Cyber Conflict Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Given the tone of cyber security debate and coverage in the news media, the assumption would be that we have entered an era of constant cyber warfare. Yet, the idea that cyber conflict is prevalent and normal flies against all evidence when the macro perspective of cyber events is taken into account. On the contrary, there is a developing cyber norm against the use of severe cyber tactics as directed by states against each other. Perception is not reality, and we cannot take the frequent news reports and fears exhibited by policy-makers as evidence that we have entered an era of perpetual cyber conflict. What we witness is cyber espionage and probes, not cyber warfare or coercion. The system has stabilized into a process of limited acceptable uses of cyber technology in international affairs prohibiting the crossing of any line that might be considered a dangerous use of force, or actions that might provoke such a response. We will explore these themes through the use of data to demonstrate the lack of severe cyber incidents, the lack of responses to cyber actions, and the notion that cyber actions represent the beginnings of a taboo that is not to be broken. 2 Introduction The year 2015 seems like a breakout year for high profile and damaging cyber actions. The Sony hack, the Office of Personal Management espionage campaign, and Ukrainian power plant hack are few of several high profile cyber incidents launched against major networks. The framing of these violations is that we are in an era of more sophisticated and threatening cyber conflict that will continue to escalate and lead to a revolution in international affairs and state-to-state interactions. 1 Yet beyond all of the media hype and threat perception that cyber conflict is the number one national security threat, what is the macro outlook for the reality of the cyber threat? It is becoming accepted that we have entered an era where cyber conflict is tolerated, that it is " the new normal ". 2 This idea that cyber conflict is prevalent and normal flies against all evidence when the macro perspective of cyber events is taken into account. 3 On the contrary, there is a developing cyber norm against the use of severe cyber tactics as directed by states against each other. In this paper we demonstrate this trend through data, also discussing the advantages of taking a macro perspective on data in the field of cyber security. There is an ongoing dramatic revolution in how we communicate, utilize data, and interact given the advent of networked computers and ubiquity of connected mobile phones, but these advances have not transitioned to the framework of conflict and warfare. The speed that digital networks provide for communications changes how we interact with governments, individuals, and corporations, but it has yet to impact the course of conflict and diplomacy. Change in one domain, interaction and communication, is not automatically bound to produce changes in other domains, such as warfighting and diplomacy. Perception of cyberwar does not make it a reality. We cannot take the frequent news reports and fears exhibited by policy-makers as evidence that cyber war is a current state of affairs. A few isolated examples of cyber conflict between states do not make a trend. Instead of demands for escalation being acceded, there is a persistent avoidance of escalation in cyberspace. Instead, what we are seeing is cyber espionage and disruption, not cyber warfare or violence. The system has stabilized into a process of limited acceptable uses of cyber technology in international affairs that prohibits the crossing of any line that might be considered a dangerous use of force. We have entered the era of cyberpeace. Exploring this issue and perspective cannot come at a more critical time. Reactions to the cyber threat are tied directly to perceptions of cyber threat. Given that cyber security is often indicated as the number one international threat, just what is the reality of cyber conflict as experienced in the system? This article explores this theme, the perspective of the cyber moderate, and the outlook of positivity through cyberpeace.

- by Ryan C Maness
- •
- Cyber Conflict, Cyber Security
- by Yuval Sinay
- •
- Information Technology, Information Security, Homeland Security, Cyber Conflict

The Fifth Dimension of Conflictuality: The Rise of Cyberspace and Its Effects on In- ternational Politics
Cyberspace has become a crucial element for political, social, financial and individual activities. The Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have enhanced the human interactions and have contributed to “reinvent” classical concepts such as political participation, political debate, decision-making. However, their all-encom- passing, ubiquitous nature and their growing use for political and military purposes poses significant risks to international peace, stability and security. The low barrier of access to ICT capabilities, the speed of technological advances and the complexity of the cyberspace environment with regard to traditional legal definitions of borders have presented new challenges to States (the main actors of international relations) such as the inherent complexity of accurately attributing cyber-attacks. It is both this complexity and the frequent insistence of parties to attribute cyber-attacks and incidents “beyond a reasonable doubt” that gives one the ability to deny responsibility and frustrate attempts to build trust and political rapport in cyberspace. The purpose of this research is to analyze how cyberspace affects the international politics. The nature of the topic dictates the use of qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources such as official reports, declarations and policy documents, and academic analysis, in order to understand effects and dynamics carried out by the cyber domain on classical concepts such as war, peace and international relations. The main idea of this research is that the development of Information and Communication Technolo- gies (ICTs) and the related (r)evolution of warfare have produced relevant effects on the dynamics of the contemporary international system highlighting, at the same time, how the militarization of the cyber domain has posed consequences on interna- tional security, peace and stability. However, the lack of specific research related to “cyberspace’s effects on international politics” highlights the need to devote more attention on this topic bearing in mind that, more extensive and enduring analysis on cyberspace’s dynamics might allowed policy makers the opportunity to improve
awareness related to cyber threats in order to governing challenges emerging from the digital sphere.

- by Luigi Martino
- •
- Information Systems, Sociology, Artificial Intelligence, Human Computer Interaction

Applications of artificial intelligence in cyber warfare have been mainly postulated and studied in the context of defensive operations. This paper provides an introductory overview of the use of autonomous agents in offensive cyber warfare, drawing on available open literature. The study supplies an introduction to the taxonomy and science underlying intelligent agents and their strengths and weaknesses: the technological elements that autonomous agents should include are explained, as well as the economics involved. The paper also aims to explore possible legal implications of the use of autonomous agents and shows how they could fit into the legal context of warfare. The conclusion of the study is that the use of AI technologies will be an important part of cyber offensive operations, from both the technological and the economical aspects; however, the legal and doctrinal landscape is still uncertain and proper frameworks are still to be developed.

- by Alessandro Guarino
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- Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, Law, International Law

Cyber-attacks are often called non-violent or non-kinetic attacks, but the simple truth is that there is a credible capability to use cyber-attacks to achieve kinetic effects. Kinetic Cyber refers to a class of cyber-attacks that can cause direct or indirect physical damage, injury or death solely though the exploitation of vulnerable information systems and processes. Kinetic cyber-attacks are a real and growing threat that is generally being ignored as unrealistic or alarmist. These types of attacks have been validated experimentally in the laboratory environment, they have been used operationally in the context of espionage and sabotage, and they have been used criminally in a number of attacks throughout the world. While these types of attacks have thus far been statistically insignificant, the rapid growth and integration of cyber physical systems into everything from automobiles to SCADA systems implies a significant kinetic cyber threat in the near future. It is imperative that the security community begin to take these types of threats seriously and address vulnerabilities associated with cyber physical systems and other devices that could be utilized to cause kinetic effects through cyber-attacks.

- by Scott Applegate
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- Cyber-Physical Systems, Cyber Conflict, Cyber Warfare, Stuxnet

Over the last years there is a growing body of literature over exploiting cyberspace for offensive and defensive purposes. Cyber-conflict is after all the newest mode of warfare and cyber-weapons have been described as weapons of mass disruption. Although the attention on the technical and military dimensions of cyberspace is justifiable, one needs also to look into the legal and ethical aspects of cyber-conflict, in order to comprehend the complex nature of cyberspace. The lack of an international legal framework that defines the use of force in cyberspace, operational difficulties in deterring and identifying cyber-attacks as well as the asymmetric dimension of cyber-conflicts pose without a doubt, great pressure on both theorists and practitioners of warfare. This paper will highlight the legal and ethical dilemmas regarding the use of force in cyberspace and question how the Law of War can be applied to cyber-threats.

- by Andrew N Liaropoulos
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- International Relations, Cyberlaw, International Security, War Studies
- by Brett Lunceford
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- Information Systems, Electronic Engineering, Communication Engineering, Sociology

In August 2008, the Russian Army invaded georgia. numerous, coordinated cyber attacks accompanied the military campaign. this represents the first instance of a large-scale computer network attack (CNA) conducted in tandem with major ground combat operations. The attack had no direct connection to the Russian government, but had a significant informational and psychological impact on Georgia: it effectively isolated the Caucasus state from the outside world.

- by Paulo Shakarian
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- Information Security, Cyberstudies, Cyber Conflict, Cyber Terrorism

Intensive use of social media by an expanding population of Russian internet users gives rise to acute concern among the Russian security structures. This follows examples of facilitation of regime change by means of social media during the Arab Spring. At the same time, both the political impact of online activism, and the extent of measures taken by the authorities to mitigate it, have been exaggerated. Opinions on the nature and role of cyber security, and even on what to call it, vary widely within the Russian leadership, giving rise to confused policy. The release of a promised Cyber Security Strategy may bring some clarity.

- by Keir Giles
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- Russian Studies, Information Security, Information Society, Russian

This paper explores the strategic intelligence failures of Operation RYAN that led to the Soviet-American War Scare of 1983, reaching its apotheosis with the Able Archer 83 exercise . Operation RYAN is a fantastic example of how mirror imaging early on in the intelligence cycle can have devastating cascading effects, creating a negative feedback loop of more and more intelligence failures with devastating consequences.

Political hackers and cyber militias have begun to play an increasingly significant role in cyber conflict. Non-state actors, hacktivist groups and patriotic hackers often participate in online hacking battles based on political, ideological or patriotic considerations. These groups, however, lack the legal, moral and ethical constraints often imposed on state-controlled entities. This lack of constraint could lead to the escalation of state-on-state conflicts and may inadvertently drive hostilities toward what Clausewitz would deem as total war in the cyberspace domain. It is with this in mind that western-style democracies, which are often reticent to make use of cyber militias and patriotic hackers, should begin to explore acceptable models to legitimately harness and employ such groups for limited cyber operations. Such usage could introduce needed constraints on these groups and could also prove to be a significant force multiplier in a domain where government and military organizations often suffer from limited human resources. This paper will explore several models for incorporating patriotic hackers and civilian technicians into militia-like organizations and integrating these types of organizations into a state’s cyber operations.

- by Scott Applegate
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- Hacktivism, Cyber Conflict, Cyber Warfare, Cyber Security

A group of eighty six nations has published National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSS). The NCSSs present similarities in basic concepts, in the identification of cyber threats and in the delimitation of strategic objectives. The present article analyzes and compares the NCSSs in respect to the similarities shown within the scope of protection of critical infrastructures (CI). The convergence points identified in the article are: the protection of CIs as a strategic objective; the definition of what constitutes a CI; the services and facilities deemed CI; the existence of a national CI protection program; the need to congregate public and private stakeholders; and the need to build resilience into CI systems. The conclusion points out the countries that have shown through their NCSSs interest in international cooperation for the protection of CIs. This can be achieved by means of joint training, information exchange on threats and incidents against CIs, and in the medium term, the regulation of the use of cyberweapons against CIs.

- by Eduardo Izycki and +1
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- International Relations, International Security, Cyber Conflict, Cyberwarfare

"In today’s information-driven business environment, enterprise systems and processes capture an ever-increasing amount of data. To derive meaningful and actionable information from this data, businesses are compelled to commit significant resources to perform the necessary analysis. While all business areas are impacted to varying degrees, few face a greater challenge than the information security department. To support its mission to protect critical information assets, the information security department must maintain an ongoing process to capture, analyze and subsequently act on log and alert information collected from a wide array of systems across the enterprise.
Typically, these data must be analyzed and actionable.... Joey Hernandez worked as a SME Reviewer for this ISACA effort"

- by joey Hernandez
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- Information Security, Machine Learning, Data Mining, Network Security
- by Keir Giles
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- Russian Studies, Computer Science, Information Technology, Cyberlaw

As we have seen several versions of Shamoon malware like 2 and 3
Generation , the fourth version has been spread, but it did not was
famous like version 3 . In this paper i will analyze the Shamoon 4
malware , which may be the next target in cyber conflict in middle
east.
Shamoon 3 gained fame in the media because the amount of damage
and the cost of recovery .Finally the virus overwrites the master boot
record of the infected computer, making it unusable.
It was later described as the "biggest hack
in history.
Several companies analyzed the third version, but
because the fourth 'version was not officially available,
no researcher analyzed it. In this paper i will analyze it.

- by Anwar Yousef
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- Forensics, Middle East Studies, Cyber Conflict, Computer Security

• Provides a multidisciplinary approach to Cyber Warfare analyzing the information technology, military, policy, social, and scientific issues that are in play.
• Presents detailed case studies of cyber-attack including inter-state cyber-conflict (Russia-Estonia), cyber-attack as an element of an information operations strategy (Israel-Hezbollah,) and cyber-attack as a tool against dissidents within a state (Russia, Iran)
• Explores cyber-attack conducted by large, powerful, non-state hacking organizations such as Anonymous and LulzSec
• Covers cyber-attacks directed against infrastructure such including but not limited to water treatment plants, power-grid and a detailed account on Stuxent"""

- by Paulo Shakarian
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- Computer Science, Information Security, Computer Networks, Hacktivism
- by Adrianna Llongueras Vicente
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- Cyber Conflict, Cyber Warfare, Cyber crime, Cyber Physical Systems

A relation of mutual influence exists between the way conflicts are waged and the societies waging them. As Clausewitz remarked, more than an art or a science, conflicts are a social activity. And much like other social activities, conflicts mirror the values of societies while relying on their technological and scientific developments. In turn, the principles endorsed to regulate conflicts play a crucial role in shaping societies. Think about the design, deployment, and regulation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). During World War II, WMDs were made possible by scientific breakthroughs in nuclear physics, which was a central area of research in the years leading to the War. Yet, their deployment proved to be destructive and violent beyond what the postwar world was willing to accept. The Cold War that followed and the nuclear treaties that ended it defined the modes in which nuclear technologies and WMDs can be used, drawing a line between conflicts and atrocities. In doing so, treaties and regulations for the use of WMDs contributed to shape contemporary societies as societies rejecting the belligerent rhetoric of the early twentieth century and to striving for peace and stability. The same mutual relation exists between information societies and cyber conflicts, making the regulation of the latter a crucial aspect, which will contribute to define current and future societies. In the short term, regulations are needed to avoid a digital wild west, as remarked by Harold Hongju Koh, the former Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State. For this reason, over the past few years, efforts have been devoted to analysing and interpreting the existing corpus of laws to guide states in engaging in international cyber conflicts.

- by Dr. Matthew Crosston
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- Business, History, Military History, Diplomatic History

This article analyses various cyber conflicts and cyber crime incidents attributed to Russian hackers, such as the Estonian and Georgian cyber conflicts and the ‘Climategate hack’. The article argues that Russian hackers were blamed by dozens of outlets for the Climategate hack, because that was consistent with global media coverage of cyber crime incidents which portrayed Russians as highly powerful hackers responsible for many hacking incidents. This narrative also was congruent with the new Cold War rhetoric that consistently takes issue with Russia acting on its geopolitical interests. These interests are seen to manifest themselves in Russia’s objection to countries, formerly under its influence, participating in the NATO alliance and its seemingly obstructive stance at the Copenhagen summit on climate change.

- by Athina Karatzogianni
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- Media Studies, New Media, Cybercrimes, Cyber Conflict
- by Athina Karatzogianni
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- Cyber Conflict

This book explores current and emerging trends in policy, strategy, and practice related to cyber operations conducted by states and non-state actors. The book examines in depth the nature and dynamics of conflicts in the cyberspace, the... more

- by Scott Applegate
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- Cyber Conflict, Cyber Warfare, Cyberspace Operations

In this article, I analyse deterrence theory and argue that its applicability to cyberspace is limited and that these limits are not trivial. They are the consequence of fundamental differences between deterrence theory and the nature of cyber conflicts and cyberspace. The goals of this analysis are to identify the limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace, clear the ground of inadequate approaches to cyber deterrence, and define the conceptual space for a domain-specific theory of cyber deterrence, still to be developed.

- by Mariarosaria Taddeo
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- Information Technology, Strategy (Military Science), War Studies, Deterrence

Recent cyberattacks, such as those carried out against Estonia and Georgia, have grayed the line between political hackers and legitimate combatants involved in cyberconflicts. There has been fierce debate as to whether these attacks are the independent acts of politically motivated individuals and groups or the strategic acts of states using covert methods to direct such actions to achieve larger political objectives. These attacks lead to many important questions but have yet to be answered in the international community. Under international agreements, can a computer attack truly be claimed as an armed attack? Are participants in these cyberattacks legitimate combatants, or are they merely politically motivated individuals who are breaking the law and should thus be treated as criminals under existing international agreements? This article explores these issues, the possible benefits and drawbacks of such actions, and the ramifications such cybermilitias might have on the current and future state of cyberconflicts.

- by Scott Applegate
- •
- Hacktivism, Cyber Conflict, Cyber Warfare, Cyber Lawfare

As the world continues on a path of increased connectivity, control over the cyber domain has become a matter of state security. The sustained loss of wealth in the form of intellectual property theft and financial shenanigans has reached critical mass. As a warning to America, General Keith Alexander, while serving as the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), stated: “What we need to worry about is when these
transition from disruptive to destructive attacks...” He goes on to say: “The conflict is growing, the probability for crisis is mounting.” (Rogin, 2012). In this context, the main danger the “special operations teams” of cyberspace in America is called the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).

- by Al Lewis
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- International Relations, Intelligence, Cyber Conflict, Cybersecurity

Cyber attacks are escalating in frequency, impact, and sophistication. For this reason, it is crucial to identify and define regulations for state behaviour and strategies to deploy countering measures that would avoid escalation and disproportionate use of cyber means, while protecting and fostering the stability of our societies. To this end, strategies to deter cyber attacks and norms regulating state behaviour in cyberspace are both necessary; unfortunately neither is available at the moment. In this chapter, I offer a theory of cyber deterrence and a set of policy recommendations to fill this vacuum.

- by Mariarosaria Taddeo
- •
- Information Ethics, Cyber Conflict, Cyberwarfare, Cyber Security

With the U.S. government acknowledgement of the seriousness of cyber threats, particularly against its critical infrastructures, as well as the Department of Defense officially labeling cyberspace as a war fighting domain, the Cold War strategy of deterrence is being applied to the cyber domain. However, unlike the nuclear realm, cyber deterrence must incorporate a wide spectrum of potential adversaries of various skill, determination, and capability, ranging from individual actors to state run enterprises. What’s more, the very principles that achieved success in deterring the launch of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, namely the threat of severe retaliation, cannot be achieved in cyberspace, thus neutralizing the potential effectiveness of leveraging a similar strategy. Attribution challenges, the ability to respond quickly and effectively, and the ability to sustain a model of repeatability prove to be insurmountable in a domain where actors operate in obfuscation.

- by Emilio Iasiello
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- Cyber Conflict, Cyber Warfare, Computer Hacking, Cyber Law

Efforts to regulate cyber conflicts—and cyber-defence postures more generally— rose to prominence almost a decade ago, when the risks for national and international security and stability arising from the cyber domain became clear.1 As I argued elsewhere (Taddeo 2014), these efforts often rely on an analogy-based approach, according to which the regulatory problems concerning cyber conflicts are only apparent, insofar as these are not radically different from other forms of conflicts. Those endorsing this approach claim that the existing legal framework2 governing armed conflicts is sufficient to regulate the cyber battlefield. All that is needed is an in-depth analysis of such laws and an adequate interpretation of the phenomena. As Schmitt stresses.

- by Mariarosaria Taddeo
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- Peace and Conflict Studies, Computer Ethics, Security Studies, Cyber Conflict

Dābiq is an electronic magazine (e-zine) utilising strategic utopianism and savagery messages supported by exemplary leadership, eschatology, and current events reports. This project analyses narrative themes present within Dābiq and how relevant and prevalent these themes are across issues. The project applies Thematic Network Analysis of the first six issues of Dābiq, laying foundations for understanding ISIL’s culture and counter-narrative development. It argues present terminology and first generation research constrain understanding of ISIL’s cultural specifics. This project establishes that rhetoric within Dābiq contains both political and religious narratives. Finally, this project establishes that ‘Exemplary Leadership’ theme dominates ISIL’s Dābiq rhetoric.

- by DAVID HOOKER
- •
- Critical Theory, Information Systems, Religion, History

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first discusses the political environment in China to provide the context for dissent and involves a broad stroke on neoliberalism in China with a further discussion on censorship and control in this environment. A second section maps networked dissent in terms of the impact and use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in relation to civil society, mass incidents and labour resistance, and shows how it links to broader resistance in the global mediascape. The final section concentrates on nationalism and the symptomatic repression of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as nationalism, which fuels and links to cybercrime and patriotic hacking.

- by Athina Karatzogianni
- •
- Digital Humanities, Digital Media, Cyber Conflict, China

This article proposes a theoretical assessment of discourses on cyberconflict, and of their relation to the current perception of the state of cyberspace. By contrasting the “battlefield” approaches to cyberconflict with theoretical and factual materials on its social and political impacts, this article suggests that the “battlefield” terminology frames the discussion of online security within a drive for the “militarization” of cyberspace. It concludes by presenting generativity-based perspectives as a contribution towards addressing contemporary challenges to network politics in cyberconflict theoretical frameworks.

- by Artur Alves
- •
- New Media, Internet Governance, Cyber Conflict, Cybercultures

The Boko Haram terrorism, which began in 2009 has had a devastating impact on the society. So far, it has triggered one of the worst humanitarian crises in history and has been responsible for over 30 thousand deaths with over two million others displaced, mostly in the North-east of the country with sizeable spillovers into the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Boko Haram’s primary goal was to create an Islamic caliphate in the region, and like other terrorist networks, uses the unconventional, hit-and-run guerrilla war tactics. This has rendered the insurgency to be a hard nut to crack, a phenomenon that is cited as one of the main reasons the group is able to continually carry out successful attacks despite being declared “technically defeated”. Hence, this need to seek for alternative, ‘unconventional’ media as a tool for counterterrorism. The media, both new and traditional have been shown to play a critical role toward the de-Bokoharamization campaign of the Nigerian Federal Government in collaboration with its Western partners. However, due to the guerrilla tactics nature of the insurgency, human-wearable digital microchip technology such as radio frequency identification and wireless body area network systems have been suggested as capable of yielding desirable outcomes. Following a critical review of literature and taking from Laswell’s communication model, this review article offers a digital communication counterterrorism model to complement the state’s efforts toward the anti-terrorism campaign.

- by Adamkolo M Ibrahim
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- Information Technology, Wearable Technologies, Cyber Conflict, Nigeria

Since 9/11, intelligence has evolved within a changing atmosphere of modern tactics and techniques for information collection. This atmosphere, coupled with massive leaps in technological advancement such as social media, mobile communications, processing analytics, large-form solid-state data storage, novel computational hardware, and software equipment, has thrust intelligence communities around the world into a strange new world of multi-dimensional intelligence. While science and technology and human capability both remain valuable facets of the same overlapping intelligence construct, there is an emerging trend of diametrically opposed camps pushing for one method over the other. This article explains how in terms of field application and intelligence information processing and analysis, both HUMINT and TECHINT could be maximized by the elimination of forced rivalry and by the encouragement of mutual cooperation that is currently lacking.

- by Dr. Matthew Crosston
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- Information Systems, Discourse Analysis, History, Military History

Studies on cyber conflict and strategy have substantially increased in the past decade but most have focused on the cyber operations of powerful states. This book moves away from the prominence of powerful states and explores the potential of cyber capabilities for small states in the Asia-Pacific, the most active region for cyber conflict. It develops a systematic explanation of why Brunei, New Zealand, and Singapore have developed or are developing cyber capabilities despite its obscure strategic value. The book argues that the distribution of power in the region and a "technology-oriented" strategic culture are two necessary conditions that influence the development of cyber capabilities in small states. Following this argument, the book draws on neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework to account for the interaction between these two conditions. The book also pursues three secondary objectives. First, it aims to determine the constraints and incentives that affect the utilization of cyber capabilities as foreign policy instruments. Second, the book evaluates the functionality of these cyber capabilities for small states. Lastly, it assesses the implications of employing cyber capabilities as foreign policy tools of small states.

- by Francis C . Domingo
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- Strategic Studies, Strategic Culture, Cyber Conflict, Small States

The U.S.-China bilateral agenda is dominated by issues like trade, intellectual property rights, monetary policy, human rights and security issues. However, given the fact that critical national infrastructures and the private sector are increasingly dependent on digital assets, cyberspace has become an important aspect of their bilateral relationship. The purpose of this paper is to define the nature of U.S.-China relationship in cyberspace and identify issues that cause conflict between Washington and Beijing. For both sides, cyberspace is a realm where they exercise power politics in order to pursue their national interests. The two global competitors have different positions on most of the issues that relate to cyberspace. Fear and uncertainty are present in cyberspace for both Washington and Beijing. Nevertheless, they also have common goals. The level of interdependence between them is high and avoiding misperception and escalation is a mutual priority. Therefore, both sides are trying to avoid mistrust and conflict in cyberspace and establish some cooperative mechanisms. Based on previous practice from nuclear diplomacy, both sides are in the process of identifying diplomatic tools (e.g. confidence building measures, Track II diplomacy and simulations) in order to avoid unnecessary tension in cyberspace.

- by Andrew N Liaropoulos
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- International Relations, Geopolitics, International Security, War Studies
- by Bill Hagestad
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- Information Security, Natural Language Processing, Information Society, Russian

Deterrence in cyberspace is possible. But it requires an effort to develop a new domain-specific, conceptual, normative, and strategic framework. To be successful, cyber deterrence needs to shift from threatening to prevailing. I argue that by itself, deterrence is insufficient to ensure stability of cyberspace. An international regime of norms regulating state behaviour in cyberspace is necessary to complement cyber deterrence strategies and foster stability. Enforcing this regime requires an authority able to ensure States compliance with the norms at an international level, run investigations into suspected State-run (or Statesponsored) cyber operations to define attribution, expose breaches of the norms, and impose adequate sanctions and punishments. These requirements define a political mandate for an authority that will have a deep impact on international relations and geo-political equilibriums. The UN Security Council has the necessary resources and the political and coercive power to meet these requirements. The time has come to embrace this power to consolidate and enforce an international regime of norms to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace. Problems, mistakes, and even failures are to be expected, but they must not hinder the process.

- by Mariarosaria Taddeo
- •
- International Relations, Strategic Studies, Deterrence, Computer Ethics

- by Jonathan Disegi
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- International Relations, Soviet History, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons

This chapter looks at what makes cyber-security a key national security issue. Section 28.2 provides background information to understand why cyberspace is insecure and what it takes to hack a system. Section 28.3 looks at different types of politically relevant cyber-operations, describing hacktivism, cyber-crime , cyber-espionage , cyber-terrorism and cyber-war , among others. Section 28.4 sets the threat into perspective, exploring the realities of cyber-conflict. The debate has shifted from scenarios of imminent cyber-doom to the observable reality of often stealthy, sometimes disruptive operations under the threshold of war. Section 28.5 details selected protection concepts that help
to reduce cyber-risks.

- by Myriam Dunn Cavelty
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- Security Studies, Cyber Conflict, Cyber Terrorism, Computer Security
- by Tim Stevens
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- New Media, Israel/Palestine, Cyber Conflict, ARAB ISRAEL CONFLICT AND HAMAS

There are few more critical questions in the field of cyber security than the issue of how to prevent malicious cyber actions and the utility of deterrence in the cyber domain. For many, deterrence will protect us from an uncertain cyber future. Yet, the proliferation of scholars and academics conceptually stretching an age old or nuclear era concept to the new domain prevents the development of logics that might be more applicable and progressive in this transformative digital age. Put simply, cyber deterrence is logically problematic, empirically unsupported, and impractical to put into practice in cyberspace. The most powerful states in the world, conventionally or in terms of cyber power, are constantly attacked and probed, yet their capabilities do not deter the adversary given the conditions of the cyber framework. Building more powerful systems, making clear the threats and consequences of actions, or extending the threats to conventional actions will not save deterrence and make it work. Instead the concept of restraint offers a more viable perspective by which to understand cyber conflict dynamics and perhaps offers a better way to manage future interactions. This article explores the evolution of the concept, its application to the cyber domain, the problems with its implementation and logic, and the policy implications of our inability to move beyond the concept. By giving up the crutch of deterrence, strategists can finally focus on the important tasks required in the cyber domain-defenses, hygiene, understanding restraint dynamics, and shared norms and institutions that might make a cyber future a safe one. A clear intellectual debt is owed to

- by Ryan C Maness
- •
- Cyber Conflict, IR Theory, Cyber Security, Cyber Threats

The world's perception of cyberspace has evolved from the libertarian promises of the 1990s to the current situation, where nation-states seek to reestablish their sovereignty. This paper explores the history of our conceptions of cyberspace, from the enthusiastic utopias culminating in the so-called " declaration of independence of cyberspace " to the technological underpinnings and the legislative steps being taken by today's governments to assert more control. It will address efforts in the West and East to resolve diverse, multi-faceted, and ongoing challenges that range from supporting open cyberspace to being able to heavily monitor the threat activities and the various state and non-state actors operating in cyberspace. The paper will highlight the technical and regulatory difficulties in establishing borders in cyberspace, as well as the corresponding policy consequences, and reveal how actors are evading borders by using various techniques such as cryptography and data havens, to name a few. The main takeaway is that the balkanization of cyberspace is not only a reality, but also a course that may be too difficult to reverse, and raises the question of how do open societies balance sovereignty with individual freedoms in cyberspace? A proposal is offered, drawing from examples in which the sovereignty of nation-states is limited and in which borders are not a factor, such as the international body of law regulating global commons. Alessandro Guarino is the principal consultant of StudioAG, an Italian information security and cybersecurity consultancy firm. Emilio Iasiello is a strategic cyber intelligence analyst, supporting US government civilian and military intelligence organizations, as well as the private sector.

- by Cyber, Intelligence, and Security INSS and +1
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- International Relations, Privacy, Internet Governance, Cyber Conflict

Multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international peace and security including cyber war, low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified by NATO as so called "Hybrid Threats" (cf BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 August 2010). This presentation aims to introduce the audience to this form of security threat with a particular focus on "cyber" terrorism and war. This new form of conflict in the fifth dimension has a truly hybrid risk potential and warrants a new holistic counter approach: from law enforcement, counter cyber strategies to kinetic responses. The authors will present the findings of an ongoing Hybrid Threat experiment, which is being undertaken at the Swedish Defence College, with a focus on the role of cyber attacks within the wider context of asymmetric conflict and how the existing legal framework governing the use of force and the law applicable to hostilities does not necessarily reflect on this new form of threat

- by Professor Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann
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- Criminology, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Terrorism