What is the Role of Negotiations When Countering an Insurgency (original) (raw)

Talking to the enemy: Negotiations in wartime

Comparative Strategy, 1992

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Negotiating with Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?

High costs have long been seen as motivating conflict participants to seek peace. This article discusses two types of deviations from the "hurting-stalemate" logic: negotiations in the absence of high costs and nonnegotiation in the face of high costs. Two prominent explanations for these deviations are discussed and evaluated, initially through a statistical analysis of peace overtures in intrastate conflicts and then through a case study of the Indian civil war in Kashmir. The results suggest that theoretical explanations focusing on the preferences and political strength of leaders have traction at all levels of violence. Variables associated with shifts in perception, such as leadership change or political shocks, seem to have different effects as the level of violence in a conflict changes.

Engaging The Insurgent In Negotiation: Lessons From Northern Ireland Applied To Afghanistan

2015

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NEGOTIATION MILITARY DOCTRINE - STRANGE BEDFELLOWS.

‘’On the surface, warfare and negotiation may seem to be polar opposites. The objective in war is to defeat the enemy. In negotiation, the goal is to find a solution that satisfies all the parties. Not surprisingly, little cross-learning and exchange has occurred across the two domains. In spite of important differences, however, the dynamics of war and negotiation have much in common. Specifically, both involve the interaction of motivated agents with distinct interests, perceptions, and values (especially in high-stakes contexts). As a result, robust strategy, creativity, and nimble tactics are essential both on the battlefield and at the bargaining table. Just as negotiation theory could be enriched by principles of maneuver warfare, military doctrine offers officers and soldiers a potentially useful foundation to better understand and manage the negotiation process, especially in complex, cross-cultural contexts.” *[Michael Wheeler ’The Fog of Negotiation: What Negotiators Can Learn from Military Doctrine’ Negotiation Journal January 2013]

Success in Counterinsurgencies Depends on Clear and Achievable Political Objectives

2008

Negotiating with Terrorists

International Negotiation, 2003

Negotiating with terrorists is possible, within limits, as the articles in this issue show and explore. Limits come initially in the distinction between absolute and contingent terrorists, and then between revolutionary and conditional absolutes and between barricaders, kidnappers and hijackers in the contingent category. Revolutionary absolute are nonnegotiable adversaries, but even conditional absolutes are potentially negotiable and contingent terrorists actually seek negotiation. The official negotiator is faced with the task of giving a little in order to get the terrorist to give a lot, a particularly difficult imbalance to obtain given the highly committed and desperate nature of terrorists as they follow rational but highly unconventional tactics. Such are the challenges of negotiating with terrorists that this issue of the journal explores and elucidates.

Pre-Conflict Management Tools: Winning the Peace

Fighting Insurgents--No Shortcuts to Success

2004

What is the Role of Negotiations When Countering an Insurgency (original) (raw)

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