The Believed as Believed: The Noematic Dimensions of Faith and Doubt in Religious Experience (original) (raw)
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Faith and Doubt: the noematic dimensions of belief in Husserl
Journal of Speculative Philosophy (SPEP Supplement) , 2015
In examining Husserl’s noesis-noema correlate that characterises his intentionality thesis of 1913, this article argues towards ‘presentation’ as a sufficient mode of givenness in accounting for religious phenomena by demonstrating how an intentional analysis of faith and doubt is possible if one’s regard is directed toward the noetic moment of believing and its corresponding noema: the ‘believed as believed’. This will be shown by directly engaging with the eidetic laws of Husserl’s series of belief modalities.
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This paper seeks to understand the place of phenomenology within the Christian philosophical tradition. Contrary to common conceptions of phenomenology, and in spite of Husserl's own description of phenomenology as an "a-theistic" project, this paper will attempt to interpret the complex relationship of Husserl's understanding of phenomenology to the religious tradition ultimately as a function of that very tradition. In so doing, this paper will explore the philosophical concept of "vocation" in Husserl's usage, its application to the intended role of phenomenology as an agent of moral and religious "renewal," and the role played by the concept of tradition in Husserl's thought, which demands explicit reflection on Husserl's own relation to the tradition. This will allow the possibility of re-envisioning the overall sense of phenomenological discussion and its place within the tradition of philosophy, particularly in the relation of Husserlian phenomenology to the Anselmian project of "faith seeking understanding."
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2010
Foundations of phenomenology Logical Investigations are the most influential part of Husserl's philosophical output. This work was undertaken with the principal objective of overcoming problems generated by the view that only psychology and psychologically-oriented research is capable of yielding ultimate answers to the fundamental questions pertaining to truth and the essence of logical forms (see Hua XIX/1; 2001b). 1 The result, Logical Investigations, divided philosophers into at least two different groups. Some of them accept Husserl's argumentation against psychologism; however, they refuse all his latter works since, as they hold, once Husserl had overcome psychologism, he immediately fell into another form of this same approach. These philosophers usually agree with the first four investigations and refuse the fifth and sixth ones. In contrast, those who accept all of the investigations also accept the phenomenological part of Husserl work. For them, Logical Investigations is the beginning of radical phenomenology, meaning that, whether Husserl was aware of this or not, through systematically developed reflection, he finally entered a field of transcendentally reduced consciousness. This group, according to historical testimony, developed one of the most influential trends in philosophy of the twentieth century. The mature form of any science becomes hermetic because of its language. Phenomenology, like physics, mathematics or information technology, has its own conceptual apparatus and, in the same manner as other disciplines, is relatively inaccessible without the relevant
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1 Perhaps we should rethink the "idea of infinity, " which for Descartes becomes sufficient evidence for the existence of God, as precisely that which comes from God-not "infinity," but the "idea" itself. Since any idea, insofar it is given, is evidence of its giver, in this case (if not in every case), it is evidence of God. The etymology of the word seems to suggest as much: an "dša (from "de‹n, the aorist of the verb Ðr£w, "to see") is an appearance-what appears is not autochthonous to the mind but its origin is elsewhere, a point outside of and beyond us.
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Defending the ancient thesis, that being and the true, or being and manifestation, are necessarily inseparable, is at the heart of transcendental phenomenology. The transcendental "reduction" disengages the basic "natural" naïve doxastic belief which permits the world to appear as essentially indifferent to the agency of manifestation. The massive work of transcendental phenomenology is showing the agency of manifestation of "absolute consciousness." Yet the foundations of this agency of manifestation are pervaded by issues which, when addressed, reveal that the question of a "second absolute" is basic and opens Husserlian phenomenology to metaphysical questions. This has to do not merely with the teleology of the agency of manifestation, i.e., the "whither" of the teleology of presencing, but also, in some sense, with the constituting "whence" of the transcendental I. Husserl argues for the teleology of truth pointing to both a divine subject as well as a divine entelechy.
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Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy
This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Admittedly, both thinkers were dualists. But, where Descartes turned out to be a dualist in the stronger sense, Husserl had brought the Ego closer to the objects it perceives, constituting them through intentionality. More specifically, through h the intertwinement between the intentional act and the intentional object. The goal of Descartes’ method was to arrive at an inconcussum quid, at something which cannot be subjected to doubt: his own existence as a thinking substance, in addition to the proof(s) of the existence of God. So, he methodically doubted all the things he had been certain about, in order to reaffirm their existence. Husserl’s method, on the other hand, employs what is sometimes seen as a twofold approach: phenomenological ἐποχή, (epoche) or “suspension of belief,” and phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s main philosophical problem had nothing to do with being certain about reality. He ...
The problem of Religious Experience: Case Studies in Phenomenology, 2019
This is an introduction to The Problem of Religious Experience: Case Studies in Phenomenology, with Reflections and Commentaries. The book presents an updated overview of the problem of religious experience in phenomenology, from the time of Husserl to French phenomenology's theological turn, which was followed by important publications such as Steinbock (2007), Depraz (2008), Alvis (2016 and 2018) and others. Significantly advancing understanding of religious experience, these studies nevertheless left open a question of what exactly makes religious experience what it is: that is, gives it a specific quality distinguishing it, for its subject, from all other experiences. In contemporary phenomenology, Dahl's (2010) theory of interruptions and Barber's (2017) theory of the appresentative mindset and the finite province of religious meaning comprise two most probable and mutually complementary answers to this question. Further, the Introduction covers the contents of the two volumes, entitled The Primeval Showing of Religious Experience and Doxastic Perspectives in the Phenomenology of Religious Experience. The case studies in Volume I proceed from the descriptive phenomenology of religious experience as it relates to subjectivity research (Part 1) to the relationship between religious experience, intersubjectivity, and alterity (Part 2). Part 2 also serves as a bridge to metaphysical, theological, and theistic approaches in Part 3 and Part 4. Along with the overview of the contents of the book, this Introduction presents Olga Louchakova-Schwartz's (as editor of the book) synthetic meta-reflection on the findings, so that the findings in the book are coherently represented in light of contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion.