HUMINT-Human Intelligence Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

The 1965 disappearance of Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris, the catalyst of one of the greatest political scandals in the history of post-war France, is still shrouded in mystery several decades later. Newly declassified documents from Czech archives have shed light on the final years of the Moroccan politician’s life, revealing that Ben Barka had cooperated with Czechoslovak intelligence from 1961 until his abduction. The aim of this study is to assess the nature of this partnership and demonstrate the activities, methods, and aims of Czechoslovak intelligence in the Third World during the 1960s.

Within a generation, intelligence studies have established themselves in continental Europe. Research infrastructure has been created with journals and conferences. The article explores how a European School of Intelligence Studies (ESIS) differs from the traditional British and American research and which scholars constitute ESIS. This work also presents new methodical proposals (e.g. using a quantitative method for selecting material from the existing empirical data sets), following the requirement that intelligence studies should have an interdisciplinary nature. Our argumentation is based on an analysis of the two main conferences , the conference of the International Intelligence History Association (IIHA) and the Need to Know-format (NtK), and it defines the content of the ESIS based on state of the art. European researchers participating in these fora were primary from Germany, Benelux, the Nordic states, and Central-and Eastern Europe. ESIS shows European West-East unity and strong ties to British, American and Israeli research, it also indicates a North-South divide. The Archival Revolution has been defining for the development of the ESIS. The access to documents regarding all areas of intelligence activity, including operational records and personal files of agents, differs from traditional declassification. This way, it is possible in Europe to do empirical research on intelligence operations in a hitherto unseen scale. Furthermore, the ESIS is characterized by substantial interest to counterintelligence and awareness of the differences between intelligence in democracies and authoritarian regimes.
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- by Władysław Bułhak and +1
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- Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence, HUMINT-Human Intelligence

Purpose. The gathering of human intelligence (HUMINT) is of utmost importance, yet the scientific literature is silent with respect to the effectiveness of different information elicitation techniques. Our aim was to remedy this by conducting the first scientific test of the so-called Scharff technique (named after the successful German WWII interrogator). Method. We developed a new experimental paradigm, mirroring some main features of a typical HUMINT situation. The participants (N = 93) were given information on a planned terrorist attack, and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too much or too little information in an upcoming interview. One third was interviewed with the Scharff technique (conceptualized to include four different tactics), one-third was asked open questions only, and the final third was asked specific questions only. The effectiveness of the three techniques was assessed by a novel set of objective and subjective measures. Results. Our main findings show that (1) the three techniques did not differ with respect to the objective amount of new information gathered; (2) the participants in the Scharff condition perceived (as predicted) that it was more difficult to read the interviewer's information objectives; and (3) the participants in the Scharff-and the Open-question condition (incorrectly) perceived to have revealed significantly less information than the participants in the Specific question condition. Conclusions. We presented a new experimental paradigm, and new dependent measures, for studying the effectiveness of different information elicitation techniques. We consider the outcome for the Scharff technique as rather promising, but future refinements are needed.

- by Simon Oleszkiewicz
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- HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Interrogation

Wilhelm Stieber greatly advanced intelligence and counterintelligence. His ideas paved the way for secret police forces and intelligence agencies for the future. He not only managed intelligence services but undertook dangerous work... more

- by Jim Garrett
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- German Studies, Military Intelligence, German History, Intelligence Studies

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) intelligence system is focused on technology acquisition, political and military intelligence, and counter-subversion, using some techniques familiar in the West but others that are less so. Chinese historical models, Soviet techniques, Western practices, and the recent evolution of work under the CCP have all shaped today’s intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) community, including the Ministry of State Security (MSS, Guojia Anquanbu), the smaller CI effort under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, Gonganbu), and the specialized collection efforts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and other government bodies. A striking characteristic of the Chinese system since 1979 is the broad “actuarial” tasking employed for technology acquisition.

Barabara est assise dans un bar avec Pierre, un consultant en voyages qu'elle fréquente socialement depuis qu'elle l'a rencontré il y a quelques semaines dans le hall de l'immeuble où elle travaille en tant qu'administrateur réseau. Son... more

- by Ahmed JEBRANE
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- HUMINT-Human Intelligence

The British and US governments entered World War II without policies or defined practices for handling, interrogating, and disposing of Soviet defectors. This gradually changed, necessitated by a post-war surge of defectors and deserters. Although the United States and Great Britain initially took different paths toward defector policies, diverging and evolving at different rates, both countries ultimately arrived at nearly the same destination. By 1950 their policies were founded on two broad benefits of defectors: they were sources of valuable intelligence; and they presented opportunities for propaganda, hopefully positive, for the West.

- by Kevin Riehle
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- Soviet History, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence, Cold War
- by Michael Andrews
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- Terrorism, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence, Collective Intelligence

Lo spionaggio industriale, nella moderna era digitale, rappresenta una limitazione allo sviluppo della competitività aziendale e nazionale. Il progetto ha l’obiettivo di analizzare il fenomeno dello spionaggio digitale quale potenziale danno al know how aziendale e alle innovazioni di prodotto/processo ed individuare un sistema efficiente di best practices endo-imprese per sostenere la crescita aziendale e la competitività nei mercati globali. La ricerca analizzerà e confronterà gli attuali strumenti economico-giuridici nei Paesi maggiormente innovativi (USA, Regno Unito, Germania, Francia e Giappone) per focalizzare punti di forza e debolezza del sistema italiano.
I risultati del progetto sono di notevole utilità per sviluppare ed implementare best practices (di management, di ICT e di diritto industriale) di protezione del know how aziendale che sostengano la competitività delle imprese italiane nel moderno mercato globale. Queste best practices sono strumenti innovativi che l’Intelligence Istituzionale dovrebbe prospettare ed incentivare con finanziamenti alla R&S e formazione, sia a livello aziendale che a livello settoriale, prodromici alla moderna politica industriale in era digitale per la tutela della proprietà intellettuale delle imprese ovvero per l’accrescimento della produttività, competitività internazionale.

- by Domenico Bevere
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- Information Technology, Economics, Financial Economics, Strategic Studies

‘Illegals’ are extensively trained individuals dispatched abroad under false identities with no observable links to their operating country. Technology has made possible a new kind of ‘virtual illegal,’ one that extends beyond the operating country’s borders without putting a human at risk. When this is done in a targeted manner by a sophisticated attacker it is called an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This article draws from historical illegals cases to identify parallels in the preparation, insertion, and control of malware by APTs. Ultimately, the methods for countering the two parallel phenomena can also be similar, despite their physical differences.

- by Kevin Riehle
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- Intelligence, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Advanced Persistent Threats, Cyber Security

This thesis is on how to elicit intelligence from human sources with the principal aim being to examine the efficacy of the tactics employed by the renowned WWII interrogator Hanns Scharff. A novel experimental set-up (as well as new dependent measures) was introduced to evaluate the efficacy of different human intelligence gathering techniques. Participants were given information about a planned terrorist attack, asked to take on the role of “sources”, and instructed to be semi-cooperative in a subsequent interview.
In Study I (N = 60), interviews were conducted over the phone. The Scharff technique (conceptualized to include five tactics) was compared to the direct approach (a combination of open-ended and specific questions). The Scharff technique resulted in relatively more new information and led sources to underestimate how much new information they revealed. With the Direct Approach, sources overestimated how much new information they revealed.
In Study II (N = 119), interacting parties met face-to-face and the sources were allowed to lie. Two versions of the Scharff technique were compared to the direct approach. The Scharff confirmation technique made use of claims that included the correct alternative while the Scharff disconfirmation/confirmation technique made use of a mix of correct and incorrect claims. The Scharff confirmation technique resulted in more new information than the Scharff disconfirmation/confirmation technique and the direct approach. Sources interviewed using the Scharff techniques had a more difficult time reading the interviewer’s information objectives and underestimated their contribution of new information. Sources interviewed using the direct approach overestimated how much new information they revealed.
In Study III (N = 200) the interview techniques were used with four different types of sources varying in both their levels of cooperation and capability to provide information as follows: (a) less willing/less able, (b) less willing/more able, (c) more willing, less able, and (d) more willing/more able. The Scharff technique was compared to the direct approach. Overall, the Scharff technique resulted in relatively more new information, particularly when interviewing less cooperative sources. Furthermore, sources interviewed using the Scharff technique had a more difficult time reading the interviewer’s information objectives and consistently underestimated their contribution of new information.
This thesis provides a psychological framework for and a conceptualization of the Scharff technique. Furthermore, the thesis introduces an experimental set-up mirroring a human intelligence interaction and offers a new set of dependent measures for mapping the efficacy of intelligence gathering techniques. In sum, this thesis provides support for the Scharff technique as an effective tool for eliciting information from human sources.

"The Human Aspects of the Operational Environment (HAOE) study explores those dimensions of human beings which would likely impact future NATO operations. It is designed to serve as the foundation for a follow-on Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) capstone concept, which would inform the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and transform existing capabilities to better adapt to human requirements in operations. The HAOE study is based on shortfalls and gaps identified in recent operations as well as the work of seven distinct research panels.
The HAOE study proposes capability transformations that can mitigate the challenges NATO might face in future operational environments as the human dimension becomes increasingly more important."

- by Claudio Bertolotti
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- NATO, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Cross-Cultural Communication
- by Mehmet Mert Çam
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- Military History, Military Intelligence, Strategy (Military Science), Propaganda

This book (ISBN 978-3-030-15182-9) provides the first ever intelligence history of Iraq from 1941 to 1945, and is the third and final volume of a trilogy on regional intelligence and counterintelligence operations that includes Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran) (2014), and Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran) (2015). This account of covert operations in Iraq during the Second World War is based on archival documents, diaries, and memoirs, interspersed with descriptions of all kinds of clandestine activity, and contextualized with analysis showing the significance of what happened regionally in terms of the greater war. After outlining the circumstances of the rise and fall of the fascist Gaylani regime, Adrian O'Sullivan examines the activities of the Allied secret services (CICI, SOE, SIS, and OSS) in Iraq, and the Axis initiatives planned or mounted against them. O'Sullivan emphasizes the social nature of human intelligence work and introduces the reader to a number of interesting, talented personalities who performed secret roles in Iraq, including the distinguished author Dame Freya Stark. Nominated for the American Political Science Association International Security Section Book Award.

The United States' over-reliance on technical collection systems and reduced focus on human intelligence reduces our capability to target adversaries that operate minimally in a technological world. This paper covers the history of US... more

- by Jim Garrett
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- Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence, War Studies

Every day, U.S. intelligence agencies gather huge amounts of information from a variety of sources. Collection of information is an essential part of the process described as Intelligence Cycle. The purpose of this article is to identify the essence and nature of intelligence sources and to analyze their practical use by the agencies and departments that make up the U.S. Intelligence Community. The author characterizes the main types of intelligence sources – Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) – and indicates which U.S. intelligence agencies are responsible for their use. Moreover, the author presents the problems with the use of intelligence sources that occur in the work of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Research findings indicate that the best results of intelligence work can be achieved with the use of “all-source intelligence” (also ...

- by Mariusz Antoni Kamiński
- •
- Sociology, Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence

This article provides an analysis of the problematic of foresight in traditional Chinese thought, articulating it with current developments in the epistemology of futures studies, planning theory, and strategic management. It is argued that in Chinese thought the answer to the question " Can the future be predicted? " depends on the forecasting horizon: whereas the immediate future can be sensed and taken advantage of by immersing oneself in the evolving situation, the remote future is fundamentally unpredictable. These dual answers are entrenched in discussions of what constitutes wisdom, opening up productive spaces of encounter between the problematic of foresight and the problematic of wisdom. https://doi.org/10.6531/JFS.2018.22(3).00A35

- by Dragos Simandan
- •
- Critical Theory, Business, Information Systems, Management

Many perceive al-Qaeda’s intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities as sophomoric, given the origins of the organization. However, the reason for the mistaken estimate of al-Qaeda’s capabilities could be in part due to the lack of knowledge regarding the genesis of said abilities. Throughout the Cold War the intelligence agencies of the major powers competed for influence throughout the world to further their government’s political and ideological objectives. The competition led to a dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that over time made their way into al-Qaeda training camps and manuals. The TTPs of the U.S., Britain, Russia, and France were provided to stalwart allies, some of which no longer exist or whose ideological leanings have shifted, who are now exploited by al-Qaeda. And, while the intelligence agencies of the major powers have enhanced their TTPs to meet new challenges, so has al-Qaeda, which benefits from the accrued knowledge that has indirectly and directly been proliferated to the organization.

- by Sergio Sanchez
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- Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, al-Qaeda

Since 9/11, intelligence has evolved within a changing atmosphere of modern tactics and techniques for information collection. This atmosphere, coupled with massive leaps in technological advancement such as social media, mobile communications, processing analytics, large-form solid-state data storage, novel computational hardware, and software equipment, has thrust intelligence communities around the world into a strange new world of multi-dimensional intelligence. While science and technology and human capability both remain valuable facets of the same overlapping intelligence construct, there is an emerging trend of diametrically opposed camps pushing for one method over the other. This article explains how in terms of field application and intelligence information processing and analysis, both HUMINT and TECHINT could be maximized by the elimination of forced rivalry and by the encouragement of mutual cooperation that is currently lacking.

- by Dr. Matthew Crosston
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- Information Systems, Discourse Analysis, History, Military History
- by Kevin Riehle
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- Soviet History, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Soviet Union (History), Cold War history
- by Marco Mendes
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- HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Counter Intelligence

- by Alexei J D Gavriel
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- Military Intelligence, Anthropology, Peace and Conflict Studies, Afghanistan

Oleszkiewicz, S. (2016). Eliciting human intelligence: A conceptualization and empirical testing of the Scharff technique. Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg. This thesis is on how to elicit intelligence from human sources with the principal aim being to examine the efficacy of the tactics employed by the renowned WWII interrogator Hanns Scharff. A novel experimental set-up (as well as new dependent measures) was introduced to evaluate the efficacy of different human intelligence gathering techniques. Participants were given information about a planned terrorist attack, asked to take on the role of “sources”, and instructed to be semi-cooperative in a subsequent interview. In Study I (N = 60), interviews were conducted over the phone. The Scharff technique (conceptualized to include five tactics) was compared to the direct approach (a combination of open-ended and specific questions). The Scharff technique resulted in relatively more new information and led sources t...

- by Sanda Damian
- •
- HUMINT-Human Intelligence

Intelligence analysts are regarded as some of the most authoritative experts in government and international affairs politically, economically, socially, technologically, environmentally and legally (PESTEL), more importantly, in crime and violent extremism. They are responsible for producing intelligence reports and analytical judgements that can affect the micro-environment of the individual to the macro-environment of state security. However, they are no different to any human where cognitive biases promote personal preferences in decision making. Regardless of the type of issue, problem or threat, analysis strives towards objectivity, regardless of what is to be analyzed. Poor analytical judgement derived from biases strangling critical thinking and analytical tradecraft account for catastrophic failures as well as many other documented events. Medical and Social Sciences have found correlations between pre-frontal cortical planning and the cognitive deficits that influence judg...

- by Rhion Karim
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- Criminology, Cognitive Psychology, International Relations, Intelligence Studies
- by Péter Bányász
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- Intelligence, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, National Security

Actors in competitive environments are bound to decide and act under conditions of uncertainty because they rarely have accurate foreknowledge of how their opponents will respond and when they will respond. Just as a competitor makes a move to improve their standing on a given variable relative to a target competitor, she should expect the latter to counteract with an iterative lagged asymmetric response, that is, with a sequence of countermoves (iteration) that is very different in kind from its trigger (asymmetry) and that will be launched at some unknown point in the future (time lag). The paper explicates the broad relevance of the newly proposed concept of " iterative lagged asymmetric responses " to the social study of temporality and to fields as diverse as intelligence and counterintelligence studies, strategic management, futures studies, military theory, and long-range planning. By bringing out in the foreground and substantiating the observation that competitive environments place a strategic premium on surprise, the concept of iterative lagged asymmetric responses makes a contribution to the never-ending and many-pronged debate about the extent to which the future can be predicted.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X17752652

- by Dragos Simandan
- •
- Critical Theory, Organizational Behavior, Management, Business Administration

Few existing archival records or secondary sources appear to narrate or describe the circumstances, relationships, and activities of “spy wives” during the Second World War. Intelligence historians currently find themselves at a turning point, where new approaches to the writing of intelligence history have been called for that transcend the study of operations and policy, while drawing when necessary upon the methodologies of such adjacent disciplines as social history and historical geoinformatics. It is therefore surely appropriate to conduct an examination of the hitherto neglected social phenomenon of female agency in the “spyscape” of wartime British and German covert operations. Through an examination of case studies of individual wives of intelligence operatives, constructed on the basis of information gathered from scattered primary and secondary sources, it is possible to assemble and analyse a wide, highly differentiated range of gender relationships at the intersection o...

- by Kevin Riehle
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- Cold War, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Intelligence and Espionage, Cold War history
- by Kevin Riehle
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- Intelligence, HUMINT-Human Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Cyber intelligence

This study firstly addresses historical evaluation of the psychological warfare concept in regular warfare. Next it’s application to irregular warfare is touched upon and the practices of both sides during the Word War I as the first total war are scrutinized by putting stress on the point it has reached resulting from the ever-changing warfare concept. Additionally, rather than regular combat called as secondary front in military terms, psychological warfare operations, which have been resorted to erode the determination and ability of the target group for fighting and to direct their willpower in the regions where low intensity or covert conflicts have been taken place, are explained with the example of Iran due to both its geographically strategic location and the ethnic, religious and sectarian parameters.
Iranian geography, where British-German-Russian struggle for the influence had been spreading from the beginning of 20th century, had the potential to have an impact on the course of the war and this led to both sides to employ asymmetric methods ranging from propaganda through the written and visual materials to joint covert operations as components of the psychological warfare in line with their aims and interests on Iran remaining de facto neutral until the end of the war. Besides, conflict of political and economic interests among allies and personal ambitions and disputes among civilian or military agents and staff triggered mutual espionage, sabotage, and misleading actions and even low intensity conflicts in later stages.
Accordingly, British and Russian psychological warfare operations toward the Central Powers are explained through examples, psychological operations of Germany and Ottoman Empire toward enemies as well as Iranian people and tribes are examined by classifying them in accordance with their objectives and methods, some determination regarding the outcomes is made and most importantly by comparing Social Darwinist oriented German psychological warfare mechanism and Turkish operations based on the “Ittihad-i Islam” ideal, the state of Central Powers in covert warfare in Iran during the World War I is handled in a didactic way in this study.

- by Mehmet Mert Çam
- •
- Military History, Military Intelligence, Strategy (Military Science), Propaganda

Does torture (or "enhanced interrogation techniques") improve HUMINT collection quality? This paper analyzes the United States' use of the practice in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in comparison with the State of Israel's use of the... more

- by Chelsea Cohen
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- Military Intelligence, Terrorism, Intelligence, HUMINT-Human Intelligence

This chapter endeavors to demystify the practices of anthropology by integrating its unique concepts and collection methodologies. Two formal intelligence disciplines, Cultural intelligence (CULINT) and ethnographic intelligence (ETHINT), and their incorporation into existing joint intelligence infrastructure are examined. Initially, the discussion illustrates Cultural Intelligence largest misconception: the uncovering of a hidden code of a foreign society and that the mastering of this code allows unrestricted control of a population. Analysis of the credibility of information and the reliability of its sources depicts data collection techniques. Further discussion stresses that Cultural knowledge is only the onset of basic intelligence requirements in an operational environment. A level of cultural awareness is achieved only when the 'why' of the social norms can be answered. Keywords: cultural relativism, cultural intelligence (CULINT), ethnographic intelligence (ETHINT), ethnographic collection, open-source intelligence (OSINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), participant observation, nonparticipant observation Stanford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter. Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

- by Alexei J D Gavriel
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- Military Intelligence, Anthropology, Communication, Afghanistan
- by Matthew J Brazil
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- Business, Intellectual Property, Intelligence Studies, International Business

Two Metropolitan Police Officers as persons of interest to the Hungarian Intelligence shortly after the revolt of 1956
One peculiar consequence of the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 must have been the fact that the basically unreal 1955-directive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the infiltration into the intelligence and security services, or the police forces, of hostile countries has become a seemingly close opportunity and a feasible project from the spring of 1957 to the fall of 1958, which was due to threatening and real assaults. Then the Chief Commissioner of the Belgrave District that provided the accommodation of the diplomatic corps in London came to friendly terms with the Hungarian diplomats including a state security officer under diplomatic cover. Nonetheless, it was taking place as a directed contact, while one of the sentries, who seemed to be a promising candidate for recruitment, the endeavor ended in the introductory phase.

- by Pál István
- •
- Military Intelligence, Intelligence, Cold War, HUMINT-Human Intelligence