Discretionary Loan-Loss Provision Behavior in the US Banking Industry (original) (raw)
Related papers
Earnings management practices in the banking industry: The role of bank regulation and supervision
Corporate governance: Search for the advanced practices, 2019
The purpose of this research is to investigate earnings management purposes in the banking industry via loan loss provisions using a sample of 156 banks from 19 European countries under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) over the period 2006-2016. Using regression analysis, banks are tested for income smoothing, capital management, and signaling purposes. This study contributes to the literature exploring the relationship between accounting quality and earnings management objectives by analyzing which one of the latter is the most important determinant. The hypothesis of income smoothing and signaling are strongly approved since loan loss provisions consist as a tool for smoothing the amount of net profit and to convey private information to the market; on the contrary, the capital management purpose is not supported. Additionally, the analysis finds that non-discretionary components of loan loss provisions (essentially non-performing loans) have played an important role, especi...
Earnings Management at Large US Bank Holding Companies
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This paper examines earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in the United States. We find that the use of discretionary loan loss provisions is positively related to a bank's unmanaged cash flow returns, capital ratios, and asset size. In contrast, the use of discretionary loan loss provisions is negatively related to a bank's non-discretionary loan loss provisions and market-to-book ratios. Further, the use of discretionary loan loss provisions to manage earnings is significantly related to the fraction of shares owned by the bank's CEO, the fraction of shares owned by all directors, the existence of CEO/chair duality, and the CEO's pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, this practice is found to be significantly reduced when the board is composed of more independent outside directors.
2021
Objective-Loan loss provision is an accrual for the banking industry, and therefore has a significant effect on bank accounting earnings and capital requirements. Previous studies showed inconsistent results for the relationship between earnings management, signaling, and loan loss provision. The difference in the results is thought to be caused by bank capitalization. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the role of bank capitalization on the effect of earnings management and signaling on loan loss provision. Methodology-The sample consists of 86 conventional banks in Indonesia for the period of 2015-2019. Furthermore, this study used panel data analysis of multiple regression. Findings-The results showed earnings management has no effect on loan loss provision. In contrast, signaling has a positive and significant effect. Although bank capitalization is not proven to weaken the effect of earnings management on loan loss provision, it strengthens the positive effect of signaling on loan loss provision. Novelty-This study proves that bank capitalization has an important role in moderating signaling impact on loan loss provision but not for the effect of earnings management. This is due to the potential for earnings management in banks is relatively low because banks are highly regulated entities and with regulated governance mechanisms limit the managers' discretionary accounting decisions.
PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY REGIMES, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY
We analyze if a change in accounting standard or a change in prudential regulation impacts banks' loan loss provision. We find that, in general, the banks using a principles-based accounting standard exhibit a lower level of earnings management compared to banks using a rules-based accounting standard. When a country moves from pro-cyclical macro-prudential regulations to a dynamic provisioning regime, banks are more likely to set aside a larger amount of loan loss provision for the purpose of income smoothing. ABSTRACT Article history:
Prior empirical research, mainly conducted in US under the US GAAP, has indicated that managers in listed banks use loan loss provisions as a primary tool for income smoothing activities. Since 2005 the accounting environment in the European Union (EU) changed, as all listed companies are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Some arguments envisage that IFRS is a set of high quality standards that plug some inconsistencies relative to national General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of the present study is to examine earnings management and in particular income smoothing through the use of loan loss provisions (LLP) to manage earnings under IFRS and national GAAPs. The sample consists of twenty large commercial banks listed in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) for the years 2004-2012 (including early adopters) and sixteen banks for the years 1996-2003 under each country's national reporting regime. Furthermore we present the body of earning management literature in conjunction with agency theory in order to grasp managers' opportunistic behavior. Finally we assess the institutional role of financial reporting standards and the arguments of how IFRS could restrict earnings management activities as proposed by some authors. Overall, our results indicate some degree of income smoothing activities through loan loss provisions by bank managers both under national GAAPs and IFRS. The study contributes to the broad literature body on earnings management, while testing income-smoothing activities on a single industry compared to previous studies where the samples comprises a variety of firms in different industries.
Earnings Management in Banks : Validation of a Two-Stage Model
2013
Studies investigating earnings management in banks have been particularly concerned with the use of Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) and mainly use two-stage models to identify discretionary management actions. Another type of record that has received attention from researchers in identifying discretionary management actions is the classification and measurement of the fair value of securities. In this case, however, one-stage models have prevailed. The present study aims to develop and validate a two-stage model for the identification of discretionary management actions using gains obtained from securities. Our model incorporates macroeconomic indicators and specific attributes of the securities portfolios to the traditional parameters used in models previously utilized in the literature. To validate the proposed model, the results are compared with the results from the estimation of a one-stage model a methodology widely used in the literature. Tests conducted with the two models reveal...
Borrowing capacity and earnings management: An analysis of private loans in private firms
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2017
This empirical study investigates whether borrowers manage earnings to ameliorate their accounting portrait and to achieve a better borrowing capacity in the private loan market. We analyse the impact of borrowers' earnings management activity on the amount and costs of their private loans both at the time of lending (ex post earnings management) and before a lending agreement is made (ex ante earnings management). We test our hypothesis on a panel sample of 465 small and medium-sized private corporations from the debt-dependent southern EU economies of Italy, Portugal and Spain over the 2002-2012 period. Using a generalized method of moments (GMM) model to control for endogeneity, we find that the discretionary earnings management activity of borrowers favours larger loan amounts, both ex post and ex ante. By contrast, we find no impact of borrowers' earnings management activity on the costs of loans. Interestingly, we find that the relationship between earnings management and firms' borrowing capacity is not significant before the enactment of the Basel II regulation; however, in the period following its enactment, we find a positive and systematic impact of earnings management (both ex post and ex ante) on the amount of bank loans, as well as some positive impact on the costs of bank loans. Our results indicate that borrowers manage earnings to signal better quality to lenders and to ameliorate their borrowing capacities, regardless of the excessive costs of doing so. In addition, we find that the introduction of the Basel II rules likely strengthened this tendency. The findings of this research should alert bank regulators to the feasibility of an unintended economic consequence of rigid discipline with respect to bank risk taking-namely, reducing borrowers' transparency may lead to less prudent assessments of borrowers' creditworthiness.