New Insights to Key Derivation for Tamper-Evident Physical Unclonable Functions (original) (raw)

2019, IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

Several publications presented tamper-evident Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for secure storage of cryptographic keys and tamper-detection. Unfortunately, previously published PUF-based key derivation schemes do not sufficiently take into account the specifics of the underlying application, i.e., an attacker that tampers with the physical parameters of the PUF outside of an idealized noise error model. This is a notable extension of existing schemes for PUF key derivation, as they are typically concerned about helper data leakage, i.e., by how much the PUF’s entropy is diminished when gaining access to its helper data.To address the specifics of tamper-evident PUFs, we formalize the aspect of tamper-sensitivity, thereby providing a new tool to rate by how much an attacker is allowed to tamper with the PUF. This complements existing criteria such as effective number of secret bits for entropy and failure rate for reliability. As a result, it provides a fair comparison among dif...

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