Kant's Political Philosophy (original) (raw)
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Sovereignty as a Right and as a Duty: Kant's Theory of the State
Critics of Immanuel Kant’s legal and political philosophy argue that his theory of the state collapses into one of two extremes. For some, Kant is a quietist who regards positive law as the instantiation of justice and thereby deprives himself of a moral standpoint for the criticism of positive law. For others, Kant is an anarchist who denies the authority of law whenever it deviates from the demands of justice. I argue that these interpretations are the opposing products of a common error: the failure to distinguish between Kant’s justification of the right of the state to exercise public authority and his corresponding theory of a perfectly just state. Once these aspects of his theory of the state are disentangled, Kant’s transformative vision comes into view. Far from reducing the idea of a state to either an authoritative fiat or a utopian vision of justice, Kant offers a standpoint for recognizing (1) the public authority of existing states, (2) the standard of justice for assessing the moral adequacy of those states, and (3) the ongoing duty of existing states to direct the exercise of public authority to the deepest possible fulfillment of public justice.
Kant, the State, and Revolution
This paper argues that, although no resistance or revolution is permitted in the Kantian state, very tyrannical regimes must not be obeyed because they do not qualify as states. The essay shows how a state ceases to be a state, argues that persons have a moral responsibility to judge about it and defends the compatibility of this with Kantian authority. The reconstructed Kantian view has implications for how we conceive authority and obligation. It calls for a morally demanding definition of the state and asserts that the primary personal responsibility is not to evaluate the morality of every single law but to evaluate the moral standing of the polity.
Political Obligations and Provisional Rights: A Study in Kant's Politics of Freedom
2018
Author(s): Messina, James | Advisor(s): Watkins, Eric; Arneson, Richard | Abstract: This dissertation argues (with Ellis 2005) that Kant’s political philosophy must be re-read in view of his commitment to the Provisionality Thesis (PT). PT states that, in our world, external rights are provisional, never peremptory. In Chapter 1, I lay the grounds for such a reading by showing how Kant’s notion of external freedom, properly understood, drives the development of his political theory (by generating duties to leave the state of nature, to form a body of international law, and to respect each person’s cosmopolitan rights). Chapter 2 then establishes (against competitors), that Kant’s theory so understood is committed to the Provisionality Thesis. Chapter 3 locates the language of provisionality in the political writings of Leibniz and Rousseau, and shows that Kant’s usage differs considerably from his predecessors’. Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 examine the conditions and meaning of provisio...
Kant's Politics in Context, Introduction
Kant's Politics in Context shows how Kant developed his legal and political philosophy in an environment of controversy between conservative and radical observers of the French Revolution. Reidar Maliks argues that Kant recognized in the Revolution of 1789 his own concept of equal freedom, which he in the following decade developed into a theory of law and the state. This concept of freedom was at the root of his condemnation of paternalistic government, which makes persons dependent on the good will of a ruler, and his denunciation of direct democracy, which subjects persons to the arbitrary decisions of a majority. It led Kant to develop a republican constitutionalism, where persons are free and independent because they are subject only to law. That Kant idealized the public sphere is well known, but that he intentionally developed his own philosophy in polemical articles and pamphlets aimed for a wide audience has not been fully appreciated. Paying attention to the debates he sparked during the 1790s- where radical followers like Fichte, Erhard, and Bergk clashed with conservative critics like Rehberg, Möser, and Gentz-can help us understand Kant's political philosophy. The first comprehensive account of Kant's politics in context, this book provides a fresh perspective both on a foundational moment for modern political philosophy and on Kant's central political concepts, including freedom, rights, citizenship, revolution, and war.
2012
Past interpreters of Kant’s thought seldom viewed his writings on politics as having much importance, especially in comparison with his writings on ethics, which (along with his major works, such as the Critique of Pure Reason) received the lion’s share of attention. But in recent years a new generation of scholars has revived interest in what Kant had to say about politics. From a position of engagement with today’s most pressing questions, this volume of essays offers a comprehensive introduction to Kant’s often misunderstood political thought. Covering the full range of sources of Kant’s political theory—including not only the Doctrine of Right, the Critiques, and the political essays but also Kant’s lectures and minor writings—the volume’s dis- tinguished contributors demonstrate that Kant’s philosophy offers compelling positions that continue to inspire the best thinking on politics today.
Immanuel Kant and the History of Political Ideas: Autonomy
2015
Modern “liberal” societies (or, if we prefer, so-called free societies) are based on an assumption that hardly needs to be articulated. External actions should be as free as possible, but on condition that they are compatible with the similar actions of others. For example, to decide whether to lie or not, to accept refugees or not, to pay or not to pay taxes, to fulfill or to avoid military duties, it is firstly necessary to determine whether it is possible for everyone to do the same without the collapse of a just society. Someone who wears a cloak of invisibility to evade these moral or political duties is clearly objectionable and even legally accountable, but not because these actions are less than noble, generous or humane. These are moral and political imperatives. We take it as given that rules apply to everyone equally, even if individuals find themselves in different situations, belong to different social conditions or political regimes, or have different emotional bonds. The judgment of a prudent man (in the Aristotelian sense) who decides on the correct action in concrete circumstances is not therefore necessary. Moral duties and rights are universal and apply to all men equally, whether in Greece or China. Differences in rights and duties among men in accordance with class or nation should be progressively abolished, as they are unjustifiable and unfair. This ideal will lead to a kind of morality that we may say is “cosmopolitan” in scope. At first sight, we might think that the principles of morality are universal and apply everywhere, insofar as men naturally belong to a society. Belonging to a society entails certain duties towards others, personal moral duties which also have consequences in the political sphere. However, since Machiavelli this link between virtue (or morality) and politics has been severed. On the contrary, the principles of morality (or the “doctrine of virtue”) and the principles of law (or “doctrine of right”) are considered different and separate parts of the moral life, which do not obey the same criteria, as Kant notes in the Metaphysics of Morals. Nor are universal principles justified because all men have a similar basic nature and what makes them happy (or, in the modern formulation, what leads to their well-being) is fundamentally the same. Law and political authority should be based on freedom and not – as the ancients believed – on the well-being or happiness of citizens. In fact, a political authority that decides about happiness is seen as “paternalistic” and unacceptable, as it implicitly presupposes that individuals are incapable of choosing what is best for themselves and therefore need guardianship. The pursuit of happiness is thus a matter of private morals and a political authority should not meddle too much. In the first wave of modernity – with Hobbes, Locke or even Hume (who wrote a Treatise of Human Nature) – human nature was the standard for evaluating what is good or bad for man. Nowadays, however, nature is no longer the criterion for morality and even less politics. Truth be told, the modern view of human nature has tended to be increasingly dark, but it is human nature nonetheless. Hume still asserted that the virtues and vices are the same everywhere: if a traveler were to describe a man not moved by ambition, covetousness, self-love and vanity, and instead moved solely by friendship, generosity and public spiritedness “ we would immediately perceive the falsity of his account, and judge him a liar with the same confidence as we would if he had filled his account with tales of centaurs, dragons, miracles and prodigies.” Today no one agrees with Locke – who bequeathed us a list of societies that fell into parricide, infanticide, cannibalism or “other monstrosities”, – when he says that “virtues and vices [...] [are] the same everywhere”. It is now evident that “the taste of Paris” is not “similar to that of Athens,” nor are the same the things that move to cry or laugh the inhabitants of Paris and Athens. Moral laws, as laws of liberty, are surely not natural laws. Political and moral ideals are defined without reference to the nature of man, and, for this reason, the most recent declarations of rights speak of human rights and not of natural rights. However, the philosopher who brought about this fundamental shift away from morality as constrained by nature (including its flaws) did not draw any relativistic consequences from the variety of conceptions of happiness. In fact, we might even describe him as one of the sterner moral philosophers. Indeed, according to him, not even a potential murderer can be lied to. Kant says that an action is good or right (richtig) only if it is compatible with everyone’s freedom and in accordance with a law or a universal maxim. A “maxim” is a principle or rule of action that indicates how one should act. All moral and political imperatives or duties follow rational maxims. Kant’s moral doctrine implies that the test that confirms whether an action is good or right is the possibility of becoming a principle of universal legislation. Universality, which at bottom is nothing more than the “form” of rationality, has become the proof or criterion of the goodness of the “matter” or substance of the action. Freed from the guardianship of nature, man confers the rule of his own actions to himself. This is the essence of true freedom or “autonomy.” The validity of arguments for or against a social and political ideal that are based on the nature of man is no longer recognized, however much they may have been tested by centuries of experience. What is called “nature” is only a stage in development, a moment in the past from which no valid lessons for the future can be drawn. From now on, the only guide to action is reason. Reason has replaced nature, and duty is no longer based on being. Values or what ought to be done are unrelated to facts or what is.