Introduction: The Varieties of Anti-Skepticism, from Past to Present (original) (raw)
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The Ways of Scepticism (Then and Now)
Iris, 2009
The following essay outlines the principal arguments presented by the sceptical tradition, from its explicit beginnings in Greek philosophy down to a variety of contemporary forms of scepticism. The discussion takes its point of departure from an analysis of the original sceptical tropes that were directed against the "Dogmatists," focussing particularly on the "Modes" of Aenesidemus and Agrippa. The principal part of the essay is dedicated to an elucidation of the nature and status of "beliefs" with a view to comparing ancient, modern, and contemporary types of scepticism. Far from re-endorsing the ideal of a life without beliefs as a model for human happiness, modern and contemporary varieties of scepticism offer a description of human historical experience that is indeed based on beliefs. From this point onwards, the actual power of scepticism -represented by a lineage that includes Montaigne, Hume, Goodman, and Primo Leviderives from its attempt to combine two perspectives that appear formally incompatible with one another: (i) the desire for a permanent order of things in the context of a predictable and meaning ful shared world, and (ii) a profound admiration for the human variety that is enshrined in different acts and kinds of belief.
2015
ABSTRACT Nowadays, when one doubts or questions extraordinarily, he is branded a skeptic and consequently resisted. The reason for this anachronistic approach towards the skeptic as an individual, and skepticism as a method or an attitude is not far-fetched. For example, people usually think that skeptics are men whose basic mood is that of doubt. Also they argue that skeptics are those who deny absolutely that true knowledge is possible. In this work, our attempt generally is to show how wrong this position is, and specifically, it is to restate that rather than denying the possibility of certain knowledge, skepticism is a philosophical method of inquiry or epistemological attitude towards knowledge whose goal is indeed certainty, but which selects a serious universal doubt concerning all knowledge as the starting point of a theory of knowledge. In this context therefore, the paradox of skepticism in epistemological enterprise would demand that whoever wants certain knowledge should proceed through doubt. Ordinarily, one would have thought that the best way to certainty is by accepting entirely all that one is told especially when it comes from a sage, or a tradition. Unfortunately, the position of this paper suggests otherwise.
Ancient Scepticism And The Contra Academicos
2008
Are we ever justified in being convinced we know something and in acting accordingly? Does our happiness depend upon the possibility or impossibility of certain knowledge? Does the good life require a stable relationship to the truth or can it be had apart from this? Is the desire to apprehend truth our central concern as rational beings, the basis of our authentic existence? Is it rather an impediment to happiness, an illusory desire which we must dispel or condemn ourselves to a life of frustration and anxiety? One might simply dismiss this as a dead issue. After all, is not certainty a discredited concept in our supposedly post-philosophical era? Have not we all learned the finite and contingent character of all human discourse? Yet the signs of discomfort with these conclusions are evident in our culture as well. Certain foundations for our beliefs and actions, whether grounded in reason or the authority of revelation, can seem necessary antidotes to the pervasive loss of meanin...
Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge
This paper responds to one of the key themes in Quassim Cassam’s book, The Possibility of Knowledgeviz., the application of the “multi-level” response to ‘how possible?’ questions that he offers to the problem of radical scepticism.