Extended Nuclear Deterrence Research Papers (original) (raw)

Les Etats adoptent-ils une posture plus ambitieuse, plus agressive ou plus provocante une fois qu'ils disposent d'un nombre minimal d'armes nucléaires ? Cette question, longtemps éclipsée par celle de "l'équilibre de la terreur", s'avère... more

El pasado 1 de febrero, el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, finalmente anunció el retiro de su país del Tratado INF (abreviación que refiere al Tratado de Eliminación de Misiles de Corto y Mediano Alcance). Al día siguiente, el presidente ruso, Vladimir Putin, replicó la acción y anunció el retiro de Rusia del tratado.
De este modo, se pone fin a un instrumento jurídico que ha servido para morigerar y poner paños fríos a la relación bilateral entre las dos potencias durante más de 30 años.
A partir de lo que pareciera ser el fin del Tratado INF, es pertinente, entonces, preguntarse ¿qué rol ha jugado el INF en la relación ruso-americana en las últimas décadas?; ¿qué cambios se esperan en la relación entre los Estados Unidos y la Federación Rusia con el fin de este acuerdo?; ¿de qué manera se reconfigura el esquema estratégico entre ambas potencias? Y, particularmente, ¿constituye el fin de este acuerdo un nuevo factor de desestabilización internacional? Estos interrogantes son los ejes disparadores del presente artículo.

In this chapter, I first review the history of Pakistan’s program, focusing upon the early years of inception, in hopes of persuading scholars to re-examine Pakistan’s nuclearization timeline as an independent variable to explain Pakistan’s increasing risk acceptance with respect to initiating conflict with India (Tellis, Fair and Medby 2001). Second, I briefly survey the progress that Pakistan made between 1990 and 2016 with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Third, I review doctrinal evolution and the ways in which Pakistan uses its nuclear weapons to deter India from responding to Pakistan’s various terrorist and other outrages; to avert the international community from enforcing punitive measures; and to extract economic rents from the United States and other bilateral and multilateral actors. I conclude with a summary of the arguments advanced here and the implications that they afford.

- by Bee Yun JO
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- Nuclear Physics, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Extended Nuclear Deterrence

The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the U.S. extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability.

- by Inwook Kim and +1
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- Security Dilemma, Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Ballistic Missile Defence, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Practice. In T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. University of Chicago Press, 2009:... more

- by Timothy W Crawford
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- Deterrence, Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Deterrence Theory
- by debalina ghoshal
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- Nuclear Weapons, China, Missile defence, Russia

In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities.

- by John K Warden
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- Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Alliances, Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Israel follows a policy of disproportionate high response to violence from its adversaries, through which it builds up 'cumulative deterrence.' While this policy has given it longer periods of 'no-violence', will it usher in sustained... more

- by Manmohan Bahadur
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- Deterrence, Israel/Palestine, Palestine, Israeli-Arab Relations
- by James Rogers and +1
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- Eastern European Studies, International Relations, Eastern Europe, International Security

As Kurt Lewin, the founder of modern social psychology, famously observed: 'There is nothing so practical as a good theory'. In keeping with this notion of the real-world usefulness of formalizations of abstract reasoning, the Paper assesses the Euro-Atlantic theatre during the period 2014-2017 and seeks to link the theoretical and conceptual nuclear-deterrence literature (Freedman 2013) with analytical models as they relate to escalation dominance, especially in intra-crisis interactions that threaten a breach of non-conventional thresholds. A particular focus of the presentation sets out the role of BMD within the conflict matrix, given the centrality of the missile-defence issue on both sides of the current NATO-Russian divide and its role as a reciprocal driver of operational planning and field deployments. In addition, the argument is made that the current crisis, set in motion by the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, is in many critical ways seen most constructively as a tiered or layered conflict that adheres to the nested model familiar in the conflict-management literature (Dugan 2015). This model posits that issue-specific conflicts are frequently embedded in more encompassing structural systems and subsystems within which adversarial relations and interactions play out. In appealing to this line of abstract thinking the Paper attempts to set out the tiered context of the deterrence-reassurance and escalation control components of both NATO (and NATO-partner) and Russian deployments and planning. Informed also by the modeling of conflict that advances the idea that escalating stages are endemic in conflict trajectories and that these stages in turn are characteristically marked by discrete triggering events followed by a chain of action-reaction cycles (Swanstrom & Weissmann 2005), the Paper seeks to apply these conceptual insights to the current conflict-one that not only has enveloped the greater part of the Euro-Atlantic theatre of operations but also reverberated globally to the effect of intensifying other conflict zones. Reference to the Conference Theme concludes the Paper when the case is made for academically and operationally solid conceptual and analytical reasoning, grounded in both deductive (modeling) and inductive (rigorous case studies) approaches, as an essential element of pre-deployment instruction and training for effective decision-making at key inflection points of crisis situations. As the responsibilities attached to carrying out operations increase, so too should prior recourse to state-of-the-art military sciences, including the kind of exercises in critical thinking set out in the proposed Paper.

A more capable, nuclear-armed, North Korea will pose very substantial challenges to the U.S. deterrence posture. While North Korea’s nuclear program already serves multiple functions in its security strategy, it is likely to acquire an even greater role over the coming years. Once the regime deploys more advanced nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, it might be tempted to pursue a revisionist agenda focusing either on the reunification of the Korean peninsula or on more limited aims. In support of such ambitions, Pyongyang may develop a theory of victory relying on the threat of nuclear escalation to deter enemies from pursuing regime change and to compel them to accede to its demands. As North Korea’s capabilities mature, the United States, South Korea, and Japan will need to articulate a comprehensive approach to deterring Pyongyang while managing their differences to respond to North Korea’s behavior during peacetime, crisis, and conflict. To deter Pyongyang, coordination is key, hence the need for the United States and its allies to adopt a layered deterrence strategy and determine courses of action that, if pursued vigorously and carefully, would increase their chances of containing a nuclear-armed North Korea and avoiding nuclear war.

- by John K Warden
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- Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, North Korea, Extended Nuclear Deterrence

“Extended deterrence,” or “active deterrence,” as it is sometimes called, threatens a nuclearstrategic
response in case of a nuclear attack on the territory or troops of one’s allies. This
paper aims to explore the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East in light of an
Iranian nuclear military capability. Two preliminary remarks are necessary in order to frame
the line of reasoning on the issue.

- by All Azimuth : A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace Research and +1
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- Iran, Iranian Nuclear Program, Extended Nuclear Deterrence
- by Bee Yun JO
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- Nuclear Weapons, Extended Nuclear Deterrence, The US-ROK Alliance, Nuclear Umbrella

If an NPT signatory can't even be kept safe from one of the treaty's five guarantors, then what is the value of banning the spread of nuclear weapons? What nation with not deterrence potential or a close alliance with a nuclear power can now count on the inviolability of its borders? If a Security Council member can enlarge its territory at the expense of a neighboring country without much punishment, the NPT turns into a vehicle for the official nuclear powers to advance their own agendas.

Nuclear weapons can serve as a reliable deterrence of war among nations to a great extent, but with an exception of its own. This answer effectively assesses the extent of reliability of the "Nuclear Deterrence Strategy" and its exceptions in today's much-nuclearized world. In doing so, it critically analyses the notion of deterrence, the credibility of existential threat, the balance of terror, the possibility of limited nuclear war, and the presence of multiples nuclear powers and their subsequent impacts on the reliability of nuclear deterrence. To begin with, the notion of nuclear deterrence arises from the basic idea of using nuclear weapons without not actually using them, rather than creating a delicate amount of terror against an adversary by way of signalling a great risk of retaliation or mutually assured destruction that abolishes further combat readiness (second-strike capability) of both sides. Such form of 'Nuclear Deterrence Strategy' was the most effective way of the Soviet Union's aggression until the time where the Soviet's' themselves has developed enough nuclear weapons of their own. After the Soviet's became nuclear powers, the strategy of 'Nuclear Deterrence' has prevented major military confrontations between the two global nuclear powers even where the Cold War tension reaches its maximum height. However, such notion of deterrence significantly depends on the credibility of the existential threat against the interest of the actors; the balance of terror that the actors could entail with their respective threats; the possibility of limited nuclear war which neutralizes the detrimental idea of nuclear alienation; and the presence of multiples nuclear powers and the risks thereof.

Air forces are of colossal importance in the Balance of Power between states. To get a clearer picture of the Balance of Power in the Middle East, I therefore decided to focus on air power. I finish the analysis with effect of nuclear... more