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2025, Regional Cooperation in the Midst of Regional Conflagration: Examining the Partnership Agenda in the Shadow of October 7th

In September of 2023, as the Abraham Accords
reached their third anniversary, there was much to
celebrate, at least in some parts of the Middle East.
The historic economic and defense agreements
signed between the member states began to show
dividends, painting a picture of a more prosperous,
peaceful, and stable region. In 2023, trade between
Israel and the Abraham Accords nations exceeded
$4 billion USD. More notably, despite Israel’s 12%
decrease in total trade over the first 9-months of
2023, its trade with its Abraham Accords partners
increased by over 24%.1 The region saw further
Arab-Israeli integration with the establishment of
the Negev Forum and the “I2U2” UAE-US-Israel-In-
dia initiative, which have fostered collaboration in
trade, diplomacy, defense, and energy. Although
Saudi Arabia has not yet normalized relations with
Israel, official visits and reports of advanced talks
gave the impression that a deal was on the horizon.
At the same time, Turkey, a member of NATO and
a US ally, had begun to improve its relations with
both Israel and the Gulf, marking a broader circle
of regional alignment.
At the Moshe Dayan Center, and specifically in
our Program for Regional Cooperation, our work
began to reflect the sentiments of collaboration,
integration, and connectivity felt in the region.
The Center partnered with five institutions in the
region to convene the first of a series of annual
conferences exploring New Regionalism and the
emerging agenda of partnership in the Middle
East. These partnerships exemplified the new par-
adigm of regional dynamics, as our partners saw
themselves as true stakeholders, investing both
time and resources, a reality largely unachieved
by previous Israeli-Arab partnerships in the region.
Immediately following the signing of the Abraham
Accords, public sentiment towards Israel in the Gulf
reached a peak. While there was widespread oppo-
sition to “normalization” across parts of the region,
citizens in the UAE and Bahrain largely expressed
support for the new regional framework. The
Accords not only facilitated government-to-gov-
ernment collaboration but also fostered closer
people-to-people ties. Initiatives like the open-
ing of the Abrahamic Family House, the influx of
Israeli tourists to the Gulf, and emerging business
ventures with Israeli companies further bolstered
public backing. However, skepticism persisted as
Gulf citizens awaited tangible benefits from the
Accords, particularly in terms of positive outcomes
for the Palestinians.
This progress, however, seemed to come to a tragic
and sudden halt on October 7th, 2023, when the
tension between brothers and cousins that always
existed now moved to the streets. The heinous
Hamas attacks and the Israeli military response
shook the region, revealing several challenges yet
to be properly addressed by the new regional para-
digm. The region was once again consumed by the
violence and destruction of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and the discourse was dominated by those
who reject the trends of partnership, and promul-
gate hostility, terror, and hate, as well as support
rogue resistance efforts throughout the region.
Nevertheless, even within this new context, the
regional arena and the partnership agenda had
far from disappeared.
While many of the partnerships, particularly
those related to civil society and people-to-peo-
ple dynamics have scaled back significantly, it is
evident that the region has been playing a grow-
ingly important role in managing the conflict. On
the ground, diplomacy was operating in high gear
as Israel’s Abraham Accords partners were the first
international allies to lead humanitarian efforts in
Gaza, with the UAE opening a field hospital and pro-
viding significant humanitarian aid. The regional
partners quickly became the main mediators and
negotiators in the attempts to end the war, reach a
ceasefire, and deal with the sensitive issues of hos-
tages and captives. In an effort to prevent further escalation and destruction, on April 14th, the US,
Israel, and their Arab partners managed to success-
fully intercept 99% of a massive barrage of rockets
and drones fired at Israel by Iran.
This publication, presented at the beginning of
2025, more than 15 months into the conflict, is an
effort to examine the current state of the regional
agenda on the background of the Gaza War, and the
larger regional conflagration it has sparked. Recog-
nizing that following the accords, regional dynam-
ics became ever more relevant to the Israeli-Pal-
estinian conflict, this publication also attempts to
analyze various efforts and initiatives regarding the
rebuilding of Gaza. The articles in this publication
envision a “day after” that will enable the region
to again move away from conflict and towards
connectivity.
In bringing together experts from across the
region, including Israeli, Palestinian, Saudi, Emarati,
and Bahraini contributors, we seek to explore what
remains of the regional agenda and how it might
contribute to drafting a “day after” plan that seeks
to end the war in Gaza and restore a partnership
agenda in the Middle East.
The publication touches on some of the key aspects
at the core of the regional agenda:
Looking at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Nir Boms
(Israel) and Sarah Aweidah (PA) propose a new
paradigm for discourse on a possible solution for
the Israeli-Palestinian question. Through historical
lenses, the article lays the groundwork for a 4.0
version of an Israeli and Palestinian future, further
integrated with the moderate states of the region.
As Israeli and Palestinian writers, they seek to chart
a way forward that frames a possible joint vision
for a “day after” that is based on new leadership,
new beginnings, and new assumptions.
Examining education and its role in shaping the
new era of regionalism, Eldad Pardo (Israel) and
Najat al Said (Saudi/UAE), both analyze the region’s
various textbooks and educational philosophies,
examining how they contribute to the political
agendas and visions of the states in question.
Despite their different angles and perspectives,
these two articles offer thoughts as to how the
educational systems, both in Gaza, and in the wider
region, must be reformed and realigned with the
trajectory of peace and coexistence in the context
of “day after” plans.
In this conflict especially, the new age of social
media has had a tremendous impact on the nar-
ratives and perceptions of the war, many of them
challenging the assumptions of the partnership
agenda. Mohammed Al Sayed (Bahrain) looks at
both traditional media and social media in the Ara-
bic language, examining how organizations, influ-
encers, and other social media trends have shaped
the discourse surrounding the war.
Economy and trade has been a core component of
the agenda. Josh Krasna (Israel) examines the eco-
nomic progression which, although showing signifi-
cant bilateral progress, had thus far failed to rise to
the challenge of “regionalism” and produce multi-
state collaborations, despite those being planned.
This angle points on a weakness in the regionalism
framework that has not yet reached real ripeness.
Discussions for Saudi-Israel normalization had
been the most significant development of the new
partnership agenda in the Middle East in the period
before October 7th. Mujtaba Isani (Saudi/Pakistani)
analyzes the Saudi response to the reemergence of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its ramifications
on the Saudi approach to cooperation with Israel.
Building on the historic insights of Ibn Khaldun,
Einat Levi (Israel) presents a new model of “City
Diplomacy” as a potential key to future progress
within the framework of regionalism. She exam-
ines Abu Dhabi, Haifa, and Essaouira as symbols
of engagement rooted in more stable foundations,
resilient to national-level conflicts, and potentially
beneficial for discussions regarding the reintegra-
tion of Gaza into the region.
Nir Boms and Stephen Cohen analyze the recent
events in Syria following Bashar Al-Assad’s depar-
ture from Damascus on December 7th. While the
idea of building a new “Syrian national project”
based on a power sharing model which considers
the interests and concerns of Syria’s diverse groups
would be supportive to the regional partnership
agenda, the feasibility of such a project is quite low. Recent events have shown that Syria may once
again spiral into further division and conflict. Nev-
ertheless, opportunities for cooperation and pos-
itive connectivity with the moderate forces should
be utilized as Syria charts its new trajectory.
As we write these lines, the first stage of cease-
fire and hostage deal is taking shape in Gaza. Yet,
the regional war continues to rage. In a lightning
offensive, Syrian rebels led by Ahmed al-Sharaa of
Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, captured Damascus in under
two weeks and toppled the Assad regime. As the
events in Syria continue to unfold and the leaders
of the rebellion chart a new trajectory for Syria’s
political reality, many challenges and opportunities
will be presented to the regional agenda. It is clear
that the changing power dynamics in the region,
most notably the weakening of the Iranian axis,
played a significant role in the success of the upris-
ing. While it may be hard to say that the agenda of
connectivity is prevailing, a closer look shows that
opportunities exist here as well.
If you look beyond the fog of war, one could argue
that the trajectory of regional connectivity and
integration is progressing just as rapidly, if not
faster than it was previously, driven by the urgent
need to contain the ongoing conflict. This was the
case in April and again in September, when the region found itself working together to foil Iranian
attacks on Israel. This is also evident in the fact that
flights from Israel to the Gulf are among the few
still operating, even as all other international air-
lines have ceased flying to Ben Gurion Airport. As
the authors have argued in the ...