Hungarian War of Independence, 1848-1849 Research Papers (original) (raw)

In Gödöllő on 7 April 1849, after the battle of Isaszeg, which closed the first stage of the Spring Campaign, the Hungarian military and political leaders decided on a somewhat hazardous operational plan, which, however, bade fair to succeed. The primary aim of the plan was the liberation of the besieged Komárom, which would also have rendered it possible to recapture Pest-Buda without fighting. Putting the plan into action, the main body of the Hungarian army, led by Artúr Görgei, got round the left wing of the Imperials and triumphed over some of the minor Austrian forces that tried to hold them up. On 10 April 1849 they won at Vác, on the 19th at Nagysalló, on the 26th at Ács and then eventually liberated the fortress of Komárom. On 23 April, the main body of the Imperial army evacuated Pest and retreated partly to Southern Hungary and partly toward Pozsony. Thus, the operational plan of Gödöllő proved to be successful, the capital and a great part of the country had been liberated. Besides the victories mentioned above and analysed thoroughly by our historiography, a less spectacular but very important and difficult task of the war plan fell to the share of General Lajos Aulich's II Corps and Lajos Asbóth's 12th Independent Division. For some 12 days, they had to contain the main body of the Imperial army, outnumbering them by four to one, so that Görgei could liberate Komárom. The two Hungarian commanders and their forces (prevailingly recruits) accomplished the task splendidly. They deceived the Imperial supreme command by a series of diversionary movements, demonstrations and the masterly distribution of the troops, which made the Austrians overestimate the strength of the opposing powers. On 10, 11, 16 and 21 April, Aulich and Asbóth fought small battles with the Imperials in the lowlands in front of Pest, by Stream Rákos. In the course of these they could avoid any defeats and harassed the insecure Imperial high command by their repeated bold advance. Their merits are not lessened by the crisis of the enemy command in the period, or by the fact that the main body of the Imperial army in Pest was practically left without a commander after relieving Field Marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz.
Among the battles of the Spring Campaign, the introduced events remain under the shadow of the spectacular successes, notwithstanding the boldness that made the Hungarian supreme command leave a force of barely 11.000 on its own for a long time, facing an army of 40.000. This is a rare example in Hungarian and universal military history, as well as the complete success of such an operation.