Daniel Dennett Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

In this volume,‭ ‬volume‭ ‬6,‭ ‬I will deal with insight and understanding,‭ ‬meaning and communication and intersubjectivity.‭ (‬In an appendix I will include a number of‭ –‬isms,‭ ‬cognitive biases and fallacies that might interfere in,‭ ‬with and distort these things.‭)
The latter is pre-supposed by,‭ ‬present,‭ ‬necessary and operating in all four of these notions when they are employed as verbs.‭ ‬I hope and intend to employ these words and explore them without the need for ghost-in-the-machine like mysterious,‭ ‬mystical and mythical‭ ‘‬mental‭’ ‬processes and organs such as‭ ‘‬mind‭’ ‬and‭ ‘‬consciousness‭’ ‬but by means of different meanings,‭ ‬dimensions,‭ ‬levels of t notions of intersubjectivity.‭ ‬Intersubjectivity enfolds‭ (‬like a pregnant mother her foetus‭) ‬insight,‭ ‬understanding,‭ ‬meaning and communication.‭ ‬Intersubjectivity is the beginning,‭ ‬the ground and reason for and the end of all meanings or sense that human beings could have.‭ ‬I am not interested in all the details of insight,‭ ‬experience,‭ ‬understanding,‭ ‬meaning,‭ ‬concepts and ideas,‭ ‬dialogue,‭ ‬discourse,‭ ‬interaction,‭ ‬communication‭ (‬for example as speculated about by Habermas and his followers,‭ ‬Brandom et al‭)‬.‭ ‬etc‭ ‬but merely the fact that these things require,‭ ‬assume,‭ ‬presuppose‭ (‬different aspects,‭ ‬features,‭ ‬functions,‭ ‬processes,‭ ‬etc of‭) ‬intersubjectivity.‭ ‬For those who are so inclined they could execute experiments‭ (‬for example in the disciplines of philosophy,‭ ‬psychology,‭ ‬sociology,‭ ‬cognitive sciences,‭ ‬anthropology,‭ ‬etc‭) ‬to establish that what I state here is a fact and not merely speculate.‭ ‬I will leave speculation‭ ‬-‭ ‬about the activities and nature of the first,‭ ‬second and third person‭ (‬the public,‭ ‬etc‭) ‬participants in the activities and process of communication,‭ ‬the question of second and third contingencies,‭ ‬or Habermas’s interactionist cum dialogical intersubjectivity and/or Brandom’s discursive intersubjectivity,‭ ‬the insufficiency of the former’s coordination and the need for synthesis,‭ ‬modes of structuration and the temporal dimensions of communication,‭ ‬threefold semiotic or twofold semiological structuralist theories of signs,‭ ‬theories of individualist or collective learning,‭ ‬action-directing models cultural models,‭ ‬pre-supposed structural‭ ‬features of the social relationships that are involved in communication,‭ ‬the structure parameters of for example the process of communication embedded in an intersubjective context‭ (‬I would say all the following themselves‭ ‬are intersubjective‭)‬,‭ ‬as discursive practice,‭ ‬including discourse,‭ ‬argumentation,‭ ‬communication,‭ ‬communication exchange,‭ ‬linguistic communication,‭ ‬everyday communication,‭ ‬interaction,‭ ‬etc‭ ‬-‭ ‬those,‭ ‬especially Continentals and those influenced by them,‭ ‬who suffer from the need for metaphysical speculation and to ontologize in complex terms about the most simple and obvious notions.

The reason for these attitudes of mine towards mental things,‭ ‬processes,‭ ‬organs,‭ ‬etc is that I do not believe they exist,‭ ‬apart from being umbrella-notions that refer to a number of undefined and not yet conceptualized meanings.‭ ‬They have their origins in uneducated,‭ ‬uninformed redundant myths and folk psychology.‭ ‬Their usage date back to almost pre-historic times in the evolution of human thinking and psychology and are conceptual remainders and linguistic left overs‭ ‬of primitive flat earth socio-cultural attitudes and beliefs.

I further need to make four points concerning my approach in this volume and my approach to or understanding of philosophy,‭ ‬they manner or style in which I write,‭ ‬especially in this volume and how I employ and interpret the nature and one function of intersubjectivity,‭ ‬both in this volume and in general.‭ ‬The latter I present as a kind of hypothesis and conclusion.

Institutionalized and internalized,‭ ‬competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality,‭ ‬including of themselves‭ (‬Dennett and Sellars‭)‬,.‭ ‬This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive,‭ ‬understanding intersubjectivity.‭ ‬It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding‭ (‬scientific,‭ ‬Dennett and Sellars‭) ‬image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics and morality deal with the reality of competence intersubjectivity‭ (‬by means of socio-cultural practices that are derived from,‭ ‬based on an created by means of this restrictive,‭ ‬misleading,‭ ‬unreal,‭ ‬illusory,‭ ‬unrealistic intersubjectivity and the life-worlds associated with it‭) ‬and human life-worlds constituted on the basis of and in terms of this intersubjectivity.‭ ‬This is why I am a nihilist,‭ ‬a libertarian,‭ ‬at least a minarchist or rather an anarchist and epistemologically a sceptic.

Kant’s‭ ‬things in themselves are similar‭ ‬to Dennett and Searle‭’‬s‭ ‬notions of manifest and scientific image.‭ ‬With my addition that we‭ ‬are socialized and internalize the competent,‭ ‬know how to do it,‭ ‬institutionalized manifest,‭ ‬everyday intersubjectivity,‭ ‬instead of the comprehension,‭ ‬insights and understanding knowing that,‭ ‬scientific intersubjectivity of all scientific disciplines.‭

This piece can be read as independent as comments on meta-ethics,‭ ‬or it can be read as a chapter in my Book‭ ‘‬Intersubjectivity‭ (‬continued‭)’‬,‭ ‬or it can be read as an introduction to my thoughts on philosophy and more specifically Intersubjectivity as‭ –

Determining the nature of‭ ‬philosophy

Determining the nature of the subject-matter of philosophy,‭ ‬sociology,‭ ‬social psychology,‭ ‬aspects of cognitive sciences,‭ ‬ethics,‭ ‬epistemology,‭ ‬etc,

Determining the nature of philosophical methodology and approaches.

Reasons why I have refrained from reflecting and writing on ethics and morality‭ ‬-‭

a‭)‬ The intersubjectivity that are institutionalized,‭ ‬socialized and internalize and therefore being employed to constitute reality,‭ ‬life-worlds,‭ ‬selves,‭ ‬discourses and socio-cultural practices,‭ ‬including specialized disciplines,‭ ‬eg philosophy,‭ ‬is that of‭ ‬Kantian things-for-us or Searle‭’ ‬and Dennett’s notion of manifest,‭ ‬imaginary,‭ ‬competent or know-how,‭ ‬knowing-how-to images.‭ ‬This kind of intersubjectivity underlies human morality and ethics,‭ ‬as well as approaches of philosophers to these and other branches of philosophy.

‭ ‬b‭) ‬How philosophers exist and how they live,‭ ‬their attitudes and beliefs,‭ ‬are very different from the theories of human existence,‭ ‬consciousness,‭ ‬selves,‭ ‬ethics,‭ ‬morality,‭ ‬epistemology,‭ ‬ontology,‭ ‬metaphysics,‭ ‬etc they advocate or express in and as their theories.‭ ‬Philosophers have their own private ways or personal styles of im/morality and being a-ethical while they advocate theories of ethics‭ (‬and other branches of philosophy‭) ‬that are completely different from their real attitudes and beliefs.

c‭) ‬As far as institutionalized and lived ethics and morality go I am a nihilist,‭ ‬an anarchist,‭ ‬or at least a minarchist,‭ ‬a Pyrrhonist,‭ ‬or at least a Humean or Kantian sceptic if not a fallibilist.

A suggestion before I paste the usual,‭ ‬contemporary encyclopaedic notions of ethics as a branch of philosophy and present notions of the‭ ‘‬division‭’ ‬of the subject and approaches to ethics and meta-ethics.‭

When a compatibilist says free will and determinism are compatible,‭ ‬and critics say they are mistaken‭ – ‬see below‭ – ‬they talk about specific situations,‭ ‬while those who points out that there do exists some kinds of determinisms after al,‭ ‬the latter take a more general,‭ ‬big picture view and make a statement on a greater or higher level of generality or generalization.