Fundamental ontology Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

A problem lurks at the heart of the phenomenological project – a problem which, though latent in the earliest articulations of Edmund Husserl’s project and undeniably a part of Martin Heidegger’s development of that project, nevertheless does not become fully apparent until the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Unfortunately, even there this problem is so subtle that it has been largely overlooked by most secondary scholars. This is a problem however which cuts to the very core of the phenomenological project; and, a proper understanding of this problem not only serves to reveal the continued relevance of phenomenology for the contemporary world, but also some of its fundamental limitations in helping its proponents navigate that world.
The problem revolves around how to account for and address appropriately the Other. The heart of the problem is this: the apparent difference between phenomenology’s ability, on the one hand, to differentiate the nature of the Other from other phenomena and to describe the ethical power of the Other; and, its apparent inability, on the other hand, to recognize the potential dangers of this power and to prescribe possible appropriate responses to it.
Far too many see the problem of the Other in phenomenology as a problem which only exists in as much as the Other is overlooked by Husserl and Heidegger, a not altogether accurate appraisal of their work. For these readers this apparent problem is solved then, or at least addressed, by Levinas. As this chapter will show, however, this is not the real problem of the Other in phenomenology. The real problem is not the way in which the Other does not appear in phenomenology; but precisely the way it does, particularly in Levinas. As this chapter will argue, the true task of phenomenology in the 21st century must be to understand and address this problem appropriately.
In order to do so, this chapter will first outline the “problem of the Other” in phenomenology by tracing its genesis through the history of phenomenology, treating along the way the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Through this analysis the true nature of the problem of the Other in phenomenology will become apparent. The chapter will then show how this new understanding of the “problem of the Other,” proves the continued relevance of phenomenology in the 21st century by showing how this problem illuminates the hidden core of a few of the most pressing social and political problems of our day, including the rise of various neo-nationalisms and the increasingly apparent lure of terroristic fundamentalisms. Through this analysis, this chapter will show, at the same time and perhaps paradoxically, the limitation of phenomenology to respond to these problems appropriately. As such, the chapter will suggest that it is only by moving beyond phenomenology through this problem that appropriate ethical and political responses to can be forged. The chapter concludes by showing how the ethical theories of Jacques Lacan address precisely this “problem of the Other in phenomenology,” helping it to overcome its limitations and move forwards relevantly into the 21st century.