Russia's Policy in the Middle East and the Fight Against Extremism (original) (raw)
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This article illustrates the shortcomings of the dominant explanations of Russia's goals and policies vis-à-vis the Islamic State. We argue that, while Russia faces limited and rather indirect challenges from the Islamic State, it has the potential to use the threat posed by the Islamic State — whether perceived or actual — to its advantage. First, the extent and nature of the threat posed by Russian-born jihadists to Russia's security is considerably overestimated. Facing increasingly united Western opposition to its controversial involvement in the Ukraine conflict, Moscow is eager to use its influence in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, as leverage in its relationship with key regional and Western countries, especially the United States. Over the last year, Moscow has consistently sought to direct international attention to the shared threat posed by the Islamic State, while simultaneously downplaying its actions in Ukraine. In spite of statements made by Russian politicians about the need to establish a common anti-jihadist front in Syria and Iraq, Moscow has exerted little effort toward a prospective international coalition. Moreover, even if, hypothetically, Moscow were interested in contributing to the liquidation of the Islamic State by concerted international efforts, its tools are limited. Finally, in providing background on Russian elite views of the Middle East crisis and Russia's role in it, this article also discusses mainstream Russian interpretations — largely unknown in the West — of the origins of the Islamic State.
Putin's Word in the Middle East
2019
This dissertation mainly focuses on Russia's current foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. During the post-Soviet era. It mainly concentrated after the Arab Spring. Russia's position in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Israel-Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, etc. Plus, how Russia has also managed to open up to a holistic alliance with all these countries as mentioned, and how it has been able to benefit as a regional player in the Middle East.
Russia's Strategy Toward Islam and Muslims
Center for Global Policy, 2018
Almost 30 years after withdrawing from Afghanistan, Moscow hosted an international peace conference earlier this month, and 12 nations attended — including a delegation from the Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani's government did not represent Afghanistan, though Kabul did send an official from the High Peace Council, the body that facilitates negotiations with jihadist rebels. Russia has been taking on a greater role in peace processes and mediation efforts in the wider Middle East, from Libya to Afghanistan, seeking to protect its own interests and knowing well that the global powers' " great game " has opened several doors for Moscow. Russia Rising Russia has been expending diplomatic energy to increase cooperation with the political office of the Taliban based in Doha, Qatar, to position itself as the great power capable of effectively mediating between the insurgent movement and Kabul. Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, a top Taliban political official, said, " We do not recognize the incumbent government as legitimate and we demand the withdrawal of foreign troops. " The Taliban's goal of seeking broad international recognition as a legitimate Afghan national movement is what the Russians are trying to leverage to their advantage. Meanwhile, the United States conceding significant political space is not the only cause of Russia's ascent as a definitive geopolitical player in key regions of the core of the Muslim world, i.e., North Africa, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, the northern rim from Turkey to Iran, and beyond to South Asia. Russia's increasing prominence has also come about because of President Vladimir Putin's efforts to geopolitically rehabilitate Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union, especially and the Kremlin's concern its own Muslim population of 22 million. But what exactly is driving Putin's aggressive policies toward Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority countries?
This article explores explanations of Russia's unyielding alignment with the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad since the Syrian crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield for Damascus in the UN Security Council and has continued to supply it with modern arms. Putin's resistance to any scenario of western-led intervention in Syria, on the model of the Libya campaign, in itself does not explain Russian policy. For this we need to analyse underlying Russian motives. The article argues that identity or solidarity between the Soviet Union/Russia and Syria has exerted little real influence, besides leaving some strategic nostalgia among Russian security policy-makers. Russian material interests in Syria are also overstated, although Russia still hopes to entrench itself in the regional politics of the Middle East. Of more significance is the potential impact of the Syria crisis on the domestic political order of the Russian state. First, the nexus between regional spillover from Syria, Islamist networks and insurgency in the North Caucasus is a cause of concern—although the risk of ‘blowback’ to Russia is exaggerated. Second, Moscow rejects calls for the departure of Assad as another case of the western community imposing standards of political legitimacy on a ‘sovereign state’ to enforce regime change, with future implications for Russia or other authoritarian members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia may try to enshrine its influence in the Middle East through a peace process for Syria, but if Syria descends further into chaos western states may be able to achieve no more in practice than emergency coordination with Russia.
FPI Bulletin: The Russian Mirage in the Middle East (November 28, 2016)
2016
President-elect Trump has articulated two primary goals in the Middle East: the defeat of radical Islamist terrorism and the abrogation or renegotiation of the Iran nuclear deal. At the same time, however, he also seeks to strengthen America’s relationship with Russia, which he has portrayed as a strategic partner that shares U.S. objectives in the region. These views are incompatible. Through its support of the Syrian and Iranian regimes, the Kremlin has fueled the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and facilitated Tehran’s nuclear and hegemonic ambitions. If the president-elect intends to advance U.S. interests in the Middle East, he must adopt a strategy aimed at combating Moscow’s influence.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC AND UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PUBLICATION , 2017
he Radicalization of Russian Islam , At the beginning of the Arab Spring, the religious aspect of the revolutions did not seem to be alarming for the West nor for Russia. As events escalated, this aspect turned out to be essential for Russia especially on the domestic level. In fact, the manifestation and reign of Islamism echoed with the Muslim population inside Russia and led to the emergence of opposition movements inside the country.As protests in Russia broke open in parallel to those in the Arab nations, Russia was anxiously concerned with the effect the Arab Spring could have on its domestic situation. KEYWORDS:Effects , Russian , Muslims , Arab Spring
Islamic State and Jihadist Media Strategies in the Post-Soviet Region
Defence Strategic Communications, 2020
The Syrian war is the first of the modern Islamist "jihad" conflicts to have attracted large numbers of recruits from Central Asia and the post-Soviet region. Some 9,000 men and women from the post-Soviet republics travelled to Syria, including 4,000-7,000 Central Asians, many of them recruited in Russia. Why did the Islamic State's caliphate attract such large numbers? Information manipulation was central to IS strategic planning and a primary factor in its unprecedented global recruiting success. IS produced Russian-language media content to build support among post-Soviet Muslims. At the same time, emerging communications networks are building ties between "Russianspeaking" Muslims and the Middle East. Jihadist media engagement in Russian and in Central Asian languages, exploiting these new networks, was a key factor in attracting Central Asians to support the caliphate.