Why Britain is going to war (original) (raw)
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The essential argument of this paper is simple: there has been a distinct lack of British strategy in Iraq. One of the central causes of this has been the nature of Blair's foreign policy approach and the relationship that has emerged between the US and UK under Tony Blair, especially since 9/11.
Politics & Policy, 2009
As one of the most contentious and far-reaching foreign policy decisions in Britain's political history, the Blair government's participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq has attracted a considerable amount of analysis, commentary, and debate. To date, however, the focus of this debate has tended to attribute primary causality for the decision to invade Iraq to individual agency, and to downplay the role that was played by broader structural factors. Although the decision was driven by the attitudes, beliefs, and values of senior government figures, and principally, on the British side, by those of Tony Blair himself, the role of structures in shaping these subjective views, and in providing senior figures with the scope, freedom, and autonomy to pursue this policy goal, has been largely overlooked. This study argues that, in this regard, a key and defining influence was exerted by the contextual environment of the British political system.
Blair's War on Terror: Selling Intervention to Middle England
The British Journal of Politics & International …, 2011
that he would have pursued a policy of intervention in Iraq regardless of Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction. In this situation he would merely have had to employ alternative arguments. Such a statement should come as little surprise. Blair's language throughout his prime ministership was highly strategic; it was framed to achieve support from his primary target audience, 'Middle England'. Two key tropesrationality and leadership-were repeatedly deployed in order to sell Blair's wars to the British public. This article demonstrates how Blair's strategically framed language was politically enabling in three analytical moments, helping to craft a conceivable, coercive and communicable British foreign policy discourse.
Bush, Blair, and the War in Iraq: Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence
Political Science Quarterly, 2010
During the Presidency of George W. Bush, American foreign policy underwent many dramatic changes. Notable among these was a re-thinking of the role of allies. Instead of consulting and bargaining with a group of traditional allies, the Bush administration became determined to make policy decisions unilaterally, and to then assemble coalitions of the willing, composed of states that supported a predetermined U.S. foreign From this perspective, British Prime Minister Tony Blair seemed to be the ideal ally. He offered steadfast public support for the Bush administration’s s foreign policy, and also undertook the burden of diplomacy on behalf of the United States, meeting with 54 world leaders in the two months after September 11. Blair, however, was hardly Bush’s “poodle.” After four years as Prime Minister, he had a well-developed philosophy on foreign policy; by sup-porting the United States in public, Blair hoped to gain the trust of Bush and to convince the President to implement his preferred polices. Despite his tireless lobbying of Bush, and his willingness to publicly support virtually all aspects of the war on terror, Blair appears to have had little influence on the foreign policy of the Bush administration. The goal of this article is to explain why. Using insights developed by Richard Neustadt in his book, Alliance Politics, I will examine the manner in which Blair personalized the Anglo-American alliance and thus mistakenly equated a close relationship with the President with leverage over the making of U.S. foreign policy. By reducing the alliance to a partnership of two leaders, Blair failed to account for the power of competing ideological factions inside the administration; as a result, he was frequently confused and disappointed by Bush’s eventual policy choices
British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War
Parameters, 2003
On 26 February 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair faced the largest parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred years. Some 120 of his Labour Party colleagues voted against the government's policy of support for US military action against Iraq. Earlier that month, more than one million people had taken to the streets of London to protest against the prospect of war, while respondents to a UK Internet poll had voted America the country that posed the greatest threat to world peace. The UK's major partners in Europe--France and Germany--also opposed Britain's stance, the government having singularly failed in its self-appointed role of providing a bridge of understanding between Europe and the United States. Prime Minister Blair faced personal attacks in the media, being frequently portrayed as America's lap dog; even Nelson Mandela referred to him disapprovingly as the foreign minister of the United States. The Prime Minister's political survival itself seemed ...
Deception and Britain’s road to war in Iraq
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 2014
Ever since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there has been a widely shared public perception in the UK and beyond that the British government lied in making the case for war. One major theme has been the view that the Blair government lied about the strength of the intelligence about alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the extent of the WMD capabilities claimed by that intelligence. A second theme that has received less attention has been the view that the Blair government lied in claiming that its actions at the United Nations (UN) were aimed at securing peaceful Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. Instead, most think that the UK was actually committed to a policy of regime change by force and did not want the 'UN route' to produce a peaceful outcome. The article argues that the conceptual focus of the discussion needs to be broadened from lying to also considering deception by omission and deception by distortion as part of a campaign of organized political persuasion. It argues that, on the WMD intelligence, it is now apparent that a campaign of deceptive organized political persuasion was conducted by UK officials. With respect to the UN route, there is mounting evidence that the Blair government ran a campaign of deception on this issue as well to pave Britain's road to war in Iraq.