Some Notes on Philo's Sceptical Strategies (original) (raw)

Some Notes on Philo's Sceptical Strategies

2021, The Philosophical Translations in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages.” Volume in Memory of Mauro Zonta (1968-2017), Flumen sapientiae: studi sul pensiero medievale, Roma: Aracne Editrice.

The Philosophical Translations in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages.” Volume in Memory of Mauro Zonta (1968-2017), Flumen sapientiae: studi sul pensiero medievale, Roma: Aracne Editrice.

In some Platonic dialogues Socrates apparently shares significant characteristics with contemporary sophists, especially a technique of antithetical argumentation. Since sophists anticipated later Academic philosophers in arguing antithetically and a resultant form of, then, with Socrates’ repeated claims to ignorance, Plato’s depiction of him arguing antithetically suggests later Academics could plausibly appeal to Plato for evidence that Socrates and he were, as it seems they actually did.

The Yearbook mirrors the annual activities of staff and visiting fellows of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies and reports on symposia, workshops, and lectures taking place at the Centre. Although aimed at a wider audience, the yearbook also contains academic articles and book reviews on scepticism in Judaism and scepticism in general. Only frontmatter and content are uploaded. The entire volume is available as open access, follow the link: https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/467151

Scepticism is a concept and a practice of numerous facets.¹ In its historical development the two branches of Academic and Pyrrhonian philosophy are still highly relevant to the enquiry of the reliability of secular and sacred knowledge.² Scepticism as a general term denotes putting every belief and all knowledge into question. Since the Early Modern period, it has also been used to designate atheism, agnos-ticism and criticism. In the context of following contribution, scepticism is used in its general meaning as enquiry into (secular and sacred) belief and knowledge, the expression of doubts about any kind of authority – comprising the question of the criterion of truth³ and including implicit and explicit sceptical paradoxes – and the purposefully evoked suspension of judgement to avoid dogmatism.⁴