Did Rorty's Pragmatism have Foundations? (original) (raw)

A Critique of Rorty's Conception of Pragmatism (Please only cite published version)

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2015

The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation.

Taking Rorty Seriously: Pragmatism, Metaphilosophy, and Truth

Inquiry, 2020

Although Rorty’s work has become a touchstone for evaluating the metaphilosophical stance appropriate for pragmatism, the suspicion prevails that his ‘neopragmatism’ (NeoP) is undermined by a failure to take first-order philosophical problems seriously. We propose that this imputation is grounded in the assumption that he attempts to distinguish metaphilosophy from philosophy in order to insulate the former from the latter, and against it argue that pragmatism’s experimental attitude towards inquiry entails that there is and can be no such separation. We go on to suggest that philosophers such as Misak who define their ‘new pragmatist’ (NewP) position partly in opposition to Rorty’s, insist on this separation because they feel themselves answerable to some ‘transcendental’ urge. The conviction that to reject that urge is to reject the calling of philosophy itself is manifest in the debate between NeoP and NewP on the role of truth-talk. We argue that acceding to this urge prevents us from taking philosophy seriously, and by extension from taking Rorty’s contribution to philosophy in like fashion.

Richard Rorty's pragmatic vision

Richard Rorty’s philosophical position can be placed in stark opposition to what he saw as the dominant one in western tradition since Plato: a philosophy preoccupied mostly with “true” knowledge and based on dualistic and essentialist models that aimed to penetrate beneath appearances to arrive at the immutable truths, out there, waiting to be discovered. Rorty saw in pragmatism the potential to move beyond the impasse of dualism and truth-seeking philosophy towards a philosophy of social hope ; one that helps us carry out practical tasks to move towards a more just and democratic society. He was not preoccupied by whether our ideas correspond to some fundamental true reality. Indeed, for him there was no such reality. In this paper the focus will be on Rorty’s vision of pragmatism specifically as it relates to his position against dualistic thinking. I argue, together with Rorty, that dualism is a very restrictive way of conceptualizing the world, because it aims at explaining things by reducing them to immutable categories that are not sensitive or responsive to the context from which they emerge. The first part of the paper (I) will address Rorty’s particular insight and contribution to pragmatism; the second part (II) will focus on his antipathy to dualism and the causes for his rejection, including representation. The focus here will be on the mind-body dualism, as an example of one of the most persistent dualities and one that Rorty returns to often in his writings and lectures. Lastly, I will touch on Rorty’s bigger picture hopes for philosophy and the role that pragmatism plays in this conception. The main aim of the paper is to show that Rorty saw pragmatism as a force capable of dismantling ingrained dualities and capable of revitalizing philosophy by offering an entirely new way of thinking; one no longer bound by the falsity of “truth” and dualisms, but rather on the hope for social justice.

A Critique of Richard Rorty's Neo-pragmatism

Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Certain questions have always intrigued the minds of philosophers regarding the nature and essence of philosophy for ages. "What is philosophy?, What is philosophy for?, How should philosophy be done?", etc. These questions were answered by many a thinker over the ages, and each of these answers had laid the path for a new theoretical discourse in philosophy. One such discourse is related to pragmatism that stresses on the practical application of philosophical theories. However, the pragmatic school of thought was vehemently criticized by analytic philosophy to such an extent that it was on the verge of extinction from the philosophical scenario. In the contemporary era, Richard Rorty is credited to have revived the spirit of pragmatism once again. Rorty revised the traditional pragmatic theories and put them in a new format and labelled it as neo-pragmatism. Our main aim in this paper would be to analyse the neo-pragmatic theory of Rorty and to argue whether or not his theory is successful in answering the age-old questions of philosophy that we cited above.

Does Rorty's Pragmatism Undermine Itself?

Paul Boghossian and Hilary Putnam have presented arguments designed to show self-referential difficulties within Rorty’s pragmatism. I respond to these arguments by drawing out the details of the pragmatic account of justification implicit within Rorty’s writings, thereby revealing it to be a sophisticated form of relativism that does not undermine itself. In Section I and II, I motivate my strategy of attributing a positive position to Rorty in order to respond to detailed, analytical arguments such as those of Boghossian, and present an outline of this position, agreeing with Rorty’s critics that it can be justifiably classified as a form of relativism. Sections III to V concern the detail of Boghossian’s argument, in which I show that Boghossian’s contention that Rorty’s rejection of all absolute justification is inconsistent can be satisfactorily answered by explaining the differences between ‘epistemic systems’ in terms of the different purposes they serve. Then in Sections VI to VIII, I further develop Rorty’s account of justification in order to answer Putnam’s charge that Rorty tries to say ‘from a God’s-Eye View there is no God’s-Eye View’. I reject Rorty’s own ‘social-reformer’ response to this argument, but show that it can be satisfactorily answered by distinguishing two integrated components within Rorty’s pragmatism, one holistic and coherentist, and the other causal and social-evolutionary.

Introduction to Rethinking Rorty’s Pragmatism: Ethics after Epistemology

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2020

The title of the symposium, "Rethinking Rorty's Pragmatism: Ethics after Epistemology," expresses the central aim of this issue: to continue the conversation about the consequences for ethics of Rorty's famous critique of modern epistemology and its well-known concern with knowledge and representation. The issue features new work that seeks to challenge the divides between and among "classico," "paleo," "neo," and "new" pragmatisms, by rethinking the interconnection of ethics and epistemology through, with, or beyond Rorty's pragmatism. The opening article of our symposium is Giovanni Maddalena's "Rorty as a Legitimate Member of the Pragmatist Family," which is a critical update of the legitimacy of Rorty's membership in the pragmatist family. Reexamining many criticisms, which mainly focused on Rorty's problematic Introduction to Rethinking Rorty's Pragmatism: Ethics after Epistemology

Rorty and the Question of Normativity: Replies to Commentators on Reconstructing Pragmatism

Contemporary Pragmatism

This response to insightful commentaries on my book, from Richard Shusterman, Susan Dieleman, Raff Donelson, and Colin Koopman, takes up the recurring theme of the nature of normativity on a Rortyan view. To frame my individual replies, I revisit the Davidsonian account of epistemic interaction that influences Rorty’s mature view and suggest that the norms implicit in Davidsonian triangulation are insufficient to support Rorty’s antiauthoritarianism in ethics and epistemology. To address the resulting question of how to account for norms of responsibility and obligation within Rorty’s thought, I highlight key strands of the pragmatic tradition, originating with Peirce but extending through James, Addams, and Dewey, that Rorty reconstructs in the process of developing the full implications of prioritizing democracy over philosophy.