Missile defence Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

2025

This article explores the possible scenarios in Russia’s arms control and disarmament policies after President Medvedev’s inauguration. The author analyzes the experience of the Putin presidency and the U.S.-Soviet agreements during the Cold War, to conclude that the problem of ABM systems and the “strategic stability” principle has become the central one. Therefore, Russia and the U.S. need to rethink their approaches and accept the new realities of their strategic relations in the 21st century.

2025, International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation–60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM

2025, none

Ukraine's Military Forces, like all contemporary militaries, rely on several Space-based capabilities providing vital support for a range of targeting, navigation, and communications services in terms of directing strikes and battlefield movement. Uniquely, much of Ukrainian Space access is dependent on a diversified patchwork of civil third-party providers 12 , which arose early in the war, and critical targeting information provided by Allies, who have their own Space Forces. Building an in-house Space Forces Capability for Ukraine, which would allow for the integration of targeting, navigation, and communications services into a comprehensive defence and offensive architecture would be the next maturing step in the transformation of Ukraine's military forces from their prewar , and current posture. Critically, Ukraine's key strategic disadvantage is its ongoing reliance on Allies for Spacebased communications coverage, and missile early warning systems. The next extension of this, will be fielding its own strategic weaponry in the form of long-range missile complexes that will require satellite support. Currently, Russia despite its evolving military problems still has a major advantage in terms of its military satellite fleet, such as its reconnaissance satellite programs: Persona satellites, which are high-resolution optical reconnaissance craft designed for detailed imaging; and, Bars-M satellites used for cartography and wide-area reconnaissance with lower resolution imagery. There is also the Liana satellite system, a Space-based intelligence program used for electronic warfare and target designation. Russia's Space-based military assets ensure accurate navigation through the GLONASS system and enhance battlefield situational awareness through Persona, significantly strengthening high-precision weaponry and operational awareness 3. Publicly enunciated in early 2022, Ukraine's Space Access Strategy, has been securing three essential Space services pillars: Pillar 1: Remote Sensing Services Pillar 2: Communications Services Pillar 3: Autonomous Capacity to bring this infrastructure into orbit Arguably, Ukraine's Space Access Strategy has reached in 2025 'Pillar 3', in terms of its armed forces' modernization and capability expansion in missile armament, missile defence, and utilizing Space-based support; where it can move away from dependency on the major Space Powers, developing its own capabilities for it to achieve Space Situational Awareness, and be able to monitor opponent Space activity that could impact on its National Security. It has been recently reported that a programme is being initiated, to seek funding for, "[a] … dual-use satellite constellation, dubbed Intermarsat … [potentially] … comprised of more than 70 small satellites in sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of about 500 kilometres (310 miles). It would provide daily revisits across the belt between the Baltic and the Mediterranean Sea, covering countries as far north as Finland and Estonia and as far south as Bulgaria." 4 The potential size of the constellation could reduce the effectiveness of Russian Antisatellite threats having a number of redundancies, to distribute functions across several satellites in face of threats, such as: (1) Rendezvous and capture technologies; (2) Direct ascent missile attacks; (3) Nuclear space mines detonations in orbit.

2025

commenced work with the Department of Supply in 1960 and qualified as a Technical Officer in 1965. He has had a wide ranging career in various technical areas, including chemistry, photography, rocketry, propellant preparation, physical testing of propellants and ingredients, computer programming in Fortran, Basic and Pascal and is currently a Technical Officer 3 with Weapons Systems Analysis Group. He was involved in this project as a camera operator and in the data processing of the camera imgaes.

2025

Quand Donald Trump revendique l’annexion du Groenland au nom de La Défense nationale des USA, il faut lui rappeler l’histoire nucléaire du Groenland entre 1947 et 1968, quand les B-52 de l’US Air Force chargés de bombes atomiques atterrissaient et décollaient de la base de Thule mais aussi s’écrasaient dans les terres et glaciers du Groenland en perdant des bombes atomiques et des aviateurs, tout en irradiant les zones des crashs et les Inuits qui y vivaient.

2025

President Reagan, in his March 1983 speech, announced his intention to investigate the possibility of defending the Nation against Soviet ballistic missiles. The speech was the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative and it has affected all strategic debate since. The program as originally set out was to be a research program to evaluate the possibility of defense against missiles, but clearly--at least early on--the ultimate defenses that were contemplated, and which created public support for the program, were robust, nation-wide defenses of population. Few doubt the fundamental stability of the current strategic relationship between the superpowers based on deterring attack through the mutual threat of assured counter-strike Iand retaliation. This stability requires a certain level of survivability of retaliatory forces but with submarines, bombers, and large numbers of ICBMs which could in theory be launched under attack, both sides could certainly mount devastating retaliations. Therefore, either side could destroy the other whether it struck first or second so there is no incentive Sto strike fit. Similarly, perfect nuclear defenses on both sides would be stable--at least considering only the offensive nuclear part of the relationship--because nuclear attack 3would have been made irrelevant and there would be no incentive to strike first or second. Even though the two end-points may be stable, there was some worry, even among 3 many of the proponents of strategic defenses, about stability during the transition to robust defenses. Very early on in the debate, general worries about arms races and more specific worries about crisis stability appeared. Partly, these concerns resulted from a cautious and perfectly reasonable conservatism regarding a nuclear relationship that is theoretically very dangerous but most agree is quite stable in its current state. Why sail unnecessarily into 3 uncharted waters? 1 Most transition studies have assumed implicitly that the ultimate goal of near-perfect defenses is feasible, the question has been how to get there safely. The near unanimous current judgment within the technical community is that near-perfect (say, 99% effective) * H-3 U

2025

This thesis asks why was only a maritime warning mission added to the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) existing aerospace warning and control mandate and not other missions? There were other viable options that could have come from the fallout of 9/11 to improve security and defence of North America such as maritime surveillance, maritime control, not to mention land and the cyberspace domains. In the end, NORAD was assigned only maritime warning in 2006. Using the international relation theory of functionalism as a framework to understand Canada-US defence policy decisions and joint defence initiatives, the maritime warning mission addition can be partially explained but it is not sufficient.

2025, Sejong Policy Brief

This paper focuses on the concept of ‘flexible redeployment’1)—namely, base modernization to enable potential, temporary, and/or emergency deployment of U.S.‘s tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Elaborating flexible... more

2025, At the secret facility "Duga-2," almost an entire power unit of the station was operational! Holos Ukrainy. 2013. April 26. №81. P. 12.

Interview with Volodymyr Fedorovych Musiyets (born July 25, 1937, in the village of Hrybova Rudnya, Ripky district, Chernihiv region). In 1976, he was appointed chief of staff of military unit 74939 (Chernobyl-2). He served as its commander from 1984 to 1988. From the Chernihiv region, a powerful shortwave pulse was transmitted into the ionosphere, reflecting back, "covering" the USA, and returning. In Chernobyl-2, a unique antenna captured the "seen" signals.

2025

This research project addresses the important issue of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the post-Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War, so went many restrictions to the conduct of states and non-state actors, including the acquisition and use of WMD. The United States' responsibility as the world's only remaining superpower requires its leaders to address its policies and capabilities to protect the United States and its vital national interests against WMD. We would like to acknowledge the assistance received from many outstanding sources. The continuing guidance received from our Faculty Research Advisor, Colonel Tommy D. Dickson, was instrumental in the development, refinement, and focus of the group's efforts. Other experts gracious enough to add their valuable insight to our research include Air War College faculty members: Colonel

2025, Defence R&D Canada

Ballistic, advanced cruise, and hypersonic missiles pose a significant threat to global security and a major challenge to modern military operations. Strategic Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) aims to create a comprehensive,... more

2025, PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN POLAND

This article presents considerations regarding the prospects of the Polish defence industry. It discusses, among other things, the state of the domestic defence industry, indicates opportunities and threats to its development, as well as the general assumptions of the Technical Modernisation Plan of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. In addition, it defines the essence of agreements concluded with entities of the domestic defence industry, namely offset, framework and implementation agreements. It also analyses the sources of financing of agreements concluded for the purpose of modernisation and re-equipping not only the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland but also other formations guarding public security and order, such as the Border Guard. The entire considerations end with conclusions, the implementation of which may contribute to the optimisation of the condition of the domestic defence industry, as well as to improving the security of the state and the effectiveness of the Polish army. One of the factors affecting the state of security of the country is its economic potential and industrial base. This applies in particular to the defense industry, which has been highlighted by the ongoing aggressive war of Russia against Ukraine. After only half a year of military operations, both sides began to experience shortages of equipment and supplies, and in particular large-caliber artillery ammunition. Currently, records are being broken in Poland in terms of defense spending - next year, funds at the disposal of the Ministry of National Defense (state budget, Armed Forces Support Fund) are to be 10% higher than in 2024. They will amount to PLN 169 billion, or 4.2% of GDP. Of this amount, PLN 53 billion, or $ 13.25 billion in 2025 alone, is to be allocated directly to the purchase of arms and military equipment. The purpose of this article is to define and indicate the prospects of the Polish defense industry. The work uses the literature studies method as the leading method, and the historical and dogmatic methods as auxiliary methods. A research limitation is access to classified information and information constituting a company's trade secret.

2025

There is no one formal definition for AI in Israel. Yet, most operational definitions refer to AI as the technology which grants computers the ability to perform tasks that would have required thinking capability or skills generally attributed to humans. At the same time, it is worth noting that the term AI is also widely used in Israel as a synonym for the “fourth industrial revolution” (4IR) and entails ancillary technological areas such as big data, IoT , automation, robotics, swarms, and more. As such, AI is acknowledged in Israel as a strategic technology – “an infrastructure of infrastructures” – with the potential to reshape military affairs, the global economy, and the distribution of power within the international system.

2025, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

Abstract
The war between Russia and Ukraine, ongoing since 2014 and suddenly escalated in 2022, has been a subject of global attention, inspiring a wide range of responses from global leaders and global organizations. One of the powerful leaders steering U.S. foreign policy during this period was former President Donald Trump, whose foreign policy approach and management of foreign wars were largely unconventional. This essay seeks to analyze Trump's intervention style into the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the prism of Social Constructivism, which is a theory of international relations based on the agency of social structures, shared norms, and collective identities in constructing political behavior. Social Constructivism is distinct from conventional theories, such as Realism or Liberalism, as it focuses not only on material power or on institutional complexes, but also on the ideational components—such as beliefs, ideologies, and discourses—that inform political decisions.
In the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Trump's interventionist foreign policies and public utterances can be understood as a function of socially constructed realities, whereby identities of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine are discursively constructed and reconstructed. This essay examines how Trump's rhetoric regarding NATO, his contentious relationship with Russia, and his view of Ukraine were shaped by his broader ideological stances and his vision of American identity within the international system. By looking at Trump's language with other international leaders, above all his torn perspective regarding Russian aggression and policy decisions on offering military aid to Ukraine, this paper looks at how constructed representations of power, sovereignty, and foreign coalition determined his approach.
In addition, the paper contrasts Trump's Social Constructivist foreign policy style with that of his forebears and successors, pitting his handling of the conflict against more traditional foreign policy perspectives grounded in Realist or Liberal schools. In doing so, it provides insights into how the prominence of discourse and identity in global relations needs to be acknowledged, particularly in a conflict that remade the global system. In conclusion, this research illustrates how Trump's intervention in the Russia-Ukraine conflict can be explained through a Social Constructivist approach in order to demonstrate the role of ideas and norms in shaping global conflicts and international relations in the contemporary era.

2025, International Relations

Abstract: The Canada-US relationship is one of the pillars of international diplomacy, marked by profound economic integration, strong security collaboration, and periodic tensions on trade, environment, and sovereignty issues. Having the longest undefended border in the world, the two countries have transformed from colonial rivals to indispensable partners. This study paper offers an in-depth study of the historical development of Canada-US relations, analyzes current trends, and foresees the prognosis for the near term, based on global economic changes, global warming, and geopolitical tensions. Through a study of milestone events, current deals, and arising concerns, this study highlights the strength and nuances of the partnership and sheds light on its trajectory into the near term.

2025, EUROPEAN SKY SHIELD INITIATIVE Capacities, Criticisms, and Türkiye’s Contribution

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), spearheaded by Germany, emerged in response to escalating missile threats, particularly from Russia, following Moscow’s aggressive actions in Ukraine. ESSI’s central objective is to establish a unified, ground-based air and missile defense system across Europe to bolster collective security. Proposed by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022, the initiative now includes 21 member countries, including recent entrants like Türkiye and Greece. ESSI is designed to enhance NATO’s air defense capabilities through the deployment of multi-layered systems capable of addressing both short and long-range missile threats. However, the initiative must navigate several strategic, technical, and political challenges to achieve its full operational potential and effectively counter emerging threats, particularly Russia’s advanced missile systems like the Iskander and Kinzhal. Türkiye’s accession to ESSI in February 2024 significantly strengthens the initiative, given its strategic geographic location and advanced air defense capabilities. Over the past decade, Türkiye has made substantial investments in developing indigenous air defense systems, including the HİSAR and SİPER projects, which address short to long-range missile threats. These systems, which leverage domestic technology and innovation, fill critical gaps in ESSI, particularly in the area of short-range defense, a key necessity for many member countries. Türkiye’s longstanding experience in managing complex security environments on its borders, combined with its sophisticated air defense infrastructure, positions it as a valuable contributor to the initiative. However, its historically delicate relations with Russia introduce a layer of complexity to its role within ESSI, especially given its balanced stance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite the promise of ESSI, it faces critiques from within Europe, particularly from France, which argues that the initiative overly relies on non-European defense systems, thereby undermining the continent’s strategic autonomy. The lack of a coherent, integrated strategy across member states, coupled with varying system requirements, has also been identified as a significant obstacle to ESSI’s success. Moreover, political challenges, including the management of leadership and coordination within the initiative, require careful handling to ensure its effectiveness. While ESSI represents a major step forward in strengthening Europe’s air defense, these challenges must be addressed to ensure the initiative delivers on its promise of enhanced collective security.

2025, CURRENT DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND CONTROL TOOLS

Abstract: The free and independent activity of the media gives any member of the people, without representatives, the chance to participate in political processes and prove that they are a rational force by directly expressing their attitude to the government's policy. Thus, political participation does not only mean elections, rallies, demonstrations, etc., but also becoming a participant in the political process by being properly informed about the government's activities through the media and expressing opinions and suggestions about its policy.

2025, SAIS Review

Dual use nature of SLVs raises concerns that they could be converted to ballistic missiles.

2025

Мотяков Ю.М., Зелений П.В., Толмачов В.Ю. Державний науково-дослідний інститут випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки ОБРИС КОМПЛЕКСУ ПРОТИДІЇ БПАК ДЛЯ ОХОРОНИ АЕРОДРОМІВ БАЗУВАННЯ ДЕРЖАВНОЇ АВІАЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ У статті розглянуто можливі шляхи розвитку систем захисту аеродромів постійного базування державної авіації України від дії основних типів безпілотних авіаційних комплексів (БпАК) , на підставі проведеного аналізу запропонований варіант побудови, комплексу засобів виявлення, протидії (ураження) БпАК.

2025, Prospects & Perspectives, Prospec Foundation

As Canadians prepare to cast their ballots on April 28, the nation confronts an unprecedented constellation of challenges to its global standing and democratic institutions. Against this tumultuous backdrop, the Indo-Pacific region... more

2025

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports,

2025, Roma, IAI, aprile 2025, 27 p. (Documenti IAI ; 25|05)

Il Global Combat Air Programme (Gcap) lanciato da Giappone, Italia e Regno Unito nel 2022 rappresenta una nuova partnership tra i tre Paesi per lo sviluppo e produzione di un caccia (con pilota a bordo) di nuova generazione. Una partnership basata sull'uguaglianza di diritti e investimenti tra i partner fondatori, nonché sui principi di libertà di azione e libertà di modifica a livello nazionale-ovvero sulla piena sovranità operativa e tecnologica sulla piattaforma, diversamente dall'esperienza dell'F-35. Il Gcap presenta dunque nuove sfide e opportunità in termini politici, militari e industriali, oltre alla serrata tempistica del programma e all'elevato livello di ambizione tecnologica. La cooperazione ha accelerato nel 2024 con l'istituzione di un'organizzazione governativa internazionale dedicata alla gestione del programma, e l'accordo su una joint venture paritetica tra le tre principali aziende coinvolte dai rispettivi Paesi. Questo documento è la traduzione dell'executive summary e delle conclusioni dello studio IAI che fornisce un'analisi approfondita e completa dei rispettivi approcci britannico, giapponese e italiano al Gcap, della governance politicoistituzionale e dell'architettura industriale del programma, nonché della questione dell'addestramento e delle implicazioni trasversali per l'Italia. Le conclusioni indicano 15 raccomandazioni per l'Italia riguardo al Gcap.

2025, International scientific conference “Theoretical foundations of law, public management and practice of their application” : conference proceedings (December 25–26, 2024. Riga, the Republic of Latvia). Riga, Latvia : Baltija Publishing, 2024. 268 page

This paper examines the international legal dimensions of Ukraine‟s renunciation of nuclear weapons in 1994 within the framework of the Budapest Memorandum and the subsequent russian aggression. The analysis highlights the non-binding nature of the security assurances provided by the signatory states and the resultant shifts in the global security system. These shifts were triggered by the armed aggression of the russian federation and its implications for international law

2025

This paper examines how North Korea can strengthen its nuclear deterrence against the United States in an asymmetric dyad. It outlines five key conditions for effective deterrence—communication, capability, credibility, identification,... more

2025, Arutz Sheva

While containing Iran’s immediate threats is necessary, it is not sufficient. The United States must think beyond short-term containment and toward long-term transformation. This requires a broader strategic vision: to reintegrate Iran... more

2025, Global Security Review

The international security architecture faces unprecedented challenges with the erosion of treaties and the resurgence of nationalist agendas, raising the specter of unconstrained nuclear proliferation. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) signal a dangerous erosion of strategic stability. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) also suffered a blow, fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Trends in arms control are marked by great power competition and declining multilateralism, with China’s military rise challenging the existing framework. Advanced technologies like hypersonic weapons and AI further complicate arms control. The erosion of trust, strategic ambiguity, and nationalist agendas undermine consensus on arms control. President Trump’s “America First” agenda, exemplified by withdrawing from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA, alienated allies and emboldened adversaries. Addressing these challenges requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue to mitigate proliferation risks and ensure a stable future.

2025, International Scientific Unity

In the digital age, information security and professionalism are foundational to the integrity and trustworthiness of modern media platforms. The rapid development of digital communication channels has transformed how information is disseminated, creating both opportunities and challenges. Information security concerns—such as data breaches, cybersecurity threats, and misinformation—have become central to
media ethics. Simultaneously, professionalism in media has evolved with new challenges, including the pressure to maintain editorial standards, ensure transparency, and uphold ethical journalism in an age of rapidly evolving digital platforms. This paper explores these issues, examining the intersection of information security and professionalism in modern media and suggesting frameworks for addressing the emerging risks.
Keywords: Information security, professionalism, modern media, cybersecurity, misinformation, ethical journalism, data privacy, media ethics.

2025, A Busca da Rússia pelo Equilíbrio Estratégico Nuclear com os Estados Unidos da América

O objetivo deste artigo é mapear a visão da Rússia sobre o seu arsenal estratégico
,
sobretudo como ferramenta de dissuasão nuclear contra os Estados Unidos da América (EUA)
e os aliados estadunidenses da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN). Logo, a
pergunta de pesquisa é: Qual o papel vislumbrado por Moscou das suas armas nucleares
estratégicas? A hipótese deste trabalho é que os russos enxergam a paridade nuclear –
através de programas de desenvolvimento de novos sistemas de armas nucleares – com os
EUA/OTAN como um fator determinante para sua segurança e também como fiador da não
intromissão de outros Estados na busca dos seus objetivos políticos no certamente
internacional, com destaque o leste europeu.
Para que o objetivo abordo acima seja atingido, é necessário considerar três aspectos:
1º O que é o equilíbrio nuclear estratégico e como este conceito se diferencia da noção de
dissuasão nuclear mínima; 2º Contextualização das forças nucleares russas nas duas
primeiras décadas após o esfacelamento da União das Repúblicas Soviéticas (URSS) e as
pressões externas sofridas pelo Kremlin neste contexto; e por fim, 3º Os desenvolvimentos já
feitos/e que estão por fazer dos sistemas nucleares estratégicos da Rússia e qual o impacto
disto na balança de poder com Washington e com os aliados estadunidenses da organização
de defesa atlântica. Agora, traremos mais detalhes da importância de esmiuçar estes três
fatores para melhor entendimento da temática desta pesquisa.
Sobre o primeiro ponto, no capítulo XIV, denominado A Estratégia da Dissuasão, do
livro “Paz e Guerra Entre as Nações” (2018), Raymond Aron utiliza a expressão “equilíbrio do
terror” para definir que a dissuasão nuclear, quando dois Estados tem poderio nuclear
semelhante, é mais segura de ocorrer do que a dissuasão mínima, ou seja, na condição de
grande disparidade de arsenais nucleares de dois possíveis rivais. Segundo este autor,
quando existe grande discrepância de forças nucleares dos lados envolvidos em uma crise
político/militar, o mais forte pode ficar tentado a realizar um primeiro ataque nuclear com
objetivo de desarmar o seu inimigo. Contudo, o Estado com menor poder nuclear, sabendo
desta possibilidade, pode atacar primeiro para garantir poder de destruição contra o seu
antagonista.
Já o segundo aspecto, pode ser bifurcado em dois momentos: 1. O esfacelamento da
força nuclear herdada pela Rússia ao passo que os Estados Unidos expandiram a capacidade
das suas armas nucleares (Lieber; Press, 2006); 2. A expansão da organização atlântica para
o leste (Powaski, 2019), a saída dos norte-americanos dos acordos de controle de forças
nucleares, principalmente o Antibalistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (ODASDNM, 2020),
respectivamente em 2002 e 2019, e, as intervenções do Kremlin na Geórgia, 2008, e na
Ucrânia, tanto em 2014 quanto em 2022.
A soma dos dois elementos acima, ou seja, a busca do “equilíbrio do terror” e os fatores
de ordem político/militar, sobretudo no entorno estratégico russo, levaram ao último tópico,
modernização das forças nucleares da Rússia. Estas vem sendo realizada, a partir da última
década, através do programa State Arms Programm 2020 (Tennis, 2018). Vemos, neste
sentido, a criação de uma série de sistemas de armas estratégicos para serem operadas
através da terra, do ar e do mar (Kristensen et al, 2024).
Para a realização desta pesquisa foi utilizada a metodologia hipotético-dedutiva
elaborada por Popper. Nela se vislumbra uma hipótese, que no nosso caso é a visão russa
da relevância primordial dada à paridade nuclear-estratégica com os EUA/OTAN, para a
resposta de uma pergunta de pesquisa. Posteriormente, a hipótese deve passar por etapas
de “falseamento”, que significa testar sua validade. No caso deste trabalho isto é feito através
da análise de livros, artigos, documentos oficiais dos Estados citados (EUA, 2022; Rússia
2020) e notícias de materiais que abordam temáticas já citadas aqui (Lakatos; Marconi, 2003).
Esta pesquisa demostra ser relevante pois nos encontramos em um momento de forte
atrito político entre a Rússia e os Estados Unidos e seus respectivos aliados. Assim, estudar
o desenvolvimento nuclear russo é importante para entender as perspectivas deste país no
Sistema Internacional.

2025, Defence & Diplomcay

RISE OF CHINA AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY RAJ MONGIA INTRODUCTION The vast majority of Indians is worried about China's rise and considers it a security threat, an opinion poll has revealed, with the results exposing a serious trust deficit between the Asian giants. The survey, conducted by the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Australia India Institute, found that 83 per cent of Indians considered China a security threat. A possible war with China was rated a "big threat" by almost three in four respondents. Reasons included China's possession of nuclear weapons, competition for resources, and border disputes. Even though China is now India's largest trading partner, just 31 per cent of Indians agreed that China's rise had been good for India. 1 Both India and China, two of the most populous countries in the world, have been moving up the ladder, militarily, economically, and politically, but each has its own priorities, strategies, successes, and failures. These have been discussed and continue to be discussed in detail on several platforms. Today, these two countries are masters of their own fate and are well on their way to take their rightful place

2025, Defence & Diplomcay

Diplomacy is an integral part of the Chinese state machinery. Though
always important and firmly embedded in the Chinese mind from
time immemorial, of late it has widened its reach. The institutional
base of China’s diplomatic machinery is firm and strong. It has found
legitimacy in the state apparatus. An analysis of the past and the
present will enable an appropriate understanding of the Chinese
actions of recent times.

2025

On Thursday evening, the Trump administration announced the creation of the "Space Force", a sixth branch of the armed forces designed to enable the United States to "dominate space". The announcement was met with almost universal... more

2025, "The View From Here" Blog

The dismissiveness with which Trump treats relations with nations that are friends and allies, glossing over tactless comments as jokes or misunderstandings, is reminiscent of other world leaders who have used bullying, threats and... more

2025

The results of PIR Center's work are of particular interest for the country's foreign policy agencies, given the relapses into a policy of the unilateral use of force that have caused small countries to feel that security is scarce and pushed large countries towards increasing weapons procurement. The continuing stagnation in the area of disarmament, though no fault of Russia, along with the increasing potential for conflict in the world as a whole are causes for concern. Russia has inherited the tradition of fighting for disarmament. The decrease in its activities in this area has ended. There is every reason to expect that Russia will present proposals aimed, if not at stopping, then at least at slowing the most dangerous aspirations of those who believe that there are neither commonsensical nor other limits to their ambitions. Sino Russian relations are not only more complicated, but also more contradictory than they appear in the speeches of the Russian president and the Chinese Communist Party chairman. Russia's leaders, whatever they say publicly and however strongly they suspect the United States of trying to drive a wedge into "model" Sino Russian relations, will not accept a strategic bloc with China. Demographic threats could be woven into the discourse of the March 2008 presidential campaign. Rather than the Faustian "loans for shares" pact of 1996, or the initiation of a second Chechen campaign in 1999 ahead of the 2000 election, March 2008 could well be characterized by the creation of a new Super National Russian idea-a unifying strategic rationale on a par with the "Third Rome" ideology of the medieval and early modern period. The new dangers that have emerged in the international arena, which are primarily linked with the further spread of nuclear weapons and the more acute threat of terrorism, have marginalized the idea of nuclear disarmament as untimely and utopian. It is very seductive to accord the nuclear weapon the role of arbiter "The Great Inquisitor" something that is sorely needed to prevent nations from engaging in mortal combat for their own selfish interests. This approach would be tantamount to acknowledging the fatal inevitability of continuing the nuclear arms race and having these weapons continue to spread across the earth's surface.

2025

This paper examines the tensions between Canada and United States and the Trump Administration implementing aggressive tariffs against Canada while stating it will become the 51 st state. It will provide a general overview of how these tensions arose, its impact on long term Canada-U.S. relations, while also discussing the risk of an escalating trade war, including the ramifications of annexing Canada-a sovereign territory.

2025, Coleção Meira Mattos

Neste artigo, propomos analisar se o sistema ASTROS pode ser uma ferramenta da estratégia de presença e dissuasão extrarregional. A pesquisa foi desenvolvida por meio de revisão bibliográfica e documental, à luz da literatura que aborda o Sistema de Foguetes de Artilharia para Saturação de Área, focando na estratégia de dissuasão preconizada na Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) e na presença indicada na Estratégia Militar Terrestre e em como é utilizado em outras nações, particularmente com a utilização da estratégia de Antiacesso e Negação de área (A2/AD). O estudo visa apresentar as possibilidades de emprego do sistema ASTROS, como uma ferramenta de A2/AD, concluindo sobre a sua capacidade de colaborar com a estratégia de dissuasão extrarregional e presença. Por fim, o trabalho é relevante para contribuir com a Força Terrestre na construção das capacidades militares terrestres em virtude do que ficou estabelecido na END.

2025, International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications

In this experiment, the primary goal is to investigate the free vibration characteristics of a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) mechanical system. The objectives include determining the system's natural frequency, damping ratio, and analyzing its transient behavior during free vibrations. We employ a combination of theoretical analysis, numerical simulations using Simulink, and experimental observations to achieve these objectives. Numerical results provide insights into the dynamic response, revealing critical system behaviors such as damping effects. The discussion contextualizes the findings within the realm of mechanical engineering principles, emphasizing practical implications. In conclusion, this study offers an understanding of SDOF system dynamics, with applications in engineering design and analysis.

2025

La sexta generación de aviación tendrá que enfrentarse a un entorno altamente congestionado de amenazas (enjambres de drones y misiles hipersónicos), requiriendo sistemas antimisiles mucho más avanzados que los actuales, donde las armas de energía dirigida serán cruciales pudiendo llegar a reemplazar al cañón y los misiles aire-aire en el combate aéreo cercano.
En este trabajo se plantea un algoritmo para el cálculo de estrategias de evasión óptimas aplicando la teoría de control, a partir de las funciones de transferencia del sistema de guiado de las amenazas, transformando las señales al plano de Laplace, y calculando un sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales, el cual puede resolverse y obtener los extremos relativos de la curva de distancia de paso amenaza-avión atacado.
Identificando al agresor con los alertadores de amenazas del avión atacado se pueden presentar dos situaciones. Que se conozcan las constantes de tiempo de su función de transferencia del sistema de guiado, con lo que el sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales puede integrarse numéricamente y calcular la distancia de paso.
Si no se conocen estas constantes de tiempo de la amenaza, con los alertadores de amenaza del avión atacado se obtiene una distancia de paso real a comienzo del vuelo, y mediante una combinación de algoritmos (Meméticos y Redes Neuronales Artificiales), comparar la distancia de paso real con la calculada al integrar el sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales, determinando las constantes de tiempo en un proceso de optimización iterativo.
Finalmente, las amenazas hostiles se clasifican en función de su distancia de paso en dos grupos, adoptando el avión atacado estrategias de evasión óptimas que maximicen la distancia de paso contra las amenazas del primer grupo, mientras que aquellas amenazas donde no es posible maximizar la distancia de paso serán interceptadas con los dispositivos de energía dirigida instalados en el avión atacado.

2025

El objeto de este trabajo consiste en la determinación de maniobras evasivas óptimas de una aeronave contra misil, utilizando la teoría de control. Partiendo de las funciones de transferencia de cada uno de los bloques del sistema de guiado, aplicando la transformada de Laplace a las señales, y empleando la teoría de control, se obtiene un sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales que describe la dinámica del proceso, el cual una vez resuelto permitiría obtener los extremos relativos de la gráfica de distancia de paso. El principal problema en esta fase es conocer las constantes de tiempo que caracterizan la función de transferencia. Si los sensores encargados de la detección de amenazas del avión atacado, son capaces de asegurar, con elevada probabilidad, la identificación concreta del misil agresor y se conoce su función de transferencia (dentro de un catálogo conocido a través de técnicas de inteligencia), el sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales puede integrarse numéricamente y calcularse la distancia de paso misil-avión atacado. En caso de no conocer las constantes de tiempo, se considera proceder a usar un algoritmo genético, integrar el sistema de ecuaciones diferenciales y obtener una distancia de paso calculada. Si los sensores de detección de amenazas del avión atacado, obtienen la distancia de paso real en una fase inicial del vuelo, se puede comparar la distancia de paso real con la distancia de paso calculada y aplicando el algoritmo genético en un proceso de optimización iterativo, converger a unas constantes de tiempo donde la distancia de paso real y calculada estén muy próximas.

2025

Aircraft that operate in a "hot" zone, under the simultaneous threat of several missiles, need to have technologies that effectively integrate evasive maneuvers, interference (Electronic Countermeasures or ECM), decoys (chaff, flares, ...), etc .; that provide advantages over the superior maneuverability of the missiles. In this context, it is clear that the missile is superior to the airplane in terms of maneuverability and thrust-to-weight ratio, with the aircraft attacked having resources that compensate for this superior maneuverability. With a cost much lower than the current combat aircraft, the missiles pose a very important threat to the crews, being necessary the development of strategies about how an aircraft can make an effective and effective defense against missile. In this way, the theory of control applied to the determination of optimal maneuvers of an aircraft that has been illuminated by a missile, aims to provide technical support to the decision-making process of the pilot of the aircraft.

2025, World Affairs

South Asia is locked in several disputes. The nuclear curtain, which was lifted from the subcontinent at the end of the twentieth century, has made it more fragile and one of the “most dangerous places on Earth”. The aspiration for nuclear weapons has resulted in competition between India and Pakistan along with China, characterised by the action–reaction spiral. Security experts argue that the nuclear arms competition in South Asia is a classic case of the security dilemma. Arms acquisitions are rising along competitive lines, as countries purchase defence systems in reaction to the policies and procurements of neighbours. This paper studies the expanding nuclear capabilities and arsenals. It illustrates the arms race in South Asia and gives theoretical explanations for it. In conclusion the author revisits various implications of missile development between the two neighbours in the security context of South Asia.

2025, The Yellowknifer

Part 2 of my three-part series, Making the Arctic Great Again? in The Yellowknifer.

2025, 112/20024

The need for autonomous missile defence in the EU in the face of growing ballistic and cruise missile threats is analysed, highlighting Europe's current dependence on the US and NATO, mainly due to the lack of its own satellite-based early-warning system. In this context, Germany is promoting the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), a missile shield relient on US and Israeli systems, sparking tensions with France, which advocates for autonomy and brings its nuclear deterrent into the strategic discussion.
The article details the capabilities needed for a missile defence shield, highlighting the importance of satellite-based early detection. While the US has advanced systems such as SBIRS, which will be enhanced by Next-Generation OPIR, the EU lacks a similar capability and faces financial and technological difficulties in developing a system of its own. Europe's TWISTER and ODIN's EYE II, HYDEF and HYDIS projects, still at an early stage, aim to create an early-warning satellite system and new interceptors, although they are not expected to be operational in the short term.
Financing these developments is a major challenge, with options such as joint debt issuance being considered. The EU must decide how to strengthen its defence and space industries, reduce its dependence on certain allies, and operate within constrained budgetary resources, with space-based early-warning capabilities being essential to achieving strategic autonomy in the defence sphere.