Платон и Декарт: «радикальное сомнение» (original) (raw)

Платон и Декарт: «радикальное сомнение»

The article continues the topic “Plato and phenomenology”, touched upon by the author in a number of previous works, where Plato is considered as the first representative of transcendentalism in European philosophy, that is, a philosopher looking for the intelligible foundations and conditions of thinking and cognition: for him, it is the “Good” (R. 508a–509d) and eide (Prm. 135cd). In this context, the author also refers to Descartes and Husserl, who both, each in his own right, are qualified representatives of the transcendental tradition. In this article the author considers doubt as such in Plato and Descartes, believing that in the context of transcendentalism, a comparative study of “radical doubt”, phenomenological reduction”, and “transcendental level of mind” in different representatives of the trend is required. The analysis of a number of passages from Plato’s dialogues (primarily, Alcibiades I and Theaetetus), as well as Descartes’ treatises Rules for the Guidance of the Mind and Reflections on the First Philosophy, leads to the following conclusions. Plato’s Socrates comes to radical doubt fundamentally in dialogue with others; it can be said that for him, the guarantee of truth is discovery of the same unchanging transcendental reality in both the questioner and the responder. Descartes does not conduct a dialogue with others, but turns exclusively to his own consciousness, thereby questioning the existence of these “others”. Moreover, Plato insists on the need to completely purify the soul from everything empirical and even rational, whereas for Descartes the area of cogitare is very extensive and includes, in addition to reason, desires, imagination, and feelings. Different methods of applying doubt in research lead to different types of reduction and, accordingly, different ways of understanding transcendence and transcendentalities.