European Security Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

NATO confronts four distinct public perception challenges: weak or varying public support for the alliance and its specific missions; a general lack of public awareness of the alliance's post-cold war transformation; diverging opinions on... more

NATO confronts four distinct public perception challenges: weak or varying public support for the alliance and its specific missions; a general lack of public awareness of the alliance's post-cold war transformation; diverging opinions on its proper role in the world; and parochial and domestic interests filtering into NATO's agenda. These various public relations challenges detract from alliance cohesiveness, impede mission performance, breed confusion and dissension about alliance aims, and raise questions about the proper operation of democratic governance within the alliance. Recent alliance communication efforts encompassing public diplomacy and strategic communications have failed to improve these public perception challenges. Instead, NATO should consider adopting a long-term branding strategy that focuses specifically on shaping the public's mental image of the alliance through the creation, promulgation, and management of a core message. Such a strategy has the potential to create a more consolidated alliance mandate that is easier for the public to understand and, ultimately, transforms the way NATO relates to its public.

The article examines the impact of Brexit on the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain. Throughout preceding decades, this relationship was marked by stability and unprecedented high level of political,... more

The article examines the impact of Brexit on the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain. Throughout preceding decades, this relationship was marked by stability and unprecedented high level of political, military, economic and financial cooperation. On the basis of quantitative analysis of the U.S. and British databases of international treaties, the authors provide a comparative analysis of the dynamic of bilateral relationship between the two countries from 1940 to 2017, as well as of their relations with the leading European powers — France and Germany. The authors also examine a wide range of agreements which laid a formal basis for the special relationship in such spheres as military and technical cooperation as a whole and nuclear cooperation in particular, intelligence, trade, taxation, scientific and industrial cooperation. It is concluded that this extensive treaty framework renders bilateral relations more coherent and stable, but at the same time it reveals their asymmetric nature which made the United Kingdom follow the U.S. foreign policy strategy. However, the analysis of bilateral relations in the context of the British withdrawal from the EU allowed the authors to shed a new light on the essence and the prospects for the special relationship. The authors conclude that, in the medium-term, military and economic cooperation will continue since it is based on the objective interests of both sides. The U.S. needs British military bases and investment while the UK needs American technologies, especially in the nuclear sphere, and investment alike. Simultaneously, one cannot exclude changes in the longer term. The United States as the leader of the Western world expect Great Britain not only to follow its policy but to support it, i.a. by maintaining a high level of military spending. In turn, the UK new foreign policy, articulated in Global Britain strategy, may come into conflict with the U.S. interests while lack of military spending can diminish the UK role in ensuring transatlantic security. This may have a negative impact on the bilateral dialogue.

Although the existence of foreign fighters is nothing new in the inter- national arena, the phenomenon has not yet triggered a substantial reflection in International Relations (IR) theory. A relatively rare phenomenon before the 1980s,... more

Although the existence of foreign fighters is nothing new in the inter- national arena, the phenomenon has not yet triggered a substantial reflection in International Relations (IR) theory. A relatively rare phenomenon before the 1980s, foreign fighters have so far received little attention under IR. This state of affairs began to change in the spring of 2014, when a jihadist armed group that incorporates an unprecedented number of foreign recruits—the Islamic State (IS)—proclaimed a ‘Caliphate’ spanning large portions of Syrian and Iraqi ter- ritory and captured global attention by widely circulating to the media all sorts of terror tactics and war crimes it systematically perpetrates. This chapter seeks first of all to bring foreign fighters into an IR analytical focus by identifying those trends that make them a discrete actor category distinct from insurgents and terror- ists. Second, it addresses some of the difficulties in grasping the question from an IR theory angle, beginning with transnational mobilisation and State sponsorship. Finally, it reflects on how foreign fighters are involved in State-making/un-making, and how this affects movements in the tectonics of the international system.

Ostatniego ćwierćwiecza polskich przemian politycznych dotyka i niniejsza publikacja, która jest zbiorem artykułów przygotowanych przez pracowników naukowych i doktorantów z różnych ośrodków w kraju. Prace dotykają zarówno polityki... more

Ostatniego ćwierćwiecza polskich przemian politycznych dotyka i niniejsza publikacja, która jest zbiorem artykułów przygotowanych przez pracowników naukowych i doktorantów z różnych ośrodków w kraju. Prace dotykają zarówno polityki wewnętrznej, jak i zagranicznej państwa, co oznacza, że odnoszą się do stosunkowo dużego obszaru poznawczego. Zdecydowaną przewagę uzyskały w tej tematyce problemy zewnątrzpaństwowe odnoszące się do Unii Europejskiej, polityki zagranicznej, kilku aspektów bezpieczeństwa europejskiego i międzynarodowego, migracji wewnątrzeuropejskich czy Kościoła katolickiego. Wszystkie te kwestie mieszczą się w ogólnych zarysach „wybranych problemów politycznych” państwa polskiego w latach 1989-2014. Zadaniem niniejszej publikacji stało się przybliżenie Czytelnikom takich problemów politycznych Polski z ostatniego ćwierćwiecza, które wymagają dodatkowego komentarza, pogłębionych analiz podmiotowych i przedmiotowych oraz ciągle aktualnego spojrzenia metodologicznego i merytorycznego.

Looming decisions on arms control and strategic weapon procurements in a range of nuclear-armed states are set to shape the international security environment for decades to come. In this context, it is crucial to understand the concepts,... more

Looming decisions on arms control and strategic weapon procurements in a range of nuclear-armed states are set to shape the international security environment for decades to come. In this context, it is crucial to understand the concepts, theories, and debates that condition nuclear policymaking. This review essay dissects the four editions of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, the authoritative intellectual history of its subject. Using this widely acclaimed work as a looking glass into the broader field of nuclear security studies, we interrogate the field's underlying assumptions and question the correspondence between theory and practice in the realm of nuclear policy. The study of nuclear strategy, we maintain, remains largely committed to an interpretive approach that invites analysts to search for universal axioms and to abstract strategic arguments from the precise circumstances of their occurrence. While this approach is useful for analysing the locutionary dimension of...

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is critical in post-conflict settings, particularly when it comes to the reform of judicial systems, intelligence services, police, correctional systems, and the military. This article traces and analyzes the... more

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is critical in post-conflict settings, particularly when it comes to the reform of judicial systems, intelligence services, police, correctional systems, and the military. This article traces and analyzes the inter-institutional division of labor between the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo, and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) concerning police reform process in Kosovo. After providing an overview of the evolution of cooperation on SSR between the EU and these other international organizations in Kosovo, the article outlines the complex division of labor among various international organizations in establishing the police force, discusses the process of recruiting minorities into the force, and analyzes the general process of reforming Kosovo's police force. Following a discussion of the obstacles and challenges associated with building and reforming the police, it concludes with a summary of key findings.

Among all European countries the United Kingdom has had by far the greatest impact on the course of European military integration. Since the early 1950s British skepticism, built on ‘atlanticism’ and a concern of weakening sovereignty in... more

Among all European countries the United Kingdom has had by far the greatest impact on the course of European military integration. Since the early 1950s British skepticism, built on ‘atlanticism’ and a concern of weakening sovereignty in defence, has blocked progress in the European defence autonomization process. However, Britain’s political initiative and its more flexible stance led to establishing the Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999.
The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum is scheduled to take place on 23 June 2016. The decision to withdraw the UK from the European Union could have crucial impact on the future of CSDP because in that case the biggest European military power would place itself outside the process of military integration. On the other hand, without Britain it could be easier for 27 remaining members of the EU to expand the CSDP.

Following the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections, Poland has reversed its consist-ently-pro-European foreign policy, marking a radical break up with its post-1989 direction. Whether this turn is a result of some well-developed... more

Following the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections, Poland has reversed its consist-ently-pro-European foreign policy, marking a radical break up with its post-1989 direction. Whether this turn is a result of some well-developed strategy, or merely a natural extension of illiberal domestic reforms introduced by the new government, is irrelevant. What matters is the outcome. Poland is no longer an engine of European integration, nor does it seem to value its relationship with Germany and France. Instead, the new government committed to revive an inter-war tradition of the alliance of central and eastern European (CEE) states, which Po-land, as the largest country of that region, would naturally lead. A dominant narrative justifying this revolution is a familiar claim that Poland must protect is sovereignty and national interest against Brussels and Berlin. In particular, Poland must defend itself against the Europe-an Union’s (EU) un-Christian liberal values, German economic domination and being forced to accept migrant and refugees of non-Christian faith.

The Russian intervention in Syria, as well as the associated deployment of electronic warfare systems, generated alarm among NATO members linked to the possibility that a strengthening of electronic warfare capabilities by Russia could... more

The Russian intervention in Syria, as well as the associated deployment of electronic warfare systems, generated alarm among NATO members linked to the possibility that a strengthening of electronic warfare capabilities by Russia could reduce the current technological asymmetry in favor of NATO. Such reduction would come from the use of electronic warfare systems to hamper the command and control capacity of attack and defense systems. This paper analyses the Russian intervention in Syria in order to define whether it can be understood that there is an increasing risk to Euro-Atlantic security stemming from Russian advances in electronic warfare.

Based on declassified documents from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian National Archives, and the General Records of the Department of State, this paper argues that the creation of a permanent European security... more

Based on declassified documents from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian National Archives, and the General Records of the Department of State, this paper argues that the creation of a permanent European security body gradually became one of the most important objectives for the Romanian diplomacy during the CSCE negotiations. The division of the European continent and the bipolar balance of power were the main threats for the security of the Romanian communist regime. Consequently, to overcome the Cold War status quo, Romania promoted the abolition of blocs and their replacement by a new security system in Europe, based on the commitment of the member states to solve their common issues through cooperation and consensus. The cooperation of the European states was meant to prevent the consecration of a bipolar hegemony in Europe by the United States and USSR.

The aspect of security has acompanied the mankind since the very beginning, becoming inherent element of its existance, the primary value, an aim in itself. By creat-ing the common security politics the countries of EU actively... more

The aspect of security has acompanied the mankind since the very beginning, becoming inherent element of its existance, the primary value, an aim in itself. By creat-ing the common security politics the countries of EU actively participate in maintaining the peace in the world. The aim of this article is to characterize the activities and to dis-cuss the security strategies in the context of globalization and fast development. The main hypothesis assumes that cooperation and solidarity are the keyfactors shaping the feeling of the security. The information community is important in building strong, equal, evaluative and independent European countries. The institutional capacity makes the peace operations more effective.

... Such understanding of energy security logically leads to the idea of more balanced distribution of profits and risks. ... It is not the least important reason underlying the current discussion aboutRussia, which is supposedly gambling... more

... Such understanding of energy security logically leads to the idea of more balanced distribution of profits and risks. ... It is not the least important reason underlying the current discussion aboutRussia, which is supposedly gambling on the competition between the EU countries ...

The term “Intermarium” has a long historical tradition and was commonly used to define the area between the Baltic and Black Seas. With its regular re-appearances in contemporary academic and political discourses, this book explores and... more

The term “Intermarium” has a long historical tradition and was commonly used to define the area between the Baltic and Black Seas. With its regular re-appearances in contemporary academic and political discourses, this book explores and assesses a variety of its connotations. In order to do this, it applies a multi-dimensional approach to the Intermarium. Six researchers specializing in Central and Eastern European history, geopolitics, security, economics, and cultural studies are brought together here to share their expert knowledge. As a result, the book discusses various, unique aspects of the Intermarium. At the very end, a conclusion is drawn as to whether the cognominal framework possesses any feasible potential for emergence and development in the contemporary international architecture.

Die größte strategische Herausforderung für die Herausbildung eines stabilen und geeinten ukrainischen Nationalstaats und das größte strukturelle Hindernis für eine erfolgreiche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Ukraine bleiben weiterhin... more

Die größte strategische Herausforderung für die Herausbildung eines stabilen und geeinten ukrainischen Nationalstaats und das größte strukturelle Hindernis für eine erfolgreiche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Ukraine bleiben weiterhin die russischen Maßnahmen der hybriden Kriegsführung. Obwohl auch weitere ukrainische Reformfortschritte wichtig sind, wird westliches Engagement entscheidend dafür sein, die Effekte des fortdauernden russischen Hybridkrieges gegen die Ukraine einzuschränken. Vor diesem Hintergrund beschreibt der Aufsatz sechs alternative Entwicklungsszenarien der kommenden Jahre.

Since March 2014, European countries are facing massive disinformation campaigns originating from the Russian Federation. Information warfare itself cannot be considered as a new phenomenon in armed conflicts, however in today’s... more

Since March 2014, European countries are facing massive disinformation campaigns originating from the Russian Federation. Information warfare itself cannot be considered as a new phenomenon in armed conflicts, however in today’s information era, the Internet and the social media have provide information warfare with a new battleground, where the main target groups are not militaries, but the minds of civilians. Russian behaviour became more and more aggressive and its origins can be traced back to 2007.

The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and southeastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its 'shared neighbourhood' with Russia and NATO its 'eastern flank',... more

The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and southeastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its 'shared neighbourhood' with Russia and NATO its 'eastern flank', Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia's actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.

The clear de-escalation in the Russian- Ukrainian war observable since late summer 2015 suggests that Russia may have decided, at least for the time being, to turn from mostly military to mostly economic and political instruments.... more

The clear de-escalation in the Russian-
Ukrainian war observable since late
summer 2015 suggests that Russia may have
decided, at least for the time being, to turn from
mostly military to mostly economic and political
instruments. However, there is no indication that
its strategic offensive goals toward Ukraine have
changed. Moscow still seems to want, in the long
term, to put Ukraine under its political control. To
that end Russia, has promoted the “federalization”
(or “decentralization”) of Ukraine: dividing it into
large regions with strong powers, possibly including
veto power over key decisions of the federal
government in Kyiv — a scenario that seems hardly
possible under the current political circumstances.
Despite the increased political dialogue between
Moscow and individual Western capitals, the crisis
seems to be far from over, and a full return to
“business as usual” between Russia and the West
seems highly unlikely.
Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began in February
2014 and included the occupation and illegal
annexation of Crimea and the support of separatist
militias in eastern Ukraine, has led to the biggest
crisis in relations between the West and Russia
since the Cold War. The gravity of what has
occurred and the continued presence of major risks
for regional stability posed by the conflict between
Russia and the West create incentives for closer
analyses of the crisis. This sort of close look reveals
that the Kremlin’s moves have not been knee-jerk,
but rather well-plotted and consistent with a long
history of wanting to draw Ukraine closer to Russia.
Several questions are critical. What were the major
reasons for the crisis? What are the consequences of
the crisis (especially for Ukraine), what is current
state of play, and where we are heading? And finally,
how should Europe and the United States react?

The overriding goals of Russia’s European security policy have remained unaltered: strategic control of the post-Soviet area, the existence of a security buffer zone in Central Europe and the transformation of the existing NATO-based... more

The overriding goals of Russia’s European security policy have remained unaltered: strategic control of the post-Soviet area, the existence of a security buffer zone in Central Europe and the transformation of the existing NATO-based security system in Europe in a manner that would maximise Russia’s political and security influence and minimise that of the USA. What has changed and been diversified are the institutional solutions Moscow has employed in an attempt to achieve these goals. From today’s perspective, it can be concluded that none of them have been achieved. Furthermore, the aggressive and revisionist foreign policy that has been sustained on President Vladimir Putin’s initiative has led to a crisis in relations with the West, in some respects even more serious than the one that prevailed during the Cold War era. At present, Russia needs to choose: whether it should continue the present confrontational approach (or even toughen it) or seek détente with the West. However, the present policy pursued by Russia seems incapable of being altered without major changes in its internal politics.

European misperceptions of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict are the result of, among others, lacking expert knowledge about Ukraine, in the member states of the EU. The most recent example of continuing misunderstanding is a Western... more

European misperceptions of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict are the result of, among others, lacking expert knowledge about Ukraine, in the member states of the EU. The most recent example of continuing misunderstanding is a Western fixation on quality of governance issues, and not on the Ukrainian state’s principal chances of survival. In Ukraine today, a major strategic task is the de-poisoning of the investment climate, especially in the South-Eastern Azov and Black Sea regions. In light of ongoing threats from Russia, Kyiv needs Western-backed guarantees to insure foreign direct investment against political risks, especially in Ukraine’s russophone parts.

This paper examines the contemporary border between Ukraine and Russia as a case study of Russia's approach to its borders. Two research questions are addressed: Firstly, what does the annexation of Crimea by Russia as well as its... more

This paper examines the contemporary border between Ukraine and Russia as a case study of Russia's approach to its borders. Two research questions are addressed: Firstly, what does the annexation of Crimea by Russia as well as its attempts to further undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity in its eastern region of Donbas say about Russia's peculiar approach to Ukraine and its borders? Secondly Whether and To what extent does Russia's approach represent a broader pattern of Russia's policy towards its borders? This paper is divided into three parts: the first part gives a brief account of the modern history of the Russian-Ukrainian border; the second part focuses on peculiar Russian approaches to Ukraine revealed during the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis; the third part puts " the Ukrainian case " into broader conceptual frameworks. This paper concludes that Russia's recognition of the territorial integrity and the borders of the post-Soviet states is conditional and depends mainly on their participation in Russia-led integration projects.

The main point of this article is that the Russian – Ukrainian war is not, as some observers tend to believe, a temporary conflict at Europe’s periphery but a key and serious challenge for the Western community and for European security,... more

The main point of this article is that the
Russian – Ukrainian war is not, as some
observers tend to believe, a temporary conflict
at Europe’s periphery but a key and serious
challenge for the Western community and for
European security, with special consideration
of Russia’s Western neighbors. Therefore
without a concerted, robust and
comprehensive response of NATO and the EU,
as well as of its member states, their security
and their cohesion will be at risk.

The decentring agenda in European Studies has called for turning our gaze from the ‘centre’ towards the ‘periphery’. This essay offers one decentred approach to EU migration governance in the Mediterranean: Studying geopolitical... more

The decentring agenda in European Studies has called for turning our gaze from the ‘centre’ towards the ‘periphery’. This essay offers one decentred approach to EU migration governance in the Mediterranean: Studying geopolitical encounters between
the receiving and sending spaces as constitutive of the very issues that are otherwise portrayed as autonomously developed. I will do this by adopting Edward Said’s method of contrapuntal reading, which involves ‘thinking through and interpreting together’ narratives from different parts of the world towards recovering ‘intertwined and overlapping histories’ of humankind. The specific case I look at is the 2015 ‘migrant crisis in the Mediterranean’ and the ways in which women’s insecurities were portrayed. While such representations presume women’s insecurities to have developed in the South/east and arrived in the North/west via migration, a contrapuntal reading of Fatima Mernissi’s writings together with everyday portrayals of the ‘crisis’ points to the connectedness of otherwise differentiated experiences. What is represented as ‘before Europe’ (in Bernard McGrane's felicitous turn of phrase) is, at the same time, the ‘aftermath of Europe’ insofar
as geopolitical encounters between North/west and South/east of the Mediterranean have been constitutive of women’s insecurities.

This article examines how, in a global strategic context presided by the rise of Asia and the US rebalance towards that region, Europeans are contributing to transatlantic burden-sharing—whether individually or through the EU/NATO. As... more

This article examines how, in a global strategic context presided by the rise of Asia and the US rebalance towards that region, Europeans are contributing to transatlantic burden-sharing—whether individually or through the EU/NATO. As Asian powers reach westward and the US shifts its strategic priorities eastward, classical geostrategic delimitations become gradually tenuous. Particularly important are the ‘middle spaces’ of the Indian Ocean, central Asia and the Arctic, in that they constitute the main avenues of communication between the Asia–Pacific and the European neighbourhood. The article seeks to understand how evolving geostrategic dynamics in Europe, the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific relate to each other, and how they might impinge on discussions on transatlantic burden-sharing. It is argued that the ability of Europeans to contribute to a more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing revolves around two main tenets. First, by engaging in the ‘middle spaces’, Europe's key powers and institutions are helping to underpin a balance of power in these regions. Second, by stepping up their diplomatic and economic role in the Asia–Pacific, strengthening their security ties to (US) regional allies and maintaining an EU-wide arms embargo on China, Europeans are broadly complementing US efforts in that key region. There are a number of factors that stand in the way of a meaningful European engagement in the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific, including divergent security priorities among Europeans, the impact of budgetary austerity on European defence capabilities and a tendency to confine foreign policy to the immediate neighbourhood. The article discusses the implications of those obstacles and outlines some ways in which they might be overcome.

Recent declassified documents from the Clinton library and the Department of State reveal how U.S. policymakers sought to preserve the confidence in NATO’s promise of a gradual enlargement after the Cold War, while restricting the first... more

Recent declassified documents from the Clinton library and the Department of State reveal how U.S. policymakers sought to preserve the confidence in NATO’s promise of a gradual enlargement after the Cold War, while restricting the first round to a small group of the three strongest candidates, in order to make the process more acceptable to Moscow. Despite meeting the criteria for membership, the Baltics could not immediately join the Alliance because of Russia’s opposition. A credible open door policy was therefore essential for avoiding the impression of a Russian veto over NATO decisions. The U.S. approach was to keep for later accession other promising candidates along with the Baltics, aiming to provide an assurance that the first round of enlargement would not also be the last. Short of having the credentials to qualify as a strong candidate, Romania was left in NATO’s waiting room, despite the massive diplomatic efforts of the new government resulted from the 1996 elections.

Russia is not the Soviet Union, but Putin would like it to be…”

This volume, according to our knowledge, is so far the most comprehensive edited collection of documents regarding NATO-Russia relations. Its content was produced either by NATO or by Russia, and sometimes by common structures of both... more

This volume, according to our knowledge, is so far the most
comprehensive edited collection of documents regarding NATO-Russia relations. Its content was produced either by NATO or by Russia,
and sometimes by common structures of both sides. The authors made
efforts to use the original records of documents in English, Russian,
or Polish. When necessary, they were carefully translated into English.
Wherever other (published or not) translations could be referred to,
Documents Talk. NATO–Russia Relations after the Cold War 11
they were reviewed, edited and, if necessary, corrected by the authors
of this edition. In each case, the source of the base text was carefully
noted.

Russian-American relations are structurally asymmetrical. Apart from nuclear parity, in all other spheres there are serious disproportions between the two states, in favour of the United States. The two countries’ mutual political and... more

Russian-American relations are structurally asymmetrical.
Apart from nuclear parity, in all other spheres there are
serious disproportions between the two states, in favour of
the United States. The two countries’ mutual political and
economic importance is also asymmetrical. Russian attitudes
towards the US are ambivalent and fluctuate in cycles,
although anti-US sentiment has been rising consistently. In
the sphere of political interests, Russia still has unmet expectations
vis-à-vis the US. The dynamics of Russia’s policy
towards the United States over the last sixteen years has
been characterised by cyclic oscillations. The recurrent pattern
starts with a normalisation and positive dynamics in
mutual relations at the start of each new US president’s term,
and ends with an escalation of tensions and a crisis towards
the end of the presidency. There seem to be structural reasons
for this: Russia is too weak to be treated by the US as a partner
or opponent on an equal footing, but is too strong to be
willing or able to accept the status of an inequitable, tactical
ally. Besides, Moscow has nothing positive to offer to the US,
apart from possibly restraining, to some extent, those of its
policies which harm the interests of the US. Making predictions
about the Russian-American relations in this situation
is very risky. However, in view of the above factors, the most
probable scenario is that the same pattern will be repeated
and the initial mutual attempts at a ‘reset’ will be followed
in the longer term by a souring of bilateral relations. However,
that does not necessarily mean that Russia will suffer
an inevitable strategic defeat, as it may try to take advantage
of the likely further weakening of the United States and the
West.

Ballistic missiles pose increasing threat worldwide. They are powerful means of warfare, but can also be used as an instrument of deterrence, political blackmail and coercion. The United States sustain strong commitment to the development... more

Ballistic missiles pose increasing threat worldwide. They are powerful means of warfare, but can also be used as an instrument of deterrence, political blackmail and coercion. The United States sustain strong commitment to the development of the missile defense to limit the effect of expanding, more and more sophisticated missile arsenals. This is considered very important if the United States are to maintain political and military freedom of action, especially in troubled regions. The European countries of NATO perceive the missile threat somewhat differently. Most of them agree that it exist but, as they do not conduct intensive policies in troubled regions, they do not believe the threat is imminent. That is why, on the one hand NATO has embraced missile defense as one of the most important goals, but on the other European members are not eager to pay huge cost of robust defensive effort. Thus, the US will bear lion’s share of European missile defense burden,
making Europe’s security more and more tied to American strategic goals and depended on US military capabilities. This is surely augmenting factor, as far as transatlantic security ties are concerned.

NATO-Russia relations after the end of the Cold War have had their ups and downs, repeating the trajectory of the wider relationship between the West and Russia. However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 brought it to its worst... more

NATO-Russia relations after the end of the Cold War have had their ups and downs, repeating the trajectory of the wider relationship between the West and Russia. However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 brought it to its worst level since the end of the Cold War. And although Russia and NATO, while no longer calling themselves partners, still do not formally recognize themselves as the main military adversaries, both in the sphere of rhetoric and operational policy, there is no doubt (especially on the Russian side) that this is the case. This situation raises a question about the causes of this situation, factors determining its development and scenarios for the future.

The five days of hostilities which began in South Ossetia on 7 August 2008, which quickly drew in the Russian military, and which ended in a Georgian rout not only from South Ossetia but also from Tbilisi's toehold in the Upper... more

The five days of hostilities which began in South Ossetia on 7 August 2008, which quickly drew in the Russian military, and which ended in a Georgian rout not only from South Ossetia but also from Tbilisi's toehold in the Upper K'odor Valley in the other disputed territory of Abkhazia occasioned much heated comment around the world at the time and has subsequently given rise to a welter of written comment. The following article presents counter-arguments to a number of points contained in one such (typically pro-Georgian) contribution to the debate.