In the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the era of Postnationalism (original) (raw)
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Greek-Turkish relations, in many ways, provides a fruitful case for scholars interested in the EU’s role in the transformation of border conflicts. First of all, it is a case where the impact of the EU is widely mentioned, but has not yet been comprehensively and systematically studied (Rumelili, 2004a). Secondly, because the EU has been a factor in Greek-Turkish relations since the early 1960s, the case contains many useful insights about the conditions under which the EU can positively impact border conflicts. There is a clear puzzle in the EU involvement in Greek-Turkish conflicts: Up until late 1990s, the EU failed to have a positive impact. Countering the links made between European integration and peace, Greek-Turkish conflicts multiplied and intensified as Greece and Turkey developed closer institutional relations with the EU. However, clearly since 1999, we observe a promising rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, one which is founded on the principles and procedures of the EU (Rumelili, 2003; 2004a). How the role of the EU changed from an additional forum for Greek- Turkish rivalry to a foundation for Greek-Turkish reconciliation is a very interesting empirical question that contains valuable insights for understanding the conditions for successful EU involvement in border conflicts. And finally, the case of Greek-Turkish relations demonstrates the complex interaction between the domestic and EU-level conditions in bringing about conflict change. As will be discussed in detail in this working paper, there have always been domestic actors in both countries, who saw the futility of the ongoing conflicts, and sought to improve the bilateral relations. The longer-term democratization and socialization influences of the EU in Greece and Turkey have cascaded1 with Turkey’s EU membership candidacy in 1999, enabling the pro-change domestic actors to convince the skeptics, mobilize coalitions, and to silence their opponents. Afterwards, the domestic actors thus enabled have, in turn, furthered EU impact by successfully using the EU as a symbol and as a legitimating handle in their advocacy for change.
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The Greek-Turkish dyad is one of the oldest rivalries between neighbours. Since 1999 Greek-Turkish relations are in a state of detente and there have been many attempts to resolve their outstanding differences (Aegean, Cyprus, minority issues) but until now little has come out of these efforts although both sides are committed to an overall settlement. Our thesis is that this lack of progress is due to the fact that various incompatible conflicts are but the tip of the iceberg. The real reasons for the impasse, the essence of the rivalry, are the following ensemble (which is presented in detail in this paper): historical memories and traumas, real or imagined that are part and parcel of their national narratives together with their respective collective identities which are built on slighting and demonizing the ‘Other’. Only if this aspect of the conflict is fully addressed will Greece and Turkey be able to settle their ‘objective conflicts of interests’ and embark on a process of m...
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The latest persistent period of tension between Greece and Turkey that has started effectively in 2019 is the first such period after the 1999 Helsinki EU Summit that ended a difficult decade. The 1990's tension built-up that resulted in a series of crises, 'hot' incidents and widespread mutual suspicion between the two states, was effectively annulled by the rapprochement that paved a difficult-albeit realistic-road for a final solution to the bilateral disputes, including the Cyprus issue. The long-term success of the venture, however, was heavily dependent on bold politics in both sides of the Aegean Sea and mutual concessions from all parties to the disputes. Less than twenty years later, the Aegean Sea and the east of the Mediterranean Sea are once again brewing new tensions, triggered by the old unresolved issues. In addition, as recent energy discoveries have put the area in the European energy map, a number of new problems have risen, and with the active involvement of several more players, including the area's regional powers, as well as western European states with regional interests, the situation has become significantly more complicated. The failure to follow through commitments in the post-Helsinki years, has resulted in the re-emergence of the Aegean Sea disputes and reinforced the deadlock in Cyprus. Today, the key parties are called upon handling the disputes, under far more complicated conditions than in 1999.