A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment. (original) (raw)
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The role of European Intelligence in countering terrorism
book: Jan-Hendrik Dietrich/Satish Sule (eds), Intelligence law and policy in Europe Beck publishers, 2020
Outline mn. A. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 I. Definition of intelligence? ..................................................................................... 6 II. Importance of intelligence .................................................................................... 12 III. Role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, including the US experience .... 17 B. The EU framework with regard to intelligence ........................................................ 33 I. Art. 4 (2) TEU ......................................................................................................... 33 II. Challenges for the EU with regard to counter-terrorism and intelligence 37 III. EU tools in the area of intelligence .................................................................... 40 1. EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN)....................................... 41 2. Passenger Name Record (PNR) ...................................................................... 42 3. EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP) ...................... 45 4. Financial Intelligence Units: FIU.net within Europol – secrecy by design .................................................................................................................... 47 5. Common risk indicators for security checks of EU nationals at external borders .................................................................................................. 50 6. Risk assessment methodology developed by the Commission (DG HOME) for air cargo (aviation security) and beyond ............................... 51 7. European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN) .............................................. 54 C. Relevant interfaces between EU tools and security services .................................. 55 I. Schengen Information System (SIS) II............................................................... 56 II. European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol............................ 61 III. Interoperability of databases................................................................................. 72 IV. Access of security services to the EU databases............................................... 73 V. Security research ..................................................................................................... 75 VI. EU Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) ....................................... 77 VII. Privacy shield ........................................................................................................... 80 VIII. Fundamental Rights Agency................................................................................. 83 IX. Battlefield information........................................................................................... 84 D. European intelligence cooperation outside of the EU context .............................. 85 I. Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG)....................................................................... 85 II. Madrid Group.......................................................................................................... 88 E. Assisting third countries to strengthen their security services in a rule of law framework.......................................................................................................................... 89 F. What more could be done in the EU context? ......................................................... 93 I. Under the existing legal framework ................................................................... 94 1. Commission to engage in dialogue with security services........................ 95 2. Commission to support cooperation in the context of Art. 73 TFEU... 96 3. Commission to support peer review and strengthening national services .................................................................................................................. 99 4. Commission to pool information in relevant areas to get a better information picture and subscribe to private databases............................ 100 5. Further develop concept of European security – what would this mean legally?................................................................................................................... 103 6. Harmonization of data protection and privacy rules?............................... 105 7. Designation by Member States of security services as competent authorities............................................................................................................. 106 8. Engagement of security services with the European Parliament............. 107 9. Engagement with the European Court of Justice ....................................... 108 II. In the transatlantic context................................................................................... 109 III. In the longer term future ...................................................................................... 112 G. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 116
Counter-terrorism in the EU: The Role of Intelligence Co-operation
JOURNAL of EUROPEAN and AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES, 2022
Counter-terrorism policies and practices increasingly depend on the availability, integrity and reliability of data and information on terrorist individuals and groups. Intelligence becomes, then, an intrinsic part of counter-terrorism and must take into account tendencies towards cross-border co-operation in information exchange and inter-institutional sharing of end-products. This is particularly important in the European Union in which shared security interests, as well as integration and co-operation mechanisms, facilitate co-ordination of counter-terrorism efforts. This article aims at analysing the dynamics of counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation (CTIC) in the European Union (EU). It stems from the assumption that intelligence co-operation in the EU has been determined in the past few years, especially after 2015, by four parallel phenomena: (1) a narrow interpretation of the “national security clause” enshrined in the Treaty on EU; (2) internal political fissions within the EU; (3) the insufficient development of practical measures; (4) the growing expectation gap between the needs of EU institutions and the Member States’ deliverables. Framed by post-functionalism, this paper employs the contested solidarity discourse in a process-tracing insight in the recent transformation of the EU’s CTIC. The argument developed throughout the paper points to a reconfiguration of the EU’s intelligence co-operation from the formula of strategic intelligence community to a multifarious conglomerate of bi- and multi-lateral networks. This process has diminished effectiveness in national counter-terrorism efforts. It also has reduced considerably the scale and intensity of international intelligence cooperation within the EU.
Intelligence sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU: lessons learned from Europol
Ex-post investigations of major terrorist attacks in Europe have highlighted the contradiction between the seemingly free movement of terrorists across Europe and the lack of Eu-wide intelligence sharing. in response, Eu policymakers have repeatedly promised to improve intelligence sharing across Europe, and some have even floated the idea that Europol should be turned into a centralised Eu criminal intelligence hub, akin to the uS Federal Bureau of investigation. in this article, i argue that despite the clear need for borderless intelligence sharing as a response to borderless terrorism, Europol is highly unlikely to become a genuine intelligence agency in the foreseeable future. Experience to date with Europol suggests that it is one thing for Europe's policymakers to make public promises to improve the fight against terrorism via better intelligence sharing across Europe, and quite another thing for them to persuade the relevant national agencies to comply.
EU Approaches to Counter Terrorism
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The opinions and the comments in the proceedings of "Global Terrorism and International Cooperation Symposium-III" represent the personal views of the authors. They do not represent the official views of Turkish Armed Forces. All the right of the articles and the pictures included in this book are reserved. However, they may be quoted if referred to.
The Intelligence Apparatus in the European Union: Building a Strategic Intelligence Community
The Intelligence Apparatus in the European Union: Building a Strategic Intelligence Community, 2017
Developing international and cross-agency intelligence cooperation has become the “sine qua non” of the current security environment. If the new security threats are to be tackled collectively and collaboratively, a common risk perception and assessment is not only desirable but also necessary. Contrary to other organizations and geopolitical actors, the EU applies and has to coordinate a wide array of security policy instruments. Therefore, it is also –somewhat- dependent on different kinds of intelligence agencies, (possibly) to a greater extent than other organizations. To this end, the EU Member States -along with the relevant institutions and agencies- have already begun to develop and promote a comprehensive EU intelligence policy framework for the collection, processing and exchange of various types of intelligence. The present study analyses elaborately the emergence of an EU strategic intelligence community as an intricate, multi-dimensional hybrid construction. It examines the operational continuum, canonical framework and overall performance of the EU‘s intelligence accords and practical arrangements, as part of an embryonic paradigm of an integrated intelligence cooperation structure. Intelligence security has become a cardinal feature of the European integration process, especially against the backdrop of an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment and multiple, heterogeneous security challenges. In this regard, cultivating a synergistic mindset at the European level is a seminal prerequisite for the creation of a solid European strategic intelligence community; current intelligence cooperation must therefore be adapted and restructured in such a way that it can serve common policies that are felicitous to the new security environment, (Müller-Wille, 2004). This paper aims to pragmatically present the current EU intelligence model, delineating the singularities and systemic attributes of the EU’s security policies.
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In recent years the nature of terrorism has changed dramatically and has taken on a new combination of characteristics. The fight against this terrorism has become a global concern and central issue of international government policies. Counter-terrorism policies have transformed all around the world, and the importance states place on certain aspects of their counter-terrorist measures vary considerably. There is no agreement on how best to fight terrorism. Within the European Union (EU) this disagreement is the most visible, with some countries supporting the United States in their military fight against terrorism, while other strongly oppose it. This paper will focus on five of the ten new EU members that joined in 2004 (Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Malta) and review some of their existing counter-terrorism measures. In doing so the paper will examine the strengths and weaknesses of each individual state’s policy and highlight some of the general trends and patterns among them.
Both anecdotal and empirical evidences confirm that the complex political, ethnic and religious dynamics in the region of South East Europe (SEE) create the perfect environment for radical groups and individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda and its goals. Supported by their strategic western partners and allies SEE countries have seriously considered threats from modern terrorism. Hence, active involvement in the global counter-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and intelligence cooperation with the coalition partners outside of these theaters clearly speak of the SEE governments' readiness to oppose global terrorists' objectives. However, recent practice shows that different human rights legal tradition and inappropriate political narrative among the coalition partners could pose serious strategic challenges to counter-terrorist intelligence cooperation. Therefore, if not approached appropriately these challenges hold potentials to harm the overall counter-terrorist effo...
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14, no. 3 (2013): 325-338., 2013
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European Agenda on Security: Intelligence-led policing and EUROPOL
Practical Implementation of Joint Investigation Teams in cross border policing. , 2017
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