Existe-t-il des dilemmes moraux insolubles ? (Extraits : Introduction, Bibliographie et Table des matières) (original) (raw)

2011

Pour la plupart d’entre nous, il ne fait aucun doute que la vie humaine, de par sa complexité, peut mener à des dilemmes moraux insolubles (où il est impossible de remplir à la fois deux obligations morales d'égales forces). Du côté des philosophes, il s’en trouve plusieurs pour avancer des arguments en ce sens. Cependant, la question demeure controversée en raison d’apories auxquelles elle donne lieu. Dans cet ouvrage, je fais valoir qu’aucune aporie ne tient en ce domaine et qu’il n’existe pas de dilemmes moraux insolubles. L’approche que je propose pour apporter une solution aux situations dilemmatiques est originale et déjoue les objections sérieuses qu’on peut soulever en cette matière. En cela, cet ouvrage contribue, je l'espère, à faire avancer le débat sur la question controversée des dilemmes moraux. Plus précisément, mon approche consiste à faire valoir qu'un dilemme moral se réduit, non pas à une disjonction d'obligations d'égales forces (l'obligation de faire A ou l'obligation de faire B), mais plutôt à une obligation disjonctive (l'obligation de faire A ou de faire B). Autrement dit, ce qui est disjonctif dans un dilemme moral, ce ne sont pas les deux obligations qu'il est impossible de remplir en même temps, mais le contenu d'une seule obligation (l'obligation de faire A ou de faire B), c'est-à-dire les actions à poser (A ou B). D'où la résolution du dilemme moral : il n'y a qu'une seule obligation à remplir : faire A ou faire B. Aucune obligation morale n'est donc laissée de côté. Ouvrage tiré de ma thèse de doctorat. In English : For many of us, there is no doubt that human life can lead to irresolvable moral dilemmas because of its complexity. Among philosophers, that is those who are dealing with ethical, epistemological, phenomenological, conceptual or any other issues, several of them are presenting arguments leaning towards the same conclusion. However, if they are right, their view leads to a paradox : the irresolvability of moral dilemmas is logically incompatible with two intuitively plausible deontic principles, which are ‘ ought implies can ’ principle and agglomeration principle (where ‘ I ought to do A ’ and ‘ I ought to do B ’ together imply ‘ I ought to do A and B ’). There seem to be three different ways to avoid this paradox : 1) to deny the irresolvability of moral dilemmas ; 2) to deny the ‘ ought implies can ’ principle ; 3) to deny the agglomeration principle. In other words, establishing the plausibility of both deontic principles would be sufficient in order to deny the irresolvability of moral dilemmas, while establishing the lack of plausibility of any one of these principles would be sufficient in order to uphold the irresolvability of moral dilemmas. My purpose in this thesis is to stand against the irresolvability of moral dilemmas by arguing that establishing the plausibility of both deontic principles mentioned above is not sufficient to deny this irresolvability. In other words, it is possible to put forward an interpretation of these principles that is not contradictory with the irresolvability of moral dilemmas. In this case, we must go beyond the trilemma aforementioned if we want to deny the irresolvability of moral dilemmas. In this thesis, I start by arguing in favor of the plausibility of both deontic principles at stake. I put forward an original argument for the ‘ ought implies can ’ principle. As for the agglomeration principle, my view consists in bringing forward the logical compatibility between this principle, the ‘ ought implies can ’ principle and the irresolvability of moral dilemmas. Secondly I raise objections against arguments in favor of the irresolvability of moral dilemmas, and irrespective of the ‘ ought implies can ’ and agglomeration principles. In order to do so, I use a methodology that differs from the typical argumentation of those who deny the irresolvability of moral dilemmas : on the one hand, I do not resort to a normative theory in particular ; on the other hand, I put aside the most a priori specific to these opponents known as rationalists. As much as possible I will stay close to the premises related to the irresolvability of moral dilemmas’ advocates’ argumentation, many of whom related to moral experiences and contextual data, without leaning towards moral particularism. Finally I defend that the solution to the puzzles raised by moral dilemmas brings in a disjunctive obligation, an answer already put forward by many philosophers. I analyze this issue by developing an original interpretation of the disjunctive obligation. On the basis of this, I refute several objections to this solution, especially those recently issued and still unanswered.