When Science Becomes Embroiled in Conflict: Recognizing the Public’s Need for Debate while Combating Conspiracies and Misinformation (original) (raw)
Related papers
Politics and Science: Untangling Values, Ideologies, and Reasons
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2015
This commentary argues that we need a more nuanced account of the sources of disagreement among experts and the sources of distrust in scientific claims among the public. Such nuance requires an understanding of the nature of science (an empirical, uncertain, and yet reliable source of knowledge) and of how that differs from faith as a basis for knowledge claims. It also requires an understanding of how values can legitimately function in science, including in the shaping of research agendas and in the assessment of evidential sufficiency, and of the inherently political nature of science (e.g. when evidence shifts the boundary between public and private). While science is neither apolitical nor value-free, it can (and should) be pursued with integrity. Detecting science with integrity and defining the legitimate roles values play in such science opens the space for genuine deliberation and a way forward out of ideological stalemate.
The Limits of Democratizing Science: When Scientists Should Ignore the Public
Philosophy of Science, 2022
Scientists are frequently called upon to "democratize" science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the non-epistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations, but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit the scientist to accepting the public's objectionable values, or may she veto them? I argue that there are a limited set of cases where scientists can, consistently with a commitment to democratized science, set aside the public's judgments.
Counteracting the Politicization of Science
Journal of Communication, 2015
Few trends in science have generated as much discussion as its politicization. This occurs when an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science by casting doubt on the existence of scientific consensus. In this paper, we offer a framework that generates predictions about when communications can be used to counteract politicization efforts aimed at novel energy technologies. We then present evidence from nationally representative survey experiments to demonstrate how warnings to dismiss future invalid politicization claims and corrections to ignore past claims can counteract the deleterious effects of politicization. The results provide novel insights about science communication in a politicized era and offer a blueprint on which future work can build.
How scientists view the public, the media and the political process
Public Understanding of Science, 2011
We review past studies on how scientists view the public, the goals of communication, the performance and impacts of the media, and the role of the public in policy decision-making. We add to these past findings by analyzing two recent large-scale surveys of scientists in the UK and US. These analyses show that scientists believe the public is uninformed about science and therefore prone to errors in judgment and policy preferences. Scientists are critical of media coverage generally, yet they also tend to rate favorably their own experience dealing with journalists, believing that such interactions are important both for promoting science literacy and for career advancement. Scientists believe strongly that they should have a role in public debates and view policy-makers as the most important group with which to engage. Few scientists view their role as an enabler of direct public participation in decision-making through formats such as deliberative meetings, and do not believe there are personal benefits for investing in these activities. Implications for future research are discussed, in particular the need to examine how ideology and selective information sources shape scientists' views.
‘Science Matters’ and the public interest
Science and the politics of openness
Much has been written about how the public are imagined and constituted in recent science-society developments. In this chapter we explore the relatively neglected but related question of how the relationship between science and the public interest is constituted. The question is timely in the wake of Britain's exit from the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as US president. Both have raised significant concerns about the future of public support for science, and of policymaking supported by scientific facts (see Introduction). These have spurred public mobilisation and reflection by scientists concerned about the implications for their profession (Economist, 2016), as well as for the public interest as a whole (Guardian, 2017). But when members of the public mobilise around scientific research or policy decisions involving science, how should we understand their relationship to the public interest? This is our focus in this chapter. At the height of concerns over science-society relations, the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered a widely cited 'Science Matters' speech (Blair, 2002). This speech echoed wider criticism, which still continues in Britain and elsewhere, of public protest against topics such as genetically modified (GM) crop trials or animal experiments. In mobilising to articulate what are minority positions vis-à-vis 'public opinion' as a whole, such publics seem, at first, to represent a monstrous departure from the social order and, in turn, the public interest. Following the twin meanings of the figure of the monster (Haraway, 1992, and see Introduction), we will critically interrogate this assumption and illustrate how minority groups are capable of engaging with
Kritische Gesellschaftsforschung, 2023
There is something quite misleading about the way the problem of “misinformation,” which I take to mean (intentionally or unintentionally) inaccurate/misleading and harmful information, is typically presented. One gets the distinct impression that there is a certain quantity of “misinformation” that can be straightforwardly identified by authorities, and then targeted by a variety of mitigation measures. On this picture, the regulator, whether a private Big Tech company, an organ of the State, or an international organ of governance such as the European Commission, can confidently identify “misinformation,” to wit, content that is inaccurate, misleading and harmful to this or that public value (e.g., public health, trust in public institutions, or rule of law), and then craft a strategy for restricting such content while giving due weight to the value of freedom of expression. This picture, as I shall argue in this paper, vastly oversimplifies the nature of the threat posed by misinformation, and virtually ignores the significant risks of interventions designed to censor or suppress it, in particular the risk of wittingly or unwittingly sabotaging the truth- seeking function of public inquiry and debate. I argue that it is not possible to reliably picking out a special class of persons uniquely qualified to arbitrate ongoing political and scientific debates, and consequently, that the whole enterprise of curbing misinformation, at least in the context of unfolding political and scientific debates, is a fool's errand.
“Counting votes” in public responses to scientific disputes
Public Understanding of Science
Publicized disputes between groups of scientists may force lay choices about groups’ credibility. One possible, little studied, credibility cue is vote-counting (proportions of scientists on either side): for example, “97%” of climate scientists believe in anthropogenic climate change. An online sample of 2600 Americans read a mock article about a scientific dispute, in a 13 (proportions: 100%–0%, 99%–1%, … 50%–50%, … 1%–99%, 0%–100% for Positions A and B, respectively) × 8 (scenarios: for example, dietary salt, dark matter) between-person experiment. Respondents reported reactions to the dispute, attitudes toward the topic, and views on science. Proportional information indirectly affected judged agreement but less so topic or science responses, controlling for scenarios and moderators, whether by actual proportions or differing contrasts of “consensus” versus “near-consensus.” Given little empirical research with conflicting findings, even these low effect sizes warrant further re...
Discriminating Citizens: Making Judgements About Science
2005
The science of genomics raises important questions about what it means to be a citizen in a scientific culture. Critics of genetics frequently point to public concern about genomics as a means of legitimating their own stance, whilst scientists and other proponents tend to see public opposition as based on, at best, partial information. In this paper, the complex and often contradictory rationales for public participation in debates about contested science are examined and the distinctions between engaged/un-engaged participants and expert/representative forums emphasised. The first distinction recognises the role played by experience and expertise in challenging technical arguments, whilst the second emphasises that debates about science and technology need are not solely matters of contested fact. Using these distinctions, the paper argues that the categories of 'scientists' and 'the public' need to be replaced by a more subtle differentiation between experts and citizens. The effect of this alternative terminology is to permit a more inclusive approach to the 'technical' whilst providing a positive role for the non-expert citizen in the democratic control of science policy. 4 Society needs to do a better job of asking what kind of tomorrow we create with the possibilities that science offers. Such decisions are governed by values, beliefs, feelings; science has no special place in such democratic debates about values. But science does serve a crucial function in painting the landscape of facts and uncertainties against which such societal debates take place. 1
Dissent, 2005
have repeatedly criticized the Bush administration for "politicizing" science for the sake of its policy goals. Right-wing commentators, such as Steven Milloy, have responded to these accusations with attacks of their own, reminding the public of similar actions taken by President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. The desire for value-free science seems to be one thing on which both right and left can agree. But is this a realistic or even desirable goal? The evidence that the Bush administration has stacked advisory committees, suppressed evidence, and disregarded scientific consensus is extremely troubling. However, simply calling for a thicker "wall" between science and politics does not resolve the fundamental problems. This position assumes that science is separate from the value-laden worlds of politics and everyday life. That is not the case. Science, like other social spheres, is a universe of divergent values and interests. Although we are strongly critical of Bush administration policies-and the use of scientific claims to justify those policies-we are equally concerned about the implications of the position that science should be sharply distinguished from politics and values. Such a distinction not only misrepresents the nature of scientific knowledge but also stifles democratic debate. Rather than pursuing the endless and misguided debate about "sound science," Democrats and the left should take advantage of recent attention to the issue of science in politics to push for a more democratic science and technology policy-making process.