Researching "The Mind (original) (raw)
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Outline of a New Approach to the Nature of Mind
I propose a new approach to the constitutive problem of psychology ‘what is mind?’ The first section introduces modifications of the received scope, methodology, and evaluation criteria of unified theories of cognition in accordance with the requirements of evolutionary compatibility and of a mature science. The second section outlines the proposed theory. Its first part provides empirically verifiable conditions delineating the class of meaningful neural formations and modifies accordingly the traditional conceptions of meaning, concept and thinking. This analysis is part of a theory of communication in terms of inter-level systems of primitives that proposes the communication-understanding principle as a psychological invariance. It unifies a substantial amount of research by systematizing the notions of meaning, thinking, concept, belief, communication, and understanding and leads to a minimum vocabulary for this core system of mental phenomena. Its second part argues that written human language is the key characteristic of the artificially natural human mind. Overall, the theory both supports Darwin’s continuity hypothesis and proposes that the mental gap is within our own species. Keywords: Cognitive science, communication, meaning, nature of mind, psychology, representation, thinking, understanding, written human language.
Regarding the Mind, Naturally Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental [sample]
Naturalism is currently the most vibrantly developing approach to philosophy, with naturalised methodologies being applied across all the philosophical disciplines. One of the areas naturalism has been focussing upon is the mind, traditionally viewed as a topic hard to reconcile with the naturalistic worldview. A number of questions have been pursued in this context. What is the place of the mind in the world? How should we study the mind as a natural phenomenon? What is the significance of cognitive science research for philosophical debates? In this book, philosophical questions about the mind are asked in the context of recent developments in cognitive science, evolutionary theory, psychology, and the project of naturalisation. Much of the focus is upon what we have learned by studying natural mental mechanisms as well as designing artificial ones. In the case of natural mental mechanisms, this includes consideration of such issues as the significance of deficits in these mechanisms for psychiatry. The significance of the evolutionary context for mental mechanisms as well as questions regarding rationality and wisdom is also explored. Mechanistic and functional models of the mind are used to throw new light on discussions regarding issues of explanation, reduction and the realisation of mental phenomena. Finally, naturalistic approaches are used to look anew at such traditional philosophical issues as the correspondence of mind to world and presuppositions of scientific research.
Between scientific and lived realities of the mind (2017 Master's thesis)
2017
The thesis puts forward an exploration of the relationship between two perspectives on the mind: the scientific perspective, through which the mind is described and explained by the disciplines of cognitive science, and the lived perspective, through which the mind is experienced and understood in the context of everyday life. In articulating this apparent duality of views I draw upon two influential philosophical accounts: Edmund Husserl’s (1970) investigation of the life-world and the world of science and Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963) analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of the human being in relation to the world. The presentation and juxtaposition of the two analyses opens a way to an exploration of the interdependence of science and the life-world. It also sets the stage for a critique of naturalism in mind sciences. Following Husserl, I show that the naturalistic attitude stems from forgetting that the idea of the objective scientific reality is but an abstraction from the concrete life-world of experience, value, and meaning. Surveying the conceptual space of philosophy of mind, I further challenge the naturalistic attitude by demonstrating the untenability of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. As I argue, naturalism amounts to a particularly inconsistent stance in studying human epistemic processes, where it must paradoxically presuppose the very aspects of the world that it set out to disclose. Concluding that cognitive science lacks absolute metaphysical or epistemological foundations, I suggest that studying the mind needs to recognize the importance of the lived perspective of being a mind. I explore the multifaceted ways in which the scientific perspective on the mind is both rooted in the life-world and shapes it in turn. I conceptualize two dimensions of this interrelatedness through the presentation of Varela et al.’s (1991) enactive approach to cognitive science and Ian Hacking’s (1995) theory of the looping of human kinds. I conclude by proposing that consistent study of mind which acknowledges the impossibility of separating the cognizing subject from her cognized world is bound to remain open to revision of its own foundations. Cognitive science is thus imbued with a demand for reflexivity towards its own theory and practice which would recognize the historical, experiential and socio-political embeddedness of its concepts as well as the role which cognitive science itself plays in shaping societal conceptions of the mind and the way in which the mind is concretely understood, experienced, lived, and acted upon in the context of everyday life.
The myth of mind, and the mistake of psychology
In psychology, it is thought 'natural' to speak of people as possessing within themselves something called their "mind," and to think that minds have their own discoverable, intrinsic principles of operation, which owe nothing either to society or to history for their nature. But the "mind" as such is, I think, a mythic entity. And attention to it diverts our attention away from the detailed social processes involved, not only in negotiating the making of common meanings, but also from those involved in the everyday methods of testing and checking we use in establishing socially intelligible and legitimate common goals. It is its failure to notice the importance of these processes of normative evaluation which is, I think, psychology's mistake. What I want to claim below is: 1) that psychology is not a natural but a moral science; 2) that instead of what might be called a theoretical/explanatory approach, aimed at producing theoretical knowledge, it must use a practical/ descriptive approach, aimed at gaining practical-moral knowledge; 3) that this aim is much more difficult to achieve than might be imagined, as more than simply academic activities are involved; and 4) that although 'social constructionist' studies are required at present, our embodied nature is what is our ultimate problematic.
Philosophy of mind, brain and behaviour
How can it possibly be the case that electrical activity in the soggy grey substance of our brains is responsible for our thoughts, our conscious experiences and our subjectivity? What is subjectivity, for that matter? Does it require a ‘self’, or a subject of experience? Is free will a possibility when all we think and do emerges from the physical brain? These are prototypical questions that characterize the philosophy of mind, brain and behaviour that we shall introduce in this book. Many of the problems and theories discussed in this book fall under what is traditionally known as analytical philosophy of mind, such as the mind-body problem, mental causation, mental content and consciousness. The range of this book, however, is wider, and includes other themes that are directly connected with the bigger issue of what it is that makes us human beings or persons. These topics are ‘the self’, ‘free will’, ‘understanding other minds’, ‘embodied, embedded cognition’ and ‘emotions’.
Gallagher, S. 2001. The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or interaction?
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 (5-7): 83-107. , 2001
Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person’s mental states and behaviours. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about second-person interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another’s behaviour. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive means for understanding other persons, go beyond both the phenomenological and the scientific evidence. I argue that the interpretation of ‘primary intersubjectivity’ as merely precursory to theory of mind is inadequate. Rather, primary intersubjectivity, understood as a set of embodied practices and capabilities, is not only primary in a developmental sense, but is the primary way we continue to understand others in second-person interactions.
3Mental Representations and the Mind-Brain Relationship (1).docx
Grand Canyon University, 2022
Mental Representations and the Mind-Brain Relationship This paper investigates the mental representation of the mind-brain relationship from the perspectives of psychoanalytic purpose, relations theory, and cognitive developmental psychology, as well as the congruence between these formulations and research and theory in cognitive science or social cognition. In the long-term, patient treatment of severely disturbed adolescents and young adults, the concept of mental representation is applied to the study of psychopathology personality evaluation, social interactions of connection styles, and therapeutic gain. Recognizing the growth of the individual's personality, psychopathology is viewed in a more positive light through therapeutic technique. What research examines the evolution of mental representations or cognitive, affective design to become a major aspect of personality development and group formation? With cognitive neurological knowledge gleaned from the study of philosophy during the past century, the mind-body or mind-brain phenomenon will be accessible to discussion. Since Descartes, no one has unscientifically advocated an alternative real-world perspective on this issue. Researchers and thinkers have uncovered several ways, but none of them have promoted the advancement of intellectuals' inferiority. The separation between an individual's mind and consciousness is rarely examined or discussed during a person's daily labor, nonetheless, it is the root source of most of our existing difficulties. This is not even a known reality, as awareness and mind are a single entity. Still, separation is essential to existence. It is what exposes the materialist to the mind reader, potentially separating humanity from a gradually integrated middle ground. This paper will address whether the mind and brain are totally connected or if they are distinct entities. Motivated by the application of theoretical tools to brain analysis, but human biological constructions, researchers began researching the activity of the human brain.
In this paper, I will summarize a few points of my model of the topography of the mind1. I will try to explain how I distinguish individual and shared awareness, resonance from intersubjectivity. The paper has two aims. The first aim is to present to psychotherapists a model which they can use in their practice, which is compatible with contemporary neurology and psychology. The second aim is to specify through which types of mechanisms it can be said that interacting with others is a necessary way of calibrating individual psychological capacities. I will focus on a few key elements of my model, leaving more detailed descriptions for future presentations.
Conceptualizing the Mind in Western Philosophical
This work investigates into the nature of the mind as one of the classical problems in western philosophy. It argues that mind as a philosophical contention has been a philosophical concern from the Pre-Socratics till date. This work argues further that the main thrust of the debate oscillates between the conception of the mind as singularity in nature and mind as contiguous with non-mental phenomena. On these heels, theories and counter-theories have been advanced. The theories advanced arguably have been influenced by reaction to earlier theories of the mind and events of each epoch. The work further argues that scientism has further opened the contention to newer dimensions and nuances. This work concludes that the mind is a perennial philosophical challenge regardless of the massive contributions and theories that have been hypothesized on the subject matter.