Extended Nuclear Deterrence Research Papers (original) (raw)

2025

Cet essai explore la politique étrangère de l'Ukraine et son impact sur la structure de la défense européenne. À travers une analyse approfondie, j’essaie d’examiner comment les choix stratégiques de l'Ukraine influencent non seulement sa propre sécurité, mais également la dynamique de la coopération en matière de défense au sein de l'Europe. En abordant des thèmes tels que l'intégration européenne, les alliances militaires et les défis géopolitiques, cet essai s'adresse aux diplomates, étudiants et chercheurs, ainsi qu'à tout public intéressé par la géopolitique de l'Ukraine. J’offre des perspectives éclairantes sur les enjeux contemporains et les implications futures pour la sécurité européenne.

2025, Global Security Review

The global nuclear landscape is undergoing rapid transformation. As arms control agreements collapse and peer competitors like China and Russia expand their nuclear capabilities, the United States faces mounting pressure to reassess its strategic posture. This article argues that traditional notions of deterrence—based on minimal, static force—are no longer sufficient in a multipolar, technologically evolving threat environment. It introduces a forward-leaning framework for nuclear dominance, not as a provocation, but as a means to restore clarity, credibility, and strategic stability. Through analysis of geopolitical trends, force posture evolution, and doctrinal adaptation, the article makes the case for a more agile and assertive U.S. nuclear strategy that can deter escalation, assure allies, and dissuade adversaries in an increasingly contested world.

2025, Sejong Policy Brief

This paper focuses on the concept of ‘flexible redeployment’1)—namely, base modernization to enable potential, temporary, and/or emergency deployment of U.S.‘s tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Elaborating flexible... more

2025, IIUS Expert Notes

Uncertainty surrounds the trajectory of the ROK–U.S. alliance under Trump 2.0. While some U.S. officials have reiterated commitments to alliance and dealing with North Korean threat, President Trump’s transactional approach to alliances and emerging shifts in U.S.’s strategic priorities raise critical questions about alliance stability. This paper explores how the potential delay or minimization of U.S.’s strategic documents, the erosion of institutional expertise, and a pivot away from multilateral deterrence to bilateral deal-making can bring a period of alliance drift for ROK-U.S. relations. Yet, this paper concludes that despite the lack of consistency from Washington, Seoul must remain calm and proactive in readjusting the alliance. As North Korea emboldens under revived Russia-DPRK mutual defense pact, it is essential to prevent any perception that the alliance is weakening in order to credibly deter any aggression from North Korea. The transformation of the alliance should be framed—especially in the eyes of adversaries—not as fragmentation, but as an evolution or renewal of the partnership.

2025, Journal of Peace and Unification

Nuclear redeployment continues to be debated policy option in Seoul as North Korea's nuclear and missile threats aggravate. However, as this article finds, there are two major gaps in current discussions: lack in actual cost estimation and overreliance on a NATOstyle 'permanent redeployment' model. In light of President Trump's transactional approach to alliances, strategic priority on China, and delays in nuclear modernization, this study argues that 'flexible redeployment' can be a more viable-if not the only-alternative, which involves building infrastructure for temporary stationing rather than permanent basing. The paper presents detailed cost estimations for two flexible redeployment options of B61-12s at Kunsan Air Base, distinguishable by the delivery platforms: an F-35A-based option ($630 million~$737 million) and bomber-based option ($143 million~$412 million). The study concludes that the price tag is markedly cheaper than permanent redeployment. While flexible option raises some strategic questions and risks for Seoul, this study argues that the option can ensure continuity of extended deterrence under Trump 2.0 at relatively marginal cost.

2025, Global Security Review

Abstract
This article examines the strategic implications of maneuverable hypersonic weapons, arguing that they introduce a fundamental vulnerability in global security architecture. By evading traditional missile defenses through high speeds and unpredictable trajectories, systems like China’s DF-17, Russia’s Avangard, and North Korea’s emerging platforms compress decision timelines and destabilize deterrence. The analysis explores how hypersonic weapons blur the lines between conventional and nuclear escalation, magnify first-strike incentives, and threaten to upend the existing strategic balance. The piece calls for a redefinition of U.S. defense posture, combining technological innovation—such as space-based sensors and glide-phase interceptors—with diplomatic efforts toward transparency and arms control. It warns that without a coordinated global response, the hypersonic era may not just represent military progress—but a profound strategic regression.

2025, La Vigie

Que Trump-le-fol ait ou non viré Macron-le-ravi en direct devant les caméras et à quelques mètres du linceul de l'évêque de Rome, cette chaise enlevée revenait de droit à la France, seule interlocutrice nucléaire des Russes sur le continent, membre permanent comme elle du Conseil de sécurité. Macron n'a encore une fois rien compris, ni à ce qui se passe, ni pour quoi et par qui il a été élu.

2025, Sejong Policy Brief

2025, BISA (GNO) Working Group Annual Conference

This study analyses Russia's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean through the concept of complex deterrence. The multidimensionalisation of threats and conflicts after the Cold War has shifted the concept of deterrence to a multidimensional ground. Accordingly, the study constructs deterrence as complex deterrence with a multidimensional perspective and deals with deterrence among great powers, deterrence among new nuclear states, deterrence involving regional powers and great powers, deterrence among nuclear states and non-state actors. These themes are particularly important in addressing the deepening rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean. The study focuses on the years 2011-2024 through the question of how these elements shape Russia's naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Between these periods, the Russian navy had the opportunity to advance in the region, especially due to the contacts with Syria, and this progress revealed important indicators on the naval strategy. This strategy, which was shaped through the Port of Tartus, has progressed to a more defence-based point with the effect of the topics that the study focuses on. While the study explains this progress through the concept of complex deterrence, it also takes into account the deterrence based on multidimensional relations in the international system.

2025, SPREC Global Issue Report

2025, Kurt Engelen

Et si, contre toute attente, l’impensable se produisait quand même ! Sommes-nous prêts ? Avons-nous osé envisager le pire ou sommes-nous restés dans le confort du plus probable ? Les futurs multiples doivent nous amener à réfléchir et à... more

Et si, contre toute attente, l’impensable se produisait quand même !
Sommes-nous prêts ? Avons-nous osé envisager le pire ou sommes-nous
restés dans le confort du plus probable ? Les futurs multiples doivent
nous amener à réfléchir et à nous préparer afin de pouvoir agir plutôt
que de devoir subir.

2025, Site de l'AFDSD

Doctrines et menaces nucléaires dans le conflit ukrainien De toutes en Ukraine, la dimension nucléaire est celle qui suscite le plus d'interrogations et d'effroi. Il s'agit d'explorer les potentialités nucléaires de la crise ukrainienne. La présente contribution est tirée d'une intervention prononcée en début de conflit, le 23 juin 2022, lors d'une journée organisée à l'Université Paris 2. Elle a été remaniée en novembre 2022 et correspond donc à la situation connue à cette date. Elle a été publiée sur le site de l'AFDSD.

2025

The paper will give a short introduction to new electronic communication use, based on European e-forum. Presented software, that helps in e-forum, is used in HERN project. It is described the main aims and tasks in the project and the connection with the SRHE association activity in London. * * * brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

2024

INTRODUCTION.
One is not surprised at the position taken by China on Russian invasion of Ukraine and her stance on nuclear issue as a demonstration of China’s position to side with Russia as a revolt against Western dominated rules that have been in force for nearly fifty years. Kyle Balzer and Dan Blumental in an article (November 2024) have beautifully portrayed the Chinese revolt against the West with an insistence for a so-called rule laid down by the Western powers for nearly fifty years. The Western powers led by the USA has been laying down the rules, for example World Bank has to be an American nominee and the IMF has to be a nominee of Europe. China along with Rusia has jointly challenged this position despite American threat to impose more tariff on countries that violated this practice. The Americans find themselves in a quandary as for the first time in the US history both the US Senate and the Congress are headed by Jews and by the Republican Party. America being democracy has to listen to institutions like AIPAC- an Israeli outfit which has the power to raise millions of dollars in favor of the candidate that

2024, Al Jundi

For decades, nuclear deterrence has dominated interactions between nuclear-armed rivals, as seen in the tense standoffs between the United States and Russia, and between India and Pakistan. This nuclear equilibrium has contributed to regional and international stability. Yet, a critical question arises: How can non-nuclear states establish credible deterrence against nucleararmed adversaries?

2024, KDR South Korea

이 글은 네루대학에서 정치학 박사학위를 한 마힌드라 교수가 쓴 글로 북한의 호전성에 대하여 그 지정 학적인 원인이 무엇인가 분석하고 있다. 인도의 학자들은 한반도 문제나 북핵 상황에 대하여 비교적 아웃 사이더의 입장에서 객관적인 아이디어를 제공한다. 마힌드라 교수는 김정은 시대 이후 북한의 핵실험과 미 사일 시험에 대하여 분석하면서 결국|대화를 재개하는 것만이 문제를 해결할 수 있다고 주장한다.

2024, Intelligence Stratégique vol. 5, n°12

L’invasion militaire de la Russie en Ukraine vient déconstruire les paradigmes classiques des relations internationales contemporaines basées sur la théorie de la stabilité hégémonique occidentale. Une ère nouvelle est en train d’être... more

2024

Cover image: As a pure counterforce weapon, the B61-11 nuclear earthpenetrating gravity bomb would be retired under the minimal nuclear deterrence policy proposed by this report.

2024, The Washington Quarterly

Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, the critical factor is perception. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, "In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally." 1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment-specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age-we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities.

2024, Comparative Strategy

Military innovation is front and center as strategists contemplate the opportunities created by the impact of the ongoing information revolution on a range of technologies, industrial sectors, and scientific endeavors. Developments in the cyber and space domains are increas- ingly integrated into defense strategies and organizations, while autonomous systems, hypersonic vehicles, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, etc. are either in advanced development or deep into the process of weaponization. Drones and hypersonic weapons have already had their battlefield debut and are entering next generation development.

2024, Croatian International Relations Review

Nous devons faire l'Europe non seulement dans l'intérêt des pays libres, mais aussi pour pouvoir y accueillir les peuples de l'Est qui, délivrés des sujétions qu'ils ont subies jusqu'à présent, nous demanderont leur adhésion et notre appui moral". Robert Schuman (1956) 1 L'Europe est aujourd'hui confrontée à une double crise: la crise de confiance interne dans son projet et la crise externe marquée par la déstabilisation simultanée des ses voisinages à l'Est comme au Sud. Répondre à la seconde dépendra de la capacité à surmonter la première. Dix ans après son grand l'élargissement à l'Est, l'Union européenne se trouve dans une situation paradoxale: une demande d'Europe dans sa périphérie orientale, de Kiev à Belgrade, au moment où le doute s'installe au centre même de l'Union. Les élections européennes du 25 mai 2014, marquées par le désenchantement voire la défiance envers l'Union européenne, contrastaient le même jour avec l'élection présidentielle à Kiev présentée et vécue comme un choix européen. L'Europe est décriée comme l'une des causes de la crise économique et identitaire à l'Ouest du continent, et perçue comme une réponse possible à la crise politique, économique et identitaire à l'Est. La crise de la zone euro a fait planer 1 Discours prononcé par Robert Schuman, ministre des affaires étrangères, à Luxembourg le 3 novembre 1956, en pleine révolution hongroise, mais cité dans France Forum seulement dans le numéro 52 de novembre 1963 sans préciser la date ni le contexte du propos.

2024, L'Acadie Nouvelle

Lors de la visite du président chinois Xi Jinping en France en mai, pendant un repas avec le président français Emmanuel Macron, un gâteau portant le nom de «Russe», initialement prévu au menu, a été remplacé à la dernière minute par une... more

2024, International Security

Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few beneªts while incurring serious costs. In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damagelimitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage limitation capabilities can make a vital contribution to U.S. strategy. Glaser and Fetter argue that various countermeasures can thwart U.S. surveillance systems relevant to hunting mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (pp. 68-70). They further argue that China can thwart attacks on its command and control (C2) by dispersing it to mobile platforms, pre-delegating launch authority, and adopting a launch-on-warning posture (pp. 73-74). truncated analysis. Glaser and Fetter conclude their analysis without extending the measure-countermeasure competition very far. In so doing, they fall prey to the "fallacy of the last move," as though there were no counters to the countermeasures they propose. 2 For instance, China can employ decoy mobile missile complexes, but countering decoys is routine in long-term military competitions. 3 In the case of surveillance of mobile missiles, U.S. space-based radar (SBR) or other

2024, Journal of Conflict Resolution

The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent scholarship in political psychology shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, assuming that a challenger’s signals endogenously increase the target’s resolve. Our model shows that introducing provocation can make signals of resolve more credible precisely because their provocative effects make them more costly to send. Moreover, against the prevailing intuition that provocation uniformly promotes conflict, the information from these signals can mitigate their provocative effects and elicit more generous offers than not signaling. Thus, in contrast to psychological accounts, we show that taking provocative actions can be rational and necessary for reaching peaceful bargains. We illustrate these findings with the 1911 Agadir Crisis.

2024

This comprehensive study delves into the intricate security dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula, with a particular focus on ROK's strategic decision-making processes in response to the nuclear threat posed by DPRK. Through the lens of defensive realism, the study explores the primary factors and constraints influencing ROK's strategic choice to enhance extended deterrence, emphasising its reliance on the US alliance framework. Drawing upon extensive analysis of ROK's threat perceptions, trust in US extended deterrence, and the evolving geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia, this study elucidates the complex interplay shaping ROK's deterrence strategies. Findings underscore ROK's pragmatic approach, prioritising security alliances and cooperation to address DPRK's nuclear ambitions within the anarchic international system. Ultimately, ROK's decision-making reflects adherence to defensive realism principles, aiming to safeguard its survival and promote regional stability amidst the intricate security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.

2024

Originally published as 倉田秀也「第3章習近平『新型大国関係』と韓国―朴槿恵政権の『均衡論』」『平成26年度研究報告書主要国の対中認識・政策の分析』公益財団法人日本国際問題研究所、2014年、29-43

2024

© Korzystanie z tego materiału jest możliwe zgodnie z właściwymi przepisami o dozwolonym użytku lub o innych wyjątkach przewidzianych w przepisach prawa, a korzystanie w szerszym zakresie wymaga uzyskania zgody uprawnionego. Małgorzata Łosiewicz Uniwersytet Gdański DZIENNIKARZ OBYWATELSKI, CZYLI KTO? Streszczenie Pierwsze serwisy dziennikarstwa obywatelskiego powstały w Polsce w 2006 roku, wtedy też rozpoczęła się dyskusja na temat tego nowego zjawiska. Uczestni czą w niej wszyscy, od profesjonalnych dziennikarzy poczynając, poprzez medioznawców na dziennikarzach-obywatelach kończąc. Istnieje wysokie prawdopodobieństwo, że obecny odbiorca-obywatel, styka jący się w mediach z różnymi treściami, w przyszłości pod wpływem impulsu zewnętrznego czy też wewnętrznej chęci wypróbowania swych sił w nowej roli, zmieni status dotychczasowego czytelnika i zacznie publikować własne treści. W swoim artykule autorka spróbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie, kim są i w ja kich warunkach działają dziennikarze obywatelscy. Odniesie się do problemów, z którymi stykają się na co dzień, a także do przyszłości, którą dziennikarze oby watelscy mają przed sobą.

2024

This document is unclassified and suitable for public release.

2024, Journal of Peace and Unification

Since the April 2023 Washington Declaration and establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group(NCG), the essence of efforts to enhance ROK-US extended deterrence has focused on improving 'conventional-nuclear integration(CNI)' of US and ROK forces, including US's nuclear weapons. Yet, as this study finds, there is an intriguing dearth of both theoretic and practical discussions on the concept of CNI. In this backdrop, main purpose of this paper is to delve into the concept of CNI and how it fits within the overall extended deterrence discourse. In brief, this article defines CNI as US's means for deterrence and assurance. This article particularly reflects on NATO's 1960s when CNI arrangements were first made into the current nuclear sharing mechanism. Then, this paper delves into the evolution of US's extended deterrence policy to ROK under the concept of CNI, leading to policy implications for the implementation of NCG.

2024, HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe)

2024, Expert Commentary on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review

2024, Boletín Informativo del Grupo de Jóvenes Investigadores

2024, Turyzm/Tourism

Omówiono czynniki wpływające na współczesną sytuację ekonomiczno-społeczną uzdrowisk. Z formalnego punktu widzenia można je podzielić na prawno-polityczne, ekonomiczne i społeczne. Na podstawie przedstawionych uwarunkowań należy wnioskować, że mimo upływu czasu sytuacja uzdrowisk nie wykazuje symptomów znaczącej poprawy. Podjęto zatem próbę zaprezentowania działań uprawdopodobniających osiągnięcie pozytywnych wyników ekonomicznych i konkurencyjnej pozycji.

2024, Journal of Education on Social Science

The United States counts South Korea as one of its most significant allies. Relations between the two countries began when the US and South Korea became military allies in the early 1950s, with the US promising to assist South Korea in defending itself against any North Korean assault. Since 2014, the US has attempted to include South Korea in the East Asia region's anti-missile defense system, but it has always been refused. There are several causes for this, including disagreements among South Koreans, relations with China, and complaints from neighboring countries such as China, North Korea, and Russia. South Korea, on the other hand, stated on July 8, 2016, that the United States would be placed in a special category. However, on July 8, 2016, South Korea stated that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defense system from the United States would be stationed in the country. This oddity piqued the writer's interest, prompting him to investigate the reasons behind South Korea's approval of THAAD placement in 2016. This research is expected to have an impact on decision-makers in choosing a defense strategy that reduces the risk of security dilemmas as has happened in South Korea.

2023

The Horizon Review: Global Perspectives from the International Students Interdisciplinary Scientific Conference is an academic journal published by the International Institute for Strategic Research. It features selected papers presented at the International Students Interdisciplinary Scientific Conference held on April 23, 2023, with the participation of 60 students and academics from 34 countries representing 49 universities. The journal encompasses diverse fields, such as Law, Economics and Management, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, and Humanitarian and Social Sciences. Included are contributions from young researchers from the University of Szeged (Hungary), the University of Jaffna (Sri Lanka), the University St. Kliment Ohridski Bitola (North Macedonia), Afe Babalola University (Nigeria), and the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece).

2023, Encuentro de Becarios de la UNLP (EBEC) (La Plata, 2018)

impunidad que existe ante casos de violencias contra las mujeres (RDM-CIDH, 2007), y particularmente ante casos de violencia sexual. El discurso jurídico, como producto del campo jurídico, trasciende los hechos lingüísticos para convertirse en un conjunto de prácticas (Costa, 2016) que legitiman, autorizan y resignifican otros discursos sociales, políticos y culturales. Las sentencias son tanto producto del discurso

2023, IPRI journal (Print)

Arms control regime has witnessed severe setbacks in recent years. This paper addresses the question that despite acknowledged benefits of arms control for peace and stability, the major powers are currently turning against arms control. By analyzing the reasons behind ongoing arms control crisis, the paper takes into account contending perspectives of major powers to map the emerging trends in arms control. The mere existence of nuclear weapons does not encourage the states to adopt restraint measures, rather it is their perception about the risks and challenges to their security that compel them to go for arms control. The ongoing geo-political competition, also exhibited in the form of strategic rivalries at global level, and advanced military-technological developments sans any consensus on mutual vulnerabilities shape the understanding of nuclear armed states for strategic stability. These are the two primary drivers behind the evolving arms control crisis. Recently, United States has veered away from its bilateral commitments that signifies the collapse of arms control arrangements between Washington and Moscow which originally served as a stabilizing factor in their adversarial relations. Prevailing disagreements on the constituents of strategic stability, concerns about other state's compliance and transparency, and accentuating differences in military capabilities are the defining features of how major states currently pursue arms control. In the absence of consensus on what threatens strategic stability among adversaries, any prospects for new arms control measures remain bleak. This factor also diminishes the prospects of any trilateral arms control agreement among U.S., Russia and China.

2023

En los últimos años se ha asistido mundialmente a un cambio en las percepciones sobre los Estados Unidos, se generó a partir de acciones como: el retiro del tratado de ABM (antiballistic missile), rechazo al protocolo de Kyoto, retiro de la Corte Internacional, evadir las resoluciones de la ONU, apartarse del sistema de alianzas militares que EEUU mismo creo (principalmente la OTAN) buscando coaliciones Ad Hoc entre otras; estas acciones contribuyeron a que la imagen "be

2023

Hypersonic missiles are a new category of weapons that have sparked intense debate among security experts. The hypersonic weapons, this combination of speed, accuracy, surprise, and maneuverability makes the defense against them more difficult than against standard ballistic or cruise missiles and therefore makes them more destabilizing. Capable of traveling over five times the speed of sound (Mach 5), and of performing evasive maneuvers mid-flight, they are considered practically impossible to intercept using conventional missile defense systems. Innovative nuclear and conventional weapon delivery systems are impressive and developing. These are grouped into three categories: intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic delivery systems and new advanced strategic weapon delivery capabilities. These and other technological advances being made simultaneously may also impact arms control and strategic stability. Other characteristics of hypersonic systems, however, are potentially advantageous compared with ballistic missiles. Of particular interest are the ability to fly at low altitude, making detection by earth-based sensors difficult; the ability to maneuver during flight to avoid detection and interception; and the unpredictability of targets, since hypersonic vehicles do not follow a ballistic trajectory.

2023, Boletín del Centro de Estudios Sociopolíticos (EIDAES-UNSAM)

Tema central: La guerra Las fórmulas de la guerra Millones de personas desplazadas, niños, adultos y ancianos, gente como vos y yo que desean vivir sus vidas lo mejor posible, las únicas que les tocó y les tocará vivir; decenas de miles de esas vidas cegadas, apagadas; millones de madres y padres, hermanas y hermanos, amigos íntimos destruidos por esas muertes; todo eso es la guerra, cuantitativa y cualitativamente devastadora. Sin embargo, en esta como en otras guerras, para un número significativo de personas, esta dimensión elemental no es lo que más los moviliza. ¿Es tal o cual líder o nación imaginariamente amiga, enemiga o adversaria de tal o cual otra? ¿Podría tal o cuál líder o nación sentirse víctima o provocada u ofendida o amenazada por el comportamiento de tal o cuál otra u otras? Esas son las preguntas que mayormente motivan y movilizan a muchos de nuestros contemporáneos.

2023, Journal Aricle

The study is aimed to view the priorities and preferences of Pak-US relations during the post-cold war period through their policy choices towards each other. From the initial alliances of the fifties to the strain relations of the nineties, Pak-US relations involved many dilemmas and differences. Pakistan was the second choice of the US when the later designed its containment policy against Soviet communism in South Asia. Indian refusal turned the US towards Pakistan, having already inclination towards the US and its evidence was the visit of the first prime minister, who preferred American visit over Soviet invitation. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led Pakistan to become frontline state and the latter received huge American military and economic assistance. The withdrawal of the troops and fall of the Soviet Union ended the cold war, changing the US priorities. It also ended wishful thinking about Pakistan's geo-strategic location that was no more an asset, but put reverse influence and the crisis episodes became dusky. Deeply seated mistrust regarding the nuclear programme dropped Pakistan from partnership to punishment. The study has adopted the qualitative method to elucidate patterns of behavior of both states and the way they defined the foreign policy to deal with the situation, choosing a specific role and making decisions accordingly. It is assumed that Pak-US relations remained victim to the situation in the post-cold war era as Pakistan's hopes were dashed for disputes with India and the US was resentful on proliferation and later terrorism. The findings proved that interests remained dominant and the betrayal was felt by the two sides, moving to those options and decisions, which generated bitterness and mistrust, creating tension in post-cold war period.

2023

Beyond." The July workshop had a broader scope and looked at the different elements of U.S. strategic posture, including not just nuclear capabilities but missile defense, conventional prompt global strike, and space and cyberspace. Participants assessed the 2030 U.S. posture relative to the predicted Russian and Chinese postures, and they examined what capabilities will be crucial beyond 2030. Discussion was guided by the following key questions: • What will be the main attributes of the US strategic posture in 2030? • Relative to the predicted Russian and Chinese strategic postures of 2030, will the US position have improved, stayed the same, or eroded? Why? • What factors should guide the development of capabilities beyond 2030?

2023, International Politics

Charting a course through US administrations from the late 1990s to the present day, this article considers the George W. Bush administration's thinking on nuclear deterrence in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11: What was distinctive about the Bush administration's thinking and approach to nuclear deterrence? To what extent, and to what effect have the Bush administration's approaches proved enduring? The article considers the prima facie contradictory nature of the administration's deterrence objectives against the backdrop of a shifting security environment, characterised by the proliferation of WMDs to 'rogue states' and non-state actors, nuclear multipolarity, disruptive emerging technologies, and long-held US commitments to its global allies and partners-ensuring the centrality of nuclear weapons in US national security policy, despite sustained efforts to reduce this reliance.