Mirror Neurons and Mind: Commentary on Vivona (original) (raw)
Related papers
Mirror neurons in humans: Consisting or confounding evidence?
Brain and Language, 2009
The widely known discovery of mirror neurons in macaques shows that premotor and parietal cortical areas are not only involved in executing one's own movement, but are also active when observing the action of others. The goal of this essay is to critically evaluate the substance of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) studies whose aim has been to reveal the presence of a parallel system in humans. An inspection of this literature suggests that there is relatively weak evidence for the existence of a circuit with 'mirror' properties in humans, such as that described in monkeys.
Mirror neurons and the self construct
Advances in Consciousness Research, 2002
The concept of mirror neurons postulates a neuronal network that represents both observation and execution of goal-directed behavior and is taken as evidence for the validity of the simulation theory, according to which human sUbjects use their own mental states to predict or explain mental processes of others. However, the concept of mirror neurons does not address the question, whether there is a specific difference between the other individual observed and myself, between first-person-and third-person-perspective. Addressing this issue, a functional magnetic resonance imaging study is presented that varies first-person-and third-person perspective systematically. A classical theory of mind paradigm was employed and extended to include first-person-and third-person-perspective stimuli. During the involvement of third person-perspective increased neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and lett temporopolar cortex was observed. During the involvement of first-person-perspective material increased neural activity in the right temporoparietal junction and in the anterior cingulate cortex was found. A significant interaction of both perspectives activated the right prefrontal cortex. These data suggest that these different perspectives are implemented at least in part in distinct brain regions. With respect to the debate on simulation theory, this result rejects the exclusive validity of simulation theory.
Mirror neurons and intentional attunement: Commentary on Olds
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2006
A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life.
Intentional attunement: Mirror neurons and the neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations
Journal of the American …, 2007
The neural circuits activated in a person carrying out actions, expressing emotions, and experiencing sensations are activated also, automatically via a mirror neuron system, in the observer of those actions, emotions, and sensations. It is proposed that this finding of shared activation suggests a functional mechanism of "embodied simulation" that consists of the automatic, unconscious, and noninferential simulation in the observer of actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed. It is proposed also that the shared neural activation pattern and the accompanying embodied simulation constitute a fundamental biological basis for understanding another's mind. The implications of this perspective for psychoanalysis are discussed, particularly regarding unconscious communication, projective identification, attunement, empathy, autism, therapeutic action, and transference-countertransference interactions.
MIRROR NEURONS: OUR CURRENT UNDERSTANDING
tcd.ie
Mirror neurons are a relatively new phenomena, first observed in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys when a number of neurons were observed to respond both when a monkey performed a goal orientated task, and when the monkey watched another (human or monkey) perform that task. A number of researchers have suggested that mirror neurons also exist in humans. It is proposed that a human mirror neuron system may contribute to a number of cognitive functions such as action understanding; 'theory of mind', humans' abilities to infer another's mental state through experiences or others' behaviour; emotion understanding; imitation; and speech perception. Faulty human mirror neurons have even been suggested to underpin social impairments such as those characteristic of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD). However, there has been much debate regarding the existence and functional roles of mirror neurons in humans. While there is much literature regarding human mirror neurons, the majority consist of reviews while few concern empirical experiments. Additionally concern has been expressed for some of the experimental methods used in empirical studies. A recent experiment from is the first of its kind to directly gather evidence for the existence of mirror neurons in humans and for their function subserving action understanding. The present review critically outlines the growth in this controversial field of research, taking into account the recent direct recording of human mirror neurons, and what implications this may have on our understanding of social cognition.
Mirror Neurons, Psychoanalysis, and the Age of Empathy
A number of psychoanalysts have become excited about mirror neurons, as they are called by neuroscientists. Mirror neurons have the remarkable property of responding identically to an action I intend as well as an action you intend. The argument of some psychoanalysts is that mirror neurons open a new pathway to understanding the intentions of others. They make possible a new type of empathy, more direct and less mediated by the typical defenses. One result of such a perspective on psychoanalysis is the virtual death of the countertransference. If one has direct empathic contact with another mind, then countertransferential experience is only a barrier, not a guide. The essay not only looks at the evidence for mirror neurons, which is ambiguous, but also at what need they might be filling in our contemporary culture.
2012
The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer's brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent's brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of grasping is the neural basis of the concept of e.g., grasping.
The mirror neuron system and the consequences of its dysfunction
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2006
| The discovery of premotor and parietal cells known as mirror neurons in the macaque brain that fire not only when the animal is in action, but also when it observes others carrying out the same actions provides a plausible neurophysiological mechanism for a variety of important social behaviours, from imitation to empathy. Recent data also show that dysfunction of the mirror neuron system in humans might be a core deficit in autism, a socially isolating condition. Here, we review the neurophysiology of the mirror neuron system and its role in social cognition and discuss the clinical implications of mirror neuron dysfunction.