM load with affectively positive words somewhat improved GT performance, whereas affectively negative words interfered with performance. Somatic markers-indicated by differential anticipatory skin conductance response (SCR) amplitude for good and bad choices-appeared at a point in the GT session when choice performance was superior. However, differential SCR developed during the session after good choice performance was already established. These results indicate that preexisting affective biases can influence GT decision making. In addition, the somatic markers that are regular accompaniments of GT decision making appeared to be temporally lagging indicators of choice performance.
2014
The current research examined whether the presentation of gambling cues facilitates the activation of gambling outcome expectancies using both reaction time (RT) and selfreport modes of assessment. Gambling outcome expectancies were assessed by having regular casino or online gamblers (N = 58) complete a gambling outcome expectancy RT task, as well as a self-report measure of gambling outcome expectancies, both before and after exposure to one of two randomly assigned video cue conditions (i.e., casino or control video). Consistent with hypotheses, participants exposed to gambling cues (i.e., casino cue video condition) responded faster to positive outcome expectancy words preceded by gambling prime relative to non-gambling prime pictures on the post-cue RT task. Similarly, participants in the casino cue video condition self-reported significantly stronger positive gambling outcome expectancies than those in the control cue video condition following cue exposure. Activation of negat...
Affective bias in complex decision making: modulating sensitivity to aversive feedback
Motivation & Emotion, 2011
The present study investigated the conflict between well-developed attitudes and incentive rewards using the Iowa Gambling Task. In particular, the incorporation of emotional labels allowed us to model the role of affective biases and their impact on complex decision making over time. Two experiments manipulated the class of deck label (emotional pictures and racial faces) using both congruent and incongruent association to the deck incentives. Both experiments demonstrated that an incongruent association can lead to striking and persistent decision making biases. Thus, a common theme was a general inability to tolerate conflict between rewards and goal-irrelevant labels. Notably, Experiment 2 demonstrated that this ‘incongruency’ effect appeared to result from positive labels interfering with aversive experiences from bad decks. More generally, sensitivity to accumulating losses from punishing decks was primarily associated with successful performance on these Gambling Task variants. These results suggest emotional biases are readily harmful in complex decision making, and that flexibility in the extent to which we permit emotional influences to guide our decisions is crucial.
Journal of Gambling Studies, 2013
The current research examined whether the presentation of gambling-related cues facilitates the activation of gambling outcome expectancies using both reaction time (RT) and self-report modes of assessment. Gambling outcome expectancies were assessed by having regular casino or online gamblers (N = 58) complete an outcome expectancy RT task, as well as a self-report measure of gambling outcome expectancies, both before and after exposure to one of two randomly assigned cue conditions (i.e., casino or control video). Consistent with hypotheses, participants exposed to gambling-related cues (i.e., casino cue video condition) responded faster to positive outcome expectancy words preceded by gambling prime relative to non-gambling prime pictures on the post-cue RT task. Similarly, participants in the casino cue video condition self-reported significantly stronger positive gambling outcome expectancies than those in the control cue video condition following cue exposure. Activation of negative gambling outcome expectancies was not observed on either the RT task or self-report measure. The results indicate that exposure to gambling cues activates both implicit and explicit positive gambling outcome expectancies among regular gamblers.
2008
The role of the frequency of wins and losses in the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, A., Damasio, A., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. 1994. Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50, 7–15) was investigated in 2 experiments manipulating the long-term expected value of the decks participants had to choose from. The first experiment adopted the typical setting of the task in which every card selection was followed by a monetary win, while losses happened only occasionally. In the second experiment every decision led to a loss while the contingent event was represented by wins. In both experiments the long-term expected value of the decks did not seem to influence the participants’ choices that were, however, sensitive to the frequency with which the decks produced the contingent event. Immediate gains or losses associated with the decks exerted their effect on the first few choices only. The relevance of these findings for Damasio's Som...
Frontiers in Psychiatry
BackgroundSince 2007, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been a standardized clinical assessment tool for assessing decision behavior in 13 psychiatric/neurological conditions. After the publication of Maia and McClelland's (1) article, there were two responses in 2005 from Bechara et al. and Maia and McClelland, respectively, discussing whether implicit emotion or explicit knowledge influences the development of foresighted decision strategies under uncertain circumstances (e.g., as simulated in the IGT).Methods and ResultsWe reanalyze and verify the data obtained by Maia and McClelland (1) in their study “What participants really know in the Iowa Gambling Task” and find that decision-makers were lured into shortsighted decisions by the prospect of immediate gains and losses.ConclusionAlthough the findings of this reanalysis cannot support any arguments concerning the effect of either implicit emotion or explicit knowledge, we find evidence that, based on the gain–loss frequency ...
The Interplay of Experience-Based Affective and Probabilistic Cues in Decision Making
Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie), 2011
In a study using behavioral and physiological measures we induced experience-based affective cues (i.e., differential anticipatory arousal) toward a risky and a safe option by letting participants repeatedly select between two decks of cards with feedback. In later test decisions we presented choice tasks between these trained and new pairs of decks. In some of the trials a low-valid probabilistic cue was provided after stimulus onset but before the decision. Although we were successful in inducing experience-based affective cues these did not influence participants' choices. In decisions without any further cues available people choose the safe and the risky option about equally often. If an additional low-valid probabilistic cue was available people followed this cue. Although experience had no effect on choices it influenced arousal. Anticipatory physiological arousal increased if the probabilistic cue and experience were conflicting. Our results are in line with recent findings indicating diminished loss aversion in experience-based decision making. They are also consistent with parallel constraint satisfaction models and shed light on the interrelation between experience, probabilistic cues, and arousal in decision making.
Implicit Negativity Bias Leads to Greater Loss Aversion and Learning during Decision-Making
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
It is widely accepted there is the existence of negativity bias, a greater sensitivity to negative emotional stimuli compared with positive ones, but its effect on decision-making would depend on the context. In risky decisions, negativity bias could lead to non-rational choices by increasing loss aversion; yet in ambiguous decisions, it could favor reinforcement-learning and better decisions by increasing sensitivity to punishments. Nevertheless, these hypotheses have not been tested to date. Our aim was to fill this gap. Sixty-nine participants rated ambiguous emotional faces (from the NimStim set) as positive or negative to assess negativity bias. The implicit level of the bias was also obtained by tracking the mouse’s trajectories when rating faces. Then, they performed both a risky and an ambiguous decision-making task. Participants displayed negativity bias, but only at the implicit level. In addition, this bias was associated with loss aversion in risky decisions, and with gr...
Affective guidance in the Iowa gambling task
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2006
It has been suggested that affective states can guide higher level cognitive processes and that such affective guidance may be particularly important when real-life decisions are made under uncertainty. We ask whether affect guides decisions in a laboratory task that models real-life decisions under uncertainty. In the Iowa gambling task (IGT), participants search for monetary payoffs in an uncertain environment. Recent evidence against an affective guidance interpretation of the IGT indicates a need to set a standard for what counts as evidence of affective guidance. We present a novel analysis of IGT, and our results show that participants' galvanic skin response (GSR) reflects an affective process that precedes and guides cognition. Specifically, prior to participants' knowledge of the optimal strategy, their GSRs are significantly higher when they are about to select from a bad deck, relative to a good deck, and this difference in GSR is correlated with a behavioral preference for the good deck.