HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANCIENT NEAR EAST, ISRAEL AND HELLAS (original) (raw)
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HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANCIENT NEAR EAST, ISRAEL AND HELLAS International Network
2023
The Gutian Period in Codex Ur-Namma: a Re-examination Gutians were an ancient nomadic people of West Asia, around the Zagros Mountains (Modern Iran). Gutians have been linked to the collapse of the Akkadian Empire after which, in 22 nd century BC, they ruled in Mesopotamia; the exact length of their rule is unknown. The recently discovered text of the Codex Ur-Namma has a unique reference to bala gu-du-ma-ka (the Gutian period) comparing it to the bala ur-d namma (the period of Ur-Namma) in matters related to a particular legal problem involving the law of sale and evidentiary procedure. The present essay will critically evaluate the current understanding of the law and offers a new interpretation. As a necessary introduction to the interpretation of cuneiform law collections the nature of the texts known as law collection and their casuistic method will be discussed.
ARAB CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN DIGNITY
The George Washington International Law Review, 2017
This Article explores how the idea of human dignity has developed in Arab constitutionalism through the decades and reflects on its meaning and implications in the framework of the new constitutional texts, given the concept’s prominence in the post-Arab Spring context. First, the Article sheds light on how Arab legal culture understands dignity, exploring both its religious and secular roots in the 1926 Lebanese Constitution, which pioneered the use of dignity by using the concept to command respect toward religions. Then, this Article explores the success of the idea of dignity at the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when the Lebanese scholar Charles Malik played a leading role in emphasizing dignity throughout the text and universalizing it to encompass all human beings. Next, the Article presents how the Arab states have used the concept and shows that their constitutions have incorporated and expounded on the idea of human dignity progressively, with the post-Arab Spring constitutional texts reinforcing its use once more. Finally, this Work offers some brief observations about how the use of dignity in Arab constitutionalism parallels the development of the same concept in Western legal culture, which has blended secular thinking with religious thinking. Notwithstanding its widespread adoption, the meaning and implications of the constitutionalization of dignity in Arab countries remain uncertain; its fate will largely depend on how Arab legal culture will balance human rights with Islamic rules. This is not, however, a specific feature of Arab constitutionalism: uncertainties surround the global discourse on dignity.
Human Dignity and the Future of the Human Rights Debate in the Islamic World
ASIATICA:ТРУДЫ ПО ФИЛОСОФИИ И КУЛЬТУРАМ ВОСТОКА, 2019
This paper seeks reconciliation between the principles of Shari'a and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since the basis for the declaration of human rights in the modern era is the modern conception of human dignity, it seems the reconciliation project should proceed by identifying the Islamic conception of human dignity and comparing it with the modern one, in order to see which differences in these conceptions lead to the alleged conflict between Islamic law and the Declaration. Accordingly, I first introduce the Islamic conception of human dignity. Nonetheless, some philosophers might argue that this religious account of human dignity cannot be used to support universal human rights as successfully as modern secular conceptions. I address two possible objections which could be leveled against this account. One of these objections, it is shown, cannot be applied to the Islamic conception; however, the other objection, regarding the importance of human interests in shaping human rights, seems to be attention-worthy. Several contemporary solutions to the reconciliation problem are then examined. I show that none of the mentioned solutions are capable of solving the problem, except for an enhanced version of Islamic Intellectualism or new Mu'tazilism. I argue that through this line of thought one can adhere to an Islamic conception of human dignity even while one respects others' rational interests, because the moral commands of reason are ultimately a divine command. The rationale of this approach is that in the conflict of moral duties we never stray outside the bounds of morality and rationality; however, it still saves the Islamic duty-oriented world view.
Human Dignity: An Islamic Perspective
Abstract The inherent dignity of man is the foundation of human rights and human rights instruments have emphasized that all human rights are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person. Although many human rights scholars may assume it as an indisputable concept, it has always been a matter of dispute among competing schools of philosophy of law. Similarly, some Muslim scholars argue that the concept of inherent dignity of man is one of the essential teachings of Islam, while there are others who deny the inherent dignity of man. This controversy among Muslim scholars has been infiltrated into the Islamic human rights instruments. This paper seeks to examine the disputed dimensions of the concept of inherent dignity of man in human rights discourse and Islamic literature. The first part of the paper deals with the concept of inherent dignity in international and regional human rights instruments. In the second part of the paper, I shall discuss the concept of human dignity in the Islamic declarations on human rights. And the third part shall focus on the concept of dignity in the light of the Holy Quran and other sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Finally, the paper concludes that a study of the theoretical foundations of human dignity in the Islamic thought will unequivocally contribute to the promotion of human rights norms and the advancement of universal standards of human rights in the Muslim world.
In 1992, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) enacted two basic laws, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The enactment of the two laws was hailed as the first step in establishing an Israeli bill of rights and was referred to by jurists as marking the beginning of a "constitutional revolution" in Israeli law. Two main issues needed to be resolved by the courts after the enactment of the two Basic Laws. The first was the scope of the Basic Laws. The second was their status within Israeli law and in particular their implications for judicial review of primary Knesset legislation. The second question was resolved relatively shortly after the Laws' enactment. In the 1995 decision of United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court determined that the Basic Laws had supra-legislative, constitutional status and, accordingly, that the Court had the power to declare void primary legislation that contradicted the Basic Laws. While the decision was initially criticized by many, it has since been reaffirmed on numerous occasions. The dispute with regard to the scope of the Basic Laws, however, and in particular the scope of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter: the Basic Law"), is ongoing. The Basic Law explicitly protects the right to life, body and dignity of the person (Articles 2 and 4), the right to property (Article 3), the right to personal liberty (Article 5), the right of all Israeli nationals to enter the country and the right of all people to leave it (Article 6), and the right to privacy (Article 7). All of these rights had already been recognized by the Court prior to the enactment of the Basic Laws. With the Basic Law’s enactment, however, and following the United Mizrahi Bank decision, these rights were elevated to the status of constitutional rights. The enactment of the Basic Laws raised questions regarding the status of other rights previously recognized in case law but not explicitly named in either of the Basic Laws. These included rights as important and central as the right to equality, freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Such rights were referred to as the "unnamed" or "unenumerated" rights. The dispute centered on the question whether the Court could interpret the Basic Laws as awarding constitutional protection to such unenumerated rights. The present article examines the manner by which the Court determines which unnamed rights fall within the scope of the Basic Law. It examines the models of interpretation applied by the Court when recognizing certain unnamed rights while refusing to recognize others. The article argues that different approaches with regard to recognition of particular rights are rooted in different value-based worldviews regarding the essence of human dignity, and argues that the lack of a clear test for the recognition of unnamed rights results from the absence of a robust, well-developed notion of human dignity in Israeli constitutional law. The article purports to demonstrate the importance of developing a concept of human dignity that encompasses the different values and world-views that exist in Israeli society.
A JEWISH CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Journal of Religious Ethics, 2006
This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued that the "dignity of the people" has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular-liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel.
On Human Dignity and Rights: The Dialectics of Religious and Secular Law in Israel
2020
Throughout the history of Judaism some Jews have defended human rights and dignity while other Jews have sought to deny these especially to those who are perceived either to endanger Israel's existence, Jewish continuity, or Jewish control of the land. In the 1948 Declaration of the Founding of the State of Israel (thereafter known as the Declaration of Independence) the values of justice, freedom and peace are identified as being rooted in the traditions of the Hebrew Prophets, and a commitment to the practice of these by the State of Israel is given to ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex. Based on this clearly articulated commitment one would assume therefore that the principles of human rights and dignity for all those living within Israel was afforded full constitutional status. However, as this discussion shows there is a clash between religious and secular law regarding gender quality and the role and status of women.
Human Dignity as a Constitutional Concept in Germany and in Israel
The article applies comparative law tools in order to portray eight significant aspects of the constitutional right for human dignity in Germany and in Israel. The aspects which are considered are: the constitutional status of human dignity; the nature of the right; its effect on other constitutional rights; its scope and definition; waiver of human dignity; human dignity after death; negative and positive aspects of the right; and the right to asylum. The textual basis of the constitutional guarantees is as different as its principal meaning. While in Germany, the guarantee is held to be absolute, not subject to any restrictions, and therefore given a quite narrow scope, in Israel the scope of the right is much broader, but can be limited in the public interest. Still, from the comprehensive comparison a similar dynamics may be identified in Germany and in Israel. On the one hand, the constitutional coverage of relative principles is widened. On the other hand, the constitutional c...