Information Fusion Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

As the spacefaring community is well aware, the increasingly rapid proliferation of man-made objects in space, whether active satellites or debris, threatens the safe and secure operation of spacecraft and requires that we change the way we conduct business in space. The introduction of appropriate protocols and procedures to regulate the use of space is predicated on the availability of quantifiable and timely information regarding the behavior of resident space objects (RSO): the basis of space domain awareness (SDA). Yet despite five decades of space operations, and a growing global dependence on the services provided by space-based platforms, the population of Earth orbiting space objects is still neither rigorously nor comprehensively quantified, and the behaviors of these objects, whether directed by human agency or governed by interaction with the space environment, are inadequately characterized. Key goals of advanced SDA are to develop a capability to predict RSO behavior, extending SDA beyond its present paradigm of catalog maintenance and forensic analysis, and to arrive at a comprehensive physical understanding of all of the inputs that affect the motion of RSOs. Solutions to these problems require multidisciplinary engagement that combines space surveillance data with other information, including space object databases and space environmental data, to help decision-making processes predict, detect, and quantify threatening and hazardous space domain activity. 1.0 INTRODUCTION This document presents an introductory overview of space surveillance, tracking, and information fusion for SDA. A relevant activity is the NATO Science and Technology Organization's Task Group (SCI-279-TG) is addressing the technical considerations for enabling a NATO-Centric Space Domain Common Operating Picture (COP). The impetus for this effort is the growing dependence by NATO and its member nations on space capabilities to achieve its mission responsibilities as well as the growing role that space, as an operational domain in its own right, is playing in matters concerning global security. NATO has recognized this important reality and increased the Alliance's collective attention on ensuring NATO operations maximize their leverage of space while ensuring the space capabilities provided by its member nations are preserved to the maximum extent possible. A critical element of ensuring the availability and efficacy of these space capabilities is the availability of a common operational perspective or picture of the space domain throughout the Alliance and its partners. The presumption is that NATO forces will be more efficient, protected and successful in their future missions if a common operational perspective can be achieved across all operational domains in which NATO must operate; air, land, sea, cyber AND space. The corollary is, without a common Alliance perspective of the space domain,