Anonymous Alone? Measuring Bitcoin’s Second-Generation Anonymization Techniques (original) (raw)
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Bitcoin is the first digital currency to see widespread adoption. While payments are conducted between pseudonyms, Bitcoin cannot offer strong privacy guarantees: payment transactions are recorded in a public decentralized ledger, from which much information can be deduced. Zerocoin (Miers et al., IEEE S&P 2013) tackles some of these privacy issues by unlinking transactions from the payment's origin. Yet, it still reveals payments' destinations and amounts, and is limited in functionality.
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Bitcoin is the first e-cash system to see widespread adoption. While Bitcoin offers the potential for new types of financial interaction, it has significant limitations regarding privacy. Specifically, because the Bitcoin transaction log is completely public, users' privacy is protected only through the use of pseudonyms. In this paper we propose Zerocoin, a cryptographic extension to Bitcoin that augments the protocol to allow for fully anonymous currency transactions. Our system uses standard cryptographic assumptions and does not introduce new trusted parties or otherwise change the security model of Bitcoin. We detail Zerocoin's cryptographic construction, its integration into Bitcoin, and examine its performance both in terms of computation and impact on the Bitcoin protocol.
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Bitcoin is the first digital currency to see widespread adoption. Although payments are conducted between pseudonyms, Bitcoin cannot offer strong privacy guarantees: payment transactions are recorded in a public decentralized ledger, from which much information can be deduced. Zerocoin (Miers et al., IEEE S&P 2013) tackles some of these privacy issues by unlinking transactions from the payment's origin. Yet it still reveals payment destinations and amounts, and is limited in functionality.
Anonymity Properties of the Bitcoin P2P Network
Bitcoin is a popular alternative to fiat money, widely used for its perceived anonymity properties. However, recent attacks on Bitcoin's peer-to-peer (P2P) network demonstrated that its gossip-based flooding protocols, which are used to ensure global network consistency, may enable user deanonymizationthe linkage of a user's IP address with her pseudonym in the Bitcoin network. In 2015, the Bitcoin community responded to these attacks by changing the network's flooding mechanism to a different protocol, known as diffusion. However, no systematic justification was provided for the change, and it is unclear if diffusion actually improves the system's anonymity. In this paper, we model the Bitcoin networking stack and analyze its anonymity properties, both pre-and post-2015. In doing so, we consider new adversarial models and spreading mechanisms that have not been previously studied in the source-finding literature. We theoretically prove that Bitcoin's networking protocols (both pre-and post-2015) offer poor anonymity properties on networks with a regular-tree topology. We validate this claim in simulation on a 2015 snapshot of the real Bitcoin P2P network topology.